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Introduction 
 With apologies to Wendell Berry, the Civil War was an agricultural act.1  The 
secession crisis and war were born of the dispute over an agricultural labor system, and our 
culture has oversimplified the conflict as one between the industrial Northern states and the 
agrarian Southern states.  The war changed agriculture in both regions as civilians fought to 
feed their families and the respective armies in the field, as well as manage with the loss of 
labor due to military enlistment.  In an era when combat required large open spaces for the 
mobilization of armies, fighting scarred the agricultural landscape from Pennsylvania and 
Virginia to Arkansas and Georgia.  To understand the causes and effects of the Civil War, 
agriculture serves as one of the best lenses available to the historian. 
 William Tecumseh Sherman’s Savannah Campaign in November, 1864, remembered 
as the March to the Sea, is the ultimate expression of the war’s interaction with agriculture.  
While historians have long discussed the campaign’s effects on the transportation 
infrastructure and collective psychology of the South, the mantra of destruction glosses over 
agriculture in many cases.  Foraging, the army’s main interaction with Georgia’s farms and 
plantations, gleaned the wealth of the land from the storehouses and sheds of the state, and 
yet the act of foraging and the Union soldier’s understanding of the Southern agricultural 
landscape often falls into anecdotal discussion while authors and historians write about other 
aspects of the campaign.   Agriculture played the central role in the planning and execution 
of the March to the Sea.  If Sherman had been wrong about the wealth of Georgia’s 
agricultural resources, history would remember the Savannah Campaign as a failed 
                                                            
1 Wendell Berry, “The Pleasures of Eating” The Art of the Commonplace: The Agrarian Essays of Wendell 
Berry edited by Norman Wirzba (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press, 2002) page 321. 
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expedition, an incident similar to Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow.  But Sherman was not 
wrong; he is not remembered for leading an army to its destruction, but rather for helping to 
usher modern warfare, the warfare of annihilation as historian Russell Weigley described in 
The American Way of War, into the American lexicon.2 
 My interest in the March to the Sea and agriculture comes from family history.  While 
in high school I met a distant relative who researched genealogy.  Through her, I learned that 
I had a relative who fought in the Union Army during the Civil War, and that he took part in 
the campaign.  From that point forward, my study of the conflict concentrated on the western 
theater of the war.  With only a name and regiment to start with, I wanted to learn as much as 
I could about the war experience of my ancestor specifically, and Iowa’s soldiers more 
generally.  I have never seen a picture of my ancestor, and the only written account of his 
surface that I have found is at best an example of the flawed nature of human memory, but 
James Donaldson has steered my historical imagination and my research interests, including 
agricultural history.  Ultimately, my work in agricultural history and Civil War studies my 
many year effort to better understand the life of one soldier. 
 This dissertation came about because of my independent reading.  While free reading 
time can be non-existent in graduate school, I have tried to improve my time when I could 
find it.  After finishing my master’s thesis and while casting about for dissertation research, I 
began reading Noah Andre Trudeau’s Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea at night.  
After fifteen years of researching the Civil War, I encountered something that piqued my 
combined research interests.  Fifty-two pages into Southern Storm, for the first time that I 
                                                            
2 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), pages 150-152. 
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could remember, Trudeau laid out the agricultural importance of Sherman’s March to the 
Sea.  “He utilized a map prepared by the Department of the Interior that displayed the 
Georgia counties he wished to traverse, over which he hand wrote livestock and crop 
production from information he found in the 1860 census.”3  For some reason, this was the 
first time that I saw a clear intersection between agriculture and the March to the Sea.  
Successful foraging was reliant on the state of Georgia’s agriculture, and it was so much 
more than just a supplemental action to the destruction of railroads and moving to Savannah.  
Foraging provided the central dialogue for the Savannah Campaign; as such, to understand 
the success of the campaign, it is essential to understand the agriculture of the state of 
Georgia. 
 The only real discussion of this topic appears in the work of Lisa Brady and Mark 
Grimsley.  Both rely on the use of the term chevauchée to explain the campaigns that Grant 
and his subordinates pursued in both theaters of the war beginning in 1863.  Last used in the 
fifteenth century during the Hundred Years’ War, the chevauchée was a combined supply 
raid and terror campaign, focused on wreaking havoc, burning, and pillaging enemy territory 
to reduce the productivity of a region, as opposed to siege warfare or wars of conquest.  
While this term is an apt description for Sherman’s march through Georgia, I have been 
unable to find evidence of a direct historical influence that links the tactics of fourteenth and 
fifteenth century warfare and the events of the American Civil War nearly four hundred years 
later.  However, I agree that Sherman’s grand campaign does share certain tenets, including 
the denial of assets to the enemy through foraging, as well as the psychological aspects of the 
                                                            
3 Noah Andre Trudeau, Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea (New York: Harper Collins, 2008) page 
52. 
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tactic.  The March to the Sea was a punitive campaign, meant to punish Georgians for 
supporting a rebellion against the government of the United States, as well as delivering 
proof that the power of the Union Army could be brought to bear with impunity wherever it 
saw fit as a means of ending the war.4  
 The struggle for the meaning of the March to the Sea has endured into the twenty-first 
century.  Mark Grimsley viewed the campaign as a punitive raid, but he also noted that the 
soldiers who marched across Georgia looked upon the movement as a non-event, an 
unopposed march between points of operation.5  When Sherman penned his memoirs, he 
shared the view that Grimsley attributed to the enlisted men under the General’s command.  
“I only regarded the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a ‘shift of base,’” Sherman wrote, 
“as the transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finished its then work, 
from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve other important 
results.  I considered this march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war.  
Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as something extraordinary, 
something anomalous, something out of the usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply 
moved from Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, a movement that 
had to be met and defeated, or the war was necessarily at an end.”6  After the war, the 
Savannah Campaign was of little importance in the General’s mind, and Sherman 
downplayed the importance of the work for which history has remembered him.  He even 
                                                            
4 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pages 190-191; Lisa M. Brady, “The Wilderness of War: Nature and 
Strategy in the American Civil War” Environmental History 10 (July, 2005) page 428. 
5 Grimsley, 203. 
6 William Tecumseh Sherman, The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Volume II (New York: Literary 
Classics of America, 1990) page 697. 
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went so far as to rate the Savannah campaign as a “one” in importance, ranking the march 
north through the Carolinas as ten times more important to the outcome of the war. 7 
 This work approaches the complex set of circumstances that combined to allow the 
Savannah Campaign to take place.  Chapters one and two act as literature reviews in many 
ways.  The first chapter discusses the changes in the nature of Georgia’s agriculture that the 
secession crisis and the onset of war brought about.  Secession created the impetus for 
Georgia’s farmers and planters to turn away from commodity cotton production in order to 
concentrate on the cultivation of food staples after the loss of Northern market access.  
Southern agricultural change was framed in patriotism.  Georgia’s planters and farmers 
succeeded in transforming a rich cash crop production area into the breadbasket of the 
Confederacy, an act which would bear grave consequences in the fall of 1864. 
 The second chapter reviews the change in Federal war policy through the course of 
the war.  Sherman’s march to the sea was inconceivable to the American military in 1861; 
governmental policy towards civilians in the various theaters of operation changed drastically 
between the fall of Fort Sumter in April, 1861, and the spring of 1864.  The evolution of the 
army’s approach to interacting with non-combatants developed because of Northern 
impatience with a prolonged war.  Ultimately, the government abandoned a conciliatory 
approach, a slower-paced form of warfare favored by Generals Winfield Scott and George 
McClellan, in favor of the development of a “hard war” concept that General U.S. Grant first 
utilized during the siege of Vicksburg, which emphasized bringing the war home to the 
Southern civilian, including the use of foraging for food as a weapon of war. 
                                                            
7 Ibid. 
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 The combination of the change in agriculture and war policy created the opportunity 
for William Tecumseh Sherman to pursue the Savannah Campaign after the fall of Atlanta.  
Chapter three discusses the process of planning the campaign.  The march to the sea was an 
unorthodox maneuver by design, with a planned disconnection from any base of supply.  
Sherman used a copy of the newly published agricultural census from 1860 to lay out his 
army’s path as it wove its way across Georgia, satisfied in his knowledge that Georgia’s 
untapped agricultural resources could provide the food and forage necessary to keep his men 
alive as they moved on Savannah. 
 During the march, some of the men of Sherman’s army kept detailed diaries that 
noted the state of farming and the environment around them.  The fourth chapter uses those 
diaries to better understand the way soldiers from the Midwest encountered Georgia’s 
agricultural landscape.  How did Sherman’s Midwestern soldiers evaluate the agricultural 
landscape they encountered in Georgia?  We know now that Sherman and his soldiers found 
a bounty of food as they went through Georgia, but what did the men of the western army say 
about the farms they saw and the food they took?  I have chosen to avoid the discussion of 
soldiers in urban areas, concentrating on those accounts left to history that describe rural 
Georgia and the farmscape these men laid waste. 
 Chapter five investigates the March to the Sea from the point of view of the women 
who faced down Sherman’s army.  While the voice of the planter class weighs heavily on the 
chapter, it works well to illustrate the chaos and violence that the women of rural Georgia 
faced when the army came to their doors.  The war had already taken a hard toll on the 
women of Georgia, forcing them to take on tasks such as farm management and labor on a 
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greater scale than prior to the war.  Now, alone in the face of an invading army, their diaries 
grant an insight as to how they dealt with Union soldiers as they took over their lands and 
households, and how foraging directly affected their lives.  The work then concludes with an 
analysis of Georgia’s agricultural recovery and the soldiers’ commentary on what they saw 
and accomplished during the March to the Sea, as well as a discussion of the memory of the 
Savannah campaign. 
 Foraging represented the ultimate interaction between Union tactical doctrine and 
Southern agriculture.  This work views Sherman’s March to the Sea through the lens of 
agriculture.  Rather than discuss foraging as one of the myriad tales of destruction that arose 
from the Savannah Campaign, I view the foraging of Georgia’s farms as the central theme of 
the March to the Sea.  While foraging created short-term damage that is difficult to 
differentiate from the total effects of the loss of the Civil War, it played a crucial role in the 
punitive nature of the campaign.  The act of foraging brought war to the doorstep of 
Georgia’s farms and plantations, and it implied that the operations of Sherman’s army could 
be replicated wherever rebellion still existed within the South.  It ensured the survival of an 
army, the success of a campaign, and the destruction of a people’s will to fight.  Leslie 
Anders began his history of the Twenty-First Missouri with a simple premise.  “It was the 
Union armies west of the Appalachians that struck the death knell of the Confederacy.”8  
That death knell sounded for Georgians when William Tecumseh Sherman’s men brought the 
war into the farmyards and homes along their path to Savannah. 
 
                                                            
8 Leslie Anders, The Twenty-First Missouri: From Home Guard to Union Regiment.  Issue 11 of “Contributions 
in Military History.”  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975) page viii. 
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Chapter One: 
Deposing the Monarch: 
Secession, War, and the Changing Nature of Agriculture in Georgia 
 
 On March 4, 1858, James Hammond, the Democratic Senator from South Carolina, 
stood before his fellow legislators and gave one of the signal speeches of the late Antebellum 
period.  The previous day, Republican Senator William Seward of New York spoke out 
against not only the expansion of slavery into Kansas under the Le Compton Constitution but 
also against the very institution of slavery itself in his remarks about Kansas’s problems 
seeking statehood and the national controversy over slavery and popular sovereignty.  When 
Hammond arose in response, he laid out an argument that moved past Seward’s discussion of 
statehood and the nature of American labor and established the social and economic claims 
that the South as a region could and would survive alone should the need arise because of the 
growing national discord.  Chief among these claims, the only part of Hammond’s speech 
that remains in the American historical imagination, was that “Cotton is king.”9 
 Cotton was king in 1858.  It remained so until the outbreak of conflict three years 
later.  The Southern cotton crop accounted for nearly sixty percent of American exports.  It 
fueled the factories of Europe and the industrial towns of the American North.  Cotton built 
financial empires and fueled a Southern agricultural empire that eschewed industrialization 
and even the growth of subsistence crops in the name of prosperity.  To make an attack on 
slavery and Southern society such as Seward’s was to make war on cotton and the financial 
prosperity of the United States itself.  As Hammond stated in the spring of 1858,  
                                                            
9 William Seward, Freedom in Kansas.: Speech of William H. Seward, in the Senate of the United States, March 
3, 1858.  (Washington: Buell & Blanchard, Printers, 1858); Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the 
Hon. James H. Hammond, of South Carolina (New York: John F. Trow & Co., 1866), 317.  The emphasis is 
Hammond’s. 
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Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us we could 
bring the whole world to our feet. . . . What would happen if no cotton was furnished 
for three years? I will not stop to depict what every one can imagine, but this is 
certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, 
save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton.10 
 As an economic weapon and as a symbol of regional might, the people of the South 
could choose no better icon than the cotton plant.  It represented not only economic might, 
and a strangle-hold on the nascent industrialization of the Western world, but also a potent 
symbol of every aspect of Southern society.  It stood for a controversial and immoral labor 
system, a social caste system built upon that system of chattel slavery, and the political 
power used in state capitols as well as the nation’s capitol in the name of the economic 
domination wielded by one region of the country.  And that power was expanding.  In the 
twenty years preceding the secession of the Southern states, cotton production nearly doubled 
in areas of the South.  In 1860, Mississippi alone produced more than 1.2 million bales of 
ginned cotton, or nearly five million pounds of the fleecy substance, two and a half times as 
much as it produced a decade earlier.  Georgia, fourth in cotton production when compared 
to its sister states, still produced nearly 702,000 bales of cotton in 1860, an increase of more 
than two hundred thousand bales from 1850.  Mississippi led the entire South in cotton 
production, and the South led the world.11 
 The use of cotton as an economic weapon reflected the belief that the United States 
was too reliant on the financial benefits of its major export crop, as well as Europe’s 
desperate need for Southern cotton to maintain the operation of its factories and mills.12  The 
                                                            
10 Hammond, ibid. 
11 Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Superintendent of Census, Agriculture of the United States in 1860, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1864), xciv. 
12 Willard Range, A Century of Georgia Agriculture, 1850-1950 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954), 
34. 
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Confederate government called upon the patriotism of citizens to create an artificial cotton 
famine, withholding current stores from the market as well as abstaining from planting while 
the crisis existed.  Such an action would not only injure the industrial base of the Northern 
states, it would also expedite European recognition of the Southern states as an independent 
nation in order to reopen markets and bolster the economic houses of England and France.  
Additionally, the move away from cotton production would promote the cultivation of food 
staples to feed the people and the army after the loss of Northern trade partners in the 
Northwestern states.13  Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan initially aided the Southern plan for a 
cotton famine with its planned blockade of disloyal seaports as a means to use economic 
coercion to bring about a relatively peaceful end to the rebellion.14  Yet the attempts at 
producing a cotton famine and forcing the economic hand of those nations that relied on the 
industrial aspects of cotton failed from nearly the beginning.  Due to the record setting crops 
produced in 1859 and 1860, Northern textile mills had been able to set aside warehouses full 
of cotton prior to the closure of Southern ports; coupled with the development of cotton 
production in areas such as Egypt, Brazil, and India, foreign exports to American mills as 
well as the mills of Europe kept factories open and negated the impact of loss of American 
cotton.15  And, Southern secessionists overlooked the role of Northern skilled labor in their 
factories and port cities, labor that left the South in the weeks and months after Fort Sumter. 
For all that cotton and the other Southern commodity crops symbolized, and for all 
that the explosive increase in cotton production represented, there was one major problem 
                                                            
13 Ibid., 37. 
14 Ibid., 25. 
15 Range, 46.  See also Paul W. Gates, Agriculture and the Civil War.  The Impact of the Civil War Series, 
Allan Nevins, editor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 13.  Range provides a nine point analysis of the 
ineffectiveness of the Confederate cotton famine on page 45 of his book. 
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that cotton could not solve: man could not eat cotton.  Georgia, the self-proclaimed “Empire 
State of the South,” was the most diverse producer in the region. Farmers and planters there 
cultivated every staple commodity and food crop found in the region, and while it did not 
lead in the production of many of these items, the farmers and planters of Georgia worked to 
raise the most diverse selection of agricultural commodities and food staples in the region.  
But the large-scale cultivation of cotton curtailed food production at the plantation level and 
limited the amount of food at the yeoman and tenant farming levels due to economic 
necessity.16  As cotton culture became more profitable in Georgia following improvements in 
shipping infrastructure and processing technology, larger farmers and planters turned 
increasingly to its production and away from raising food crops for domestic consumption.  
As a result Georgia and the South as a whole became economically connected to the Midwest 
for the importation of basic food stuffs like wheat, corn, and livestock.17  Only the Upcountry 
section in the northern portion of the state, most recently opened after the Cherokee removal 
and with scarce transportation resources connecting it to marketing centers, continued to 
operate at a something near a subsistence level of production.  
 The emphasis on cotton and market commodity production meant that Georgia and 
the other Southern states relied on outside resources in order to import foodstuffs.  With the 
rise of sectional hostilities and secession, correspondents in the Southern press immediately 
recognized the dearth of food crops and what it meant for the future of the region.  In January 
                                                            
16 The South’s level of food production is a contentious topic.  All of the secondary authors consulted for this 
study varied greatly in their opinions on that subject.  For counter-examples supporting the possible self-
sufficiency of Southern agriculture, see Robert E. Gallman, “Self-Sufficiency in the Cotton Economy of the 
Antebellum South,” as well as Diane Lindstrom, “Southern Dependence Upon Interregional Grain Supplies: A 
Review of the Trade Flows, 1840-1860.”  Both articles appear in Agricultural History, Volume 44, No. 1.  
(January, 1970).   Gallman’s article appears on pages 5-23, and Lindstrom’s article appears on pages 101-113. 
17 Range, 14. 
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of 1861, the Southern Cultivator carried a lengthy editorial about the food emergency that 
loomed just over the horizon.  While the Fire-Eaters and those pushing for military 
operations to secure the independence of the South preached the need for guns and the 
munitions of war, the editor bemoaned the lack of subsistence crops produced in Georgia.   
The State of Georgia has not now grain enough within her limits to feed her 
population and domestic animals until the gathering of the next crop.  It is presumed 
that the rest of the Cotton States are in similar condition.  Last year we obtained our 
supplies from the North-west. . . . The subject is worthy of the immediate attention of 
the authorities of the Plantation States.18 
The writer stated bluntly that while the drought and poor weather conditions of 1860 were in 
part to blame for the lack of food crops in Georgia’s storehouses, the full weight of blame fell 
squarely on the shoulders of a self-proclaimed agrarian society that chose to concentrate its 
powers of production on the cultivation of market crops rather than concern itself with 
growing enough food to feed a society.  The editor summed up his argument in such a way as 
to leave little doubt about the state of the food production of Georgia before secession.  “The 
deficiency is then a natural result of our system of Agriculture.  We are presenting in 
Georgia, at this moment, the anomalous spectacle of a people having upwards of twenty 
millions of dollars worth of the earth’s products for sale, yet requiring a large proportion of 
the results of sale to buy the common necessaries of life, which are also the products of the 
soil!” 19  In the same issue, a correspondent known only as “J.” also bemoaned the state of 
Southern dependence on the other agricultural regions of the United States in the name of 
cotton and the economic prosperity it reputedly brought with its production.  
                                                            
18 Southern Cultivator, XIX: 1 (January, 1861): 10 
19 Ibid. 
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The South is emphatically an Agricultural community.  With regard to the products of 
the soil, there can be no excuse for dependence.  The absurdity of our importing Hay 
from Maine, Irish Potatoes from Nova Scotia, Apples from Massachusetts, Butter and 
Cheese from New York, Flour and Pork from Ohio, or Beef from Illinois, is apparent 
at a glance.  The Connecticut Yankees might with as much propriety take to the 
cultivation of Cotton and Sweet Potatoes, and send to South Carolina for their 
timepieces and to Georgia for a supply of wooden nutmegs.”20 
 While historians have attempted to reconstruct the South’s ability to feed itself 
through the use of statistics, and some claim that the region was self-sufficient, the voices of 
those who lived in the region in 1861 show clearly that they feared the loss of foodstuffs 
from Northern markets that came with secession.  Including the two articles mentioned 
previously, the Southern Cultivator published thirty-five articles in 1861 alone that raised the 
alarm of food shortages in the newly formed Confederacy.  Writers from every state that 
seceded prior to the fall of Fort Sumter called for a renewal of Southern agriculture to feed 
the people of the region following the loss of Northern commodities.  The Washington 
County, Georgia, Central Georgian laid bare why farmers and planters lagged behind in 
staple production.  “For some time past, we (individually) have been purchasing Western 
corn, which cost us one dollar per bushel – twenty-five cents cheaper than we could purchase 
it from our own countrymen.  Georgia can never be independent until she raises her own corn 
and pork.”21  In an April letter to the editor, G. D. Harmon of Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana, 
bemoaned how few of their own needs the agriculturists of the region actually met.  “We 
have so long bought Cincinnati and Western pork, worked Western mules, used Northern 
Agricultural implements and Gin stands, planted Northern fruit trees, and wore Northern 
goods, that it has almost become second nature with us to look away from ourselves for 
                                                            
20 Ibid.,15.   
21 “Plant Provision Crops.”  Originally published in the Central Georgian, date unknown, and reprinted in 
Southern Cultivator, XIX:2 (February, 1861), 67. 
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everything except the raw article of Cotton, and Corn bread.”22  The editors of the Cultivator 
quoted the Cincinnati Enquirer in March, showing that even those in the North recognized 
the state of Southern farming.  “Heretofore, the Cotton, Rice, and Sugar States have found it 
to be more profitable to cultivate those staples to the exclusion of all products and depend 
upon the North-west for Corn, Pork, Flour, etc.  That was a matter of choice, not of 
necessity.”23   
 The statesmen of the South and those who most loudly pushed for regional 
separation saw that King Cotton would be the great savior of the nascent Confederate states.  
Cotton was the great national export of the United States, the commodity that fueled the 
plantations of Georgia and Mississippi as well as the textile and shipping industries of New 
England.  Who would make war on the South if it meant the loss of the one great export that 
fueled so many economic markets?  In the popular imagination of the cotton states, the loss 
of the great Southern crop meant that factories in both the industrial North and Europe faced 
shut downs due to the shortage of raw materials, in turn causing labor unrest and massive 
unemployment.  Farmers in the Northwest and the rest of the North would lose their main 
regional markets and encounter economic ruin with no outlet for their crops and livestock.  
Shipping interests in New England would stand idle with no cargo in the holds of their ships.  
Nationally and internationally, the power of cotton as a vital commodity would create a 
clamor such as to ensure the recognition of the South, thereby diverting any crisis. 
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While the vocal proponents of Southern agrarianism and secession touted the region’s 
ability to stand alone, others across the breakaway states, including the government in 
Richmond, worked to prevent the possibility of famine and shortage that lay in the wake of 
cutting ties with the Mississippi Valley and the Northwestern states.  Long reliant on trade 
with the agricultural North in order to not just supplement but also to supply the nutritional 
needs of its slave and free populations, secession created a crisis of food acquisition as early 
as the spring of 1861.  Historian John Otto rightly places Georgia’s farmers in the midst of a 
global market economy; the South bodily felt the hardships from the loss of that global 
market economy when it became removed from it through its own actions, as well as actions 
imposed by others.24  Prior to secession, the planters of Georgia relied heavily on trade with 
the upper Mississippi Valley as well as trade along the Ohio River corridor to provide the 
majority of the foodstuffs they consumed.  While farmers in the Northwest relied upon 
Southern production of sugar, rice, tobacco and other products, the people of Georgia in turn 
depended upon the interregional trade network for grain, livestock, fruit, dairy products, and 
a host of other food staples.  One historian has estimated that up to one half of the pork 
produced in the upper Mississippi Valley in 1860 went south to support the food needs of the 
region.25  In short, the South valued interaction with the global market economy so heavily 
that it relied on other American regions to produce the food it needed to survive; Georgia’s 
planters found it more cost effective to pay more for food brought in from outside its borders 
than to remove land from commodity production to cultivate its own staples.  Indeed, from a 
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market economy perspective, the loss of Southern buyers for Midwestern crops brought a 
short-lived recession to farmers in the upper Mississippi region that was only resolved with 
increased European trade and a redirection of trade routes via the railroad to the East Coast.26 
The maintenance of pre-established trade networks along the rivers of America’s 
heartland and the provender it allowed the people of the South weighed heavily on the minds 
of the region’s leaders.  Free navigation of American waterways had long been a tenet of 
trade and interregional relations.  Cutting off free navigation of the Mississippi and ending 
the trade relationships that provided food to the people of the South could potentially bring 
about the end of Southern independence faster than any military might the Union states could 
muster.  To these ends the Confederate Congress moved quickly to maintain any normalized 
relations it could with the agricultural North.  In February and April of 1861 that body passed 
two separate yet nearly identical resolutions calling for the duty-free passage of specified 
products into the borders of the rebellious territories.  The roster of duty-free products read 
like the grocery list that in fact it was.  In essence, the agricultural produce of the upper 
Mississippi Valley, the staples that were the backbone of the American diet, were to be 
allowed into the Southern Confederacy without fear of protective taxation.  This was not 
simply an attempt by the Southern states to stave off the specter of starvation while southern 
farmers brought the cultivation of foodstuffs up to speed; the legislation was a vain endeavor 
to reinforce some form of friendly relations with the Northwest, an area that outwardly 
shared few ties with the Yankee North.27 Should the South and Northwest reinforce 
financially important trade networks following secession, there existed a hope within the 
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South that a divided nation would further fracture, thereby preventing war and ensuring 
Confederate independence.  Ultimately the legislation was of no avail.  With the enactment 
of the Federal blockade of the South along its entire boundary prior to the passage of the 
second duty-free act, any attempt to import food was preordained to failure.28  To feed the 
people of the South, let alone prosecute what many now called a war for independence, the 
people of Georgia and the region as a whole now faced the reality of reforming the very 
nature of agricultural production by returning it to a position of regional self-reliance.29  
Cotton brought about the secession crisis and war, but corn would win it. 
Throughout the region, the press called attention to the new patriotic role of farmers 
in the face of separation and possible war.  The patriotic farmer and planter would cast aside 
the old modes of commodity agriculture in the name of cultivating food crops to feed both 
the people of the South as a whole as well as the grey-clad armies struggling for freedom.30  
The Columbus, Georgia, Sun stated plainly that the corn equaled freedom, while the South 
“will be powerless against grim hunger and gaunt famine, such as will overwhelm us if we 
insanely raise Cotton instead of corn.”31  Even the grand jury seated in Macon County, 
Georgia, issued a statement on the importance of agriculture in the coming conflict, echoing 
the calls of the revolutionary generation to practice non-importation and self-sufficiency in 
the time of crisis:   
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It behooves us all to avert the evil that might befall our young Confederacy in the way 
of provisions by planting three or four times as much corn, peas, potatoes, rice, sugar 
cane, all sorts of vegetables, as we have ever before planted.  In short, that we plant 
no cotton, except what we want to spin and weave at home, that we pay more 
attention to stock of all kinds and have them fat and fine, especially the pigs, calves 
and lambs, that we make our own clothes at home, tan our own leather and make our 
own shoes – make our own hats and weave our own blankets.32 
And so the clarion call went out to Southern agriculture; the citizen farmer best 
expressed his patriotism and loyalty to the new Confederate government was by growing 
food crops, and the chief food crop was corn.  King Cotton was to be deposed in favor of 
Prince Corn.  Officials and editors across the region urged farmers across the South to 
increase production of food staples, and these calls to action continued throughout the war; 
following the territorial losses of much of Virginia, Tennessee and Texas, the pressure to 
produce more food fell heaviest on Georgia, where the only major area of Federal incursion 
was around Fort Pulaski on the Atlantic coast.  While famine and destruction came to the 
other states of the Confederacy, Georgia turned its cotton fields to a bounty of food 
production.  Throughout the state farmers worked to diversify their production to include 
more and more corn, wheat, livestock, and other table crops in support of the civilian and 
military staple markets.33  A corn crop was patriotism manifest; those planters and farmers 
who chose to continue planting cotton faced public disdain for pursuing profit over the need 
for food in times of crisis.34 
The agrarian shift to increased food production in the war-time South concentrated on 
two long-time staples that typified the diet of not just the South, but rural America as a 
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whole.  Corn and pork, hog and hominy, were the mainstays of much of America’s diet in the 
nineteenth century.  Typically found on dinner tables in regions on the frontiers of society as 
well as a dietary mainstay of rural areas, hog and hominy found resurgence in the austerity of 
wartime dining across the South.35  Cornbread, a culinary mainstay of the rural poor, found 
its way back to the dining rooms of the wealthy across the region with the loss of wheat 
imported from the North as well the loss of the wheat-producing areas of the Confederacy.36  
But corn was necessary to the Southern cause beyond the bread pan; corn fattened hogs and 
cattle that provided the other main nutritional components of the diet of farmer, clerk, and 
soldier alike, as well as meeting the needs of the draft animals that moved both commercial 
and military vehicles.  The average person in the South consumed approximately thirteen 
bushels of corn per year either directly in its native form or as animal flesh.  Comparatively, 
horses and mules put away seven and a half bushels of corn directly as feed grain every year, 
and hogs ate four bushels of the grain annually.37  Corn in all of its forms was both a military 
and civil necessity. 
Corn’s place on the tables of the Deep South also rose from environmental factors.  
Georgians tended to import more wheat from Virginia, Tennessee, or the states of the 
Northwest than they cultivated.38  With an annual rainfall of approximately forty inches per 
year, Georgia possessed an adverse climate for the production of wheat, which preferred 
drier climates with fewer than thirty inches of rain per year.39  With an ever-decreasing arable 
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territory, and those territorial losses coming in the wheat producing areas of the upper south, 
wheat became a much scarcer staple in Confederate larders.  As an example, some forecasted 
wheat production in 1863 to bring forth 2.5 million bushels of grain.  Farmers and planters 
required twenty percent of that crop, half a million bushels, to seed the crop for 1864; only 
two million bushels of wheat was left to meet the bread needs of both civilians and an army 
in the field.  Clearly wheat flour was an unsustainable portion of the secessionist menu, and 
corn products, often seen as a primitive form of frontier food by the planter class, became 
much more important regionally.40 
It is hard to quantify increases in corn production in any of the Confederate States 
during the war.  The only reliable statistics available to use as a benchmark are the 
production numbers for the 1859 crop year recorded in Schedule IV, the agriculture section 
of the 1860 U.S. census.  In that year, farmers in the state of Georgia reported a crop of 
30,776,293 bushels; the South as a whole produced 282,626,778 bushels of corn in 1859.  In 
comparison, Illinois produced 115,174,777 bushels of corn, Tennessee claimed 52,089,926 
bushels, and the state of Iowa cultivated 42,410,686 bushels of corn in the same year.41  
Historian John Solomon Otto estimated that the average laborer in Georgia, free or enslaved, 
could produce approximately thirty acres of corn with an average yield of seventeen bushels 
per acre, as compared with the eight acres of cotton one laborer could cultivate in a single 
season.  With optimal corn production anticipated at almost five hundred bushels of corn per 
farm in the pre-war period, the change of emphasis in agriculture to promote food crop 
cultivation more than likely equated to a significant increase in corn output, if farmers and 
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planters actually stopped growing cotton.42  The amount of corn produced in the peaceful 
year of 1859 clearly illustrated how important corn was to the Southern diet and economy 
prior to the call for agricultural collusion with secession and rebellion.43 
Amid calls for an increase in the production of garden crops such as peas, beans, the 
ubiquitous sweet potato, and pumpkins for consumption by soldiers and at home, accounts 
began to circulate in the press as early as the spring of 1861 that the number of acres planted 
to corn jumped by fifty percent.44  In the spring of the following year, the Southern 
Cultivator declared that farmers planted more than five million Confederate acres of corn and 
other grain crops.  Without interference and the loss of arable territory, the corn yield alone 
would stand near fifty-five million bushels, nearly double to crop of 1861.  Conversely, an 
article in the same issue claimed that cotton production dropped at least a million bales from 
the benchmark of 1860.45  One editor estimated in March of 1863 that the farms of Georgia 
and the other Southern states needed to produce four hundred and eighty million bushels of 
corn in order to meet the needs for human consumption, both as corn meal as well as feed for 
meat animals, as well as feed for draft animals.  This would culminate in a seventy percent 
increase in the production of corn.46  According to statistics published in the Memphis 
Appeal, corn production in the Confederacy topped out at three hundred and fifty million 
bushels of corn in 1863, well below the stated need of the Confederate States as estimated 
that same year.  However, by harvest season of 1863, the South had lost much of Tennessee’s 
and Virginia’s best agricultural land to advancing Union armies.  The article showed a 
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marked increase in Southern production of corn, wheat, and potatoes, all critical staple crops, 
but there is no way to actually verify the numbers printed in the Appeal.  While numbers 
provide a benchmark for estimating the increases in production in the face of the loss of 
normal supply markets, without a way to validate the production estimates provided by the 
Southern press, a number of reasons come to mind that prevent using the numbers as a 
serious means of measuring the agricultural output of the beleaguered Confederacy.47 
Not every planter actually took his nation’s interests to heart over the best interests of 
his pocketbook.  Almost as quickly as the calls for increased corn production went out across 
Georgia and the rest of the South, reports of the continued cultivation of cotton began to echo 
across the Confederacy.  Rumors abounded that some farmers and planters were planting 
corn where visible from the road, only to screen the production of cotton in the center of their 
fields.  A small group of planters throughout Georgia and the other Cotton States declared 
they needed to maintain some semblance of cotton production, not only to supply the fiber 
needs of the Confederacy, but also to keep a viable stock of cotton seed.  Once the war ended 
Southerners would need seed to supply the European markets when they once again begged 
for the crop that fueled the productive capacity of their factories.  Some larger planters, 
personified by Georgia’s Robert Toombs, the noted secessionist and Southern politician, 
continued to produce bumper crops of cotton, no matter how loudly the public cried out 
against their unpatriotic activities.  If the Southern Confederacy was established on the 
property rights of individual, as well as in opposition to the strong-handed legislation of a 
central government, these purists felt that the private citizen had every right to produce any 
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crops he chose for the market.  Other charges went out in the press that those who produced a 
combination of cotton and food crops were using the freshest, fortified soils for the 
production of cotton for the market while utilizing older, exhausted soils to cultivate corn for 
the government tithes and the support of the general welfare.48 
The other pillar on which secession relied upon to rebuild the agricultural base of the 
South was animal husbandry.  The United States as a whole and the South as a region had 
long relied on some variation of common field open grazing, where agriculturists fenced their 
fields in to prevent damage from livestock that were allowed to roam free and fend for 
themselves on mast, the dried nuts of various trees such as acorns, hickory nuts, and the like,  
and native grasses until such time as they were needed, such as herding hogs in the fall in 
order to fatten them on corn prior to slaughter.  In the cotton portion of the state, south of the 
mountains and below the fall line, plantation-style agriculture allowed for open ranging of 
livestock on private lands; above the fall line, in the Georgia upcountry where poorer soils 
unfit for cotton and commodity tended to limit farm size, smallhold farmers practiced 
common right to unfenced lands on a larger scale.49  The state of Georgia helped enforce this 
custom through its Stock Law, designed to limit and define a farmer’s right to sue for 
damages to crops done by roaming livestock.  Fences must be kept at a minimum height of 
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five feet and properly maintained; only then could a farmer sue the owner of any cattle or 
hogs that broke through a field’s perimeter and damaged the enclosed crops.50   
While the common field system of grazing benefited farmers and planters by 
lessening the amount of time required handling and managing their stock, it also had a 
negative effect on animal husbandry in the South.  Livestock outside of the daily 
management of the farm tended to be of poorer quality.  Farmers and planters saw animal 
husbandry as secondary in importance to field crops, and especially the marketable 
commodity of cotton.  Therefore, they gave little thought and effort to the improvement of 
herd bloodlines and the general quality of animals.51  The results can be seen in the 
description of Southern livestock.  Solon Robinson, one of America’s preeminent agricultural 
writers of the nineteenth century, described cattle in the South as small and “scrubby.”  
While Georgia’s cattle production ranked second only to the famed beef production of Texas, 
common pasturage without intensive management resulted in smaller cattle, lean and bony 
with lower meat and milk production to the point that on average they dressed out after 
slaughter at between four hundred and six hundred pounds in an era when Robinson and 
other writers pushed America’s farmers to produce fat cattle.52  With the loss of the regional 
trade that normally brought in Northern hay to feed cattle in lean times, crafty farmers 
attempted to substitute crab grass as fodder with little benefit.53  Beef remained of secondary 
importance in the South, however.  Even at a smaller size, six hundred pounds of meat from 
one animal was more than one farmer could preserve satisfactorily.  The upper classes of the 
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South usually consumed beef fresh; beef played a significantly smaller role in the culinary 
rotation of the average small farmer who slaughtered perhaps one to two beeves a year.54 
The admonitions against Georgia’s hogs were even more pointed, despite their status 
as the nation’s signature meat supplier.  If cotton was king of the fields, pork was “king of 
the table,” outpacing in importance any other form of animal protein available.55  In the 
February, 1860, Godey’s Lady’s Book, John S. Wilson’s “Health Department” held forth on 
the importance of the hog to the American table, calling the South the “Republic of Porkdom 
. . . for in many parts of this region, so far as meat is concerned, it is fat bacon and pork, fat 
bacon and pork only, and that continually morning, noon, and night, for all classes, sexes, 
ages, and conditions . . .hogs’ lard is the very oil that moves the machinery of life, and they 
would as soon think of disposing with tea, coffee, [or] tobacco . . . as with the essence of 
hog.”56  Pork ruled the American diet, with occasional inclusions of beef.  Sam Hilliard 
estimated the annual per capita consumption of pork by Southern whites at approximately 
one hundred and fifty pounds; the enslaved population of the South received between two 
and one half and five pounds of pork in their weekly rations, or between one hundred and 
twenty-five and two hundred and fifty pounds annually.  Taking variables of age, location, 
and other items into consideration, Hilliard estimated that the average enslaved adult 
received three and one half pounds of pork per week, with a seasonal and geographic range 
of one hundred and fifty-six to two hundred and sixty pounds of pork consumed per year.57  
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Mutton remained such a rarity on the dinner table that only the upper classes in the South 
consumed it, as the management of sheep was less common on small farms due to the 
fragility of the animal and the close contact required to husband a flock, as compared to the 
open-field system used in large animal production.  Only poultry contributed a viable 
alternate protein for the Southern table in the form of eggs and meat, but it never approached 
the levels of pork.58 
Despite the recognized status of pork as the main meat dish of the Southern table, 
agricultural writers reserved special vitriol for the condition of the common hog.  As with 
other varieties of livestock, there was little concern about improving the blood lines and 
breeding of animals, while the open-field system of grazing allowed agriculturists to limit the 
amount of man-hours dedicated toward herd management.  The downside of this practice was 
that animals of varying quality were part of the available breeding population, to the point 
that there was no real recognizable breed of hog.  Foraging in the woods for mast and 
whatever food they could root out helped to create a hog designed for survival: fast, small in 
size, and in essence a wild animal, rather than a refined breed of domesticated livestock.59  
Southern writers described Georgia’s numerous hogs as “. . . long-headed, long legged, fleet 
footed ‘piney woods rooters’ . . .”, generally small of frame and inferior to animals found on 
Northern farms.60  Additionally, free-ranging sows tended to have smaller litters, usually 
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three to five piglets per birthing, rather than the potentially larger farrowing of up to ten 
offspring per litter in well managed plantation herds.61 
Meat production in Georgia and the rest of the South kept pace with the dietary needs 
of the people theoretically, but in practice still needed support through trade with other 
regions of the country.  The 1860 census recorded more than twenty million hogs present on 
Southern farms in 1859.  Otto estimated that if half of these animals were available for 
slaughter that year, with a potential yield of one hundred and forty pounds of meat per 
animal.  If the average person consumed one hundred and fifty pounds of pork per annum, a 
rather large deficit of pork quickly accumulated.  This deficit reflected the Southern emphasis 
on low-grade management of livestock in favor of the monetary yield of cotton and the 
culinary yield of corn.  The only way to fill this void before secession was interregional 
trade, a method lost to southern farmers by the late spring and early summer of 1861.62  The 
loss of Northern trade was so problematic that L. B. Northrop, the Commissary General in 
charge of subsistence for the Confederate Army, spent the first months of the war attempting 
to stockpile Northern pork in an unsuccessful bid to curtail a pork deficit.  Insufficient 
regional production meant that there was not enough of the Southern staple to meet the needs 
of an army in the field as well as the civilian and slave population on the home front.63  Otto 
estimated a theoretical potential surplus of Southern beef, but this “surplus” was often 
marketed to foreign markets before the war.  This figure dipped dramatically with the loss of 
Texas beef after the fall of New Orleans in April, 1862, and the intensifying presence of the 
Federal navy on Southern waterways, culminating in the loss of Vicksburg in early July, 
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1863. The loss of the Mississippi River cut off Texas beef from Southern larders after the 
summer of 1863.64   
Lack of standard slaughter practices also limited Southern pork production, often 
influenced by the commons system of grazing and irregular feeding patterns.  If the standard 
farming practice in the Midwest and other regions called for the slaughter of hogs after 
approximately one year of growth, Georgia’s farmers often held swine over for a second or 
even third year in order for them to complete the fattening process on a hardscrabble diet of 
forest mast and grasses.  While Otto estimated a yield of one hundred and forty pounds of 
meat per animal, there is no real estimated slaughter weight for hogs available.  The result 
was often a mixture of generations of hogs awaiting slaughter at the same time, with the 
more visionary practitioners of animal husbandry attempting to fatten their swine on corn in 
the final weeks and months before they were transformed into hams, pork shoulders, and 
sausage.65  With the onset of war, pork production failed to meet the needs of the nascent 
Confederacy.  The rapid and continuing loss of territory left Georgia alone as the leading hog 
producer in the rebellion.  Coupled with grain shortages and droughts, hog cholera swept 
through Georgia between 1862 and 1864, cutting deeply into the number of animals available 
for food on all fronts, and the impact of foragers from both armies, the number of hogs in 
Georgia and the other Confederate states continued to decline, leading to a crisis in available 
meat.66 
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Secession and the onset of civil war brought about another change for Southern 
agriculture with much deeper implications for the war effort: the attempt to switch from 
commodity agriculture to subsistence farming.  The number of men required to serve in 
Georgia’s regiments as well as support the Confederate war effort in Georgia’s few industrial 
centers seriously depleted the available pool of labor to manage the change to subsistence 
agriculture.  The loss of enslaved labor through both the impressment of slaves to work on 
the defenses near Savannah and other strategically important cities and the self-emancipation 
of slaves who ran away to Federal-occupied areas of the South magnified the labor issue.67  
John Solomon Otto claimed that the loss of labor actually gave an advantage to food 
production in Georgia; with fewer hands available to begin with, and fewer people needed to 
cultivate food rather than cotton, the potential problem of an excess labor force never came to 
a head, as corn and other subsistence crops required less intensive labor than cotton did.68   
The change in labor became another source of patriotism for Georgians, who called 
upon the spirit of their forebears to inspire the push for home production of goods as the 
Revolutionary generation did with the calls for the non-importation of British goods.  More 
importantly, the meaning of labor itself changed in the era of the Second American 
Revolution.  No longer would Southerners cling tightly to the words of John C. Calhoun, 
who declared in the 1830s that manual labor was below the dignity of any white man, a 
statement long used to justify race-based slavery and the social caste system that evolved in 
the decades prior to secession.69  Labor carried a new dignity, one based in the patriot’s duty 
to see to it that his or her country found independence rooted in a return to the yeoman values 
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of Jefferson while shunning, at least temporarily and publicly, the values of a slaveholding 
aristocracy molded by the image of South Carolina’s fieriest son. 
One challenge to the change in the honor of labor came in the form of changing 
gender roles on the farm.  Whereas large farms and plantations in Georgia’s cotton-producing 
areas were generally far enough from Union lines to prevent large-scale escape attempts, thus 
maintaining a sufficient labor force, areas in the northern half of the state had a long history 
of limited or small scale slave investment.  Coupled with the proximity of Federally-held 
Tennessee acting as a lure to what slaves did live in the region, northern Georgia was 
plagued with a severe loss of farm labor.  More importantly, almost none of the small farms 
in Georgia qualified for the exemption from service under the South’s “twenty slave law,” 
which meant that those farmers did not qualify for draft exemptions based on the number of 
slaves they owned.  These small farmers became the rural draft pool for soldiers, while 
planters with at least twenty slaves were exempt from service.  
The loss of free white labor created a much larger vacuum with fewer resources to 
replace the sons and husbands that enlisted in the armies of the Confederacy, be it through 
free enlistment or conscription.70  This left women, the elderly, and the infirm to handle the 
task of managing the farm.  The onus of this change fell hardest on women, although class 
did mitigate how deeply the struggles of war on the home front were felt.  The wives of the 
planter class suffered the loss of a standard of living they once enjoyed, often using this as a 
symbol of patriotism, although the loss of accustomed social status and the luxuries that went 
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with that status did not rival the losses felt by women of the yeoman South.71  Additionally, 
the circumstances of war forced some women of the planter elite to assume the management 
of their familial lands and the slaves that formed the basis of their power and wealth.  This 
challenged the paternalistic ideals of the South, both through socially elite women taking on 
a task historically done by men, but also through the role of women in charge of slaves, seen 
as the duty of a male “parent” to lead his child-like laborers.  While some women were able 
to subvert the traditional narrative of female powerlessness, societal fears based on the 
perceived sexual brutishness of slaves played on the collective consciousness of the region, 
limiting the success of female plantation operators.72 
Women of the poor rural South felt the harshest effects of the loss of white male labor 
during the war.  This population, no matter how hard they tried, could not fill the loss of male 
labor due to the nature of farming in the South.  Prior to the war, the demands of labor often 
stretched thin the yeoman family’s resources; the loss of a farm’s male population often acted 
as a breaking point in the functionality of a family.73  While Northern farms had 
technological assets that eased the tasks of plowing, harrowing and harvesting, these same 
tasks in Georgia relied on manual labor with much simpler tools.  The physically taxing 
action of walking behind a team of horses while plowing, cultivating a corn field with a 
garden hoe, and harvesting wheat in the summer sun with only a sickle or a grain cradle was 
often more than those left behind could physiologically handle, resulting in the lower 
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productivity of the small yeoman farms that made up the majority of agricultural operations 
in Georgia.74  The wives of Georgia’s yeomen soldiers struggled to maintain their family 
farms without the guidance and assistance of their husbands and sons, but the task proved too 
great for many of them.  As the war dragged on and farms fell out of optimal production, an 
increasing minority of Georgia’s rural poor farm wives found called upon the state for food 
relief, unable to feed their families, let alone produce food for the Confederate war effort.75 
Coupled with the loss of farm labor was the loss of farm tools available to Georgia’s 
yeomen.  As with so many other items vital farm life, Northern factories produced the 
majority of tools used in the South prior to the war, with only a small portion made in the 
native shops of Georgia’s cities and towns.76  Not only was the source of horse-drawn 
implements curtailed by the blockade, the source for axes, scythes, shovels, and the myriad 
other farm tools needed to run a farm and cultivate the fields was also lost.  With this loss, 
tools became harder to replace when they wore out or broke, further limiting the productivity 
of Georgia’s farms.77  Moreover, the few iron-producing facilities in the South, such as 
Richmond’s Tredegar Iron Works, focused on supplying the military needs of the South, 
rather than producing agricultural goods such as plows and other tools. 
Impressment, the official Confederate course of action taken to supply the troops in 
the field and fill the needs of the defense of the South, added exponentially to the loss of 
tools and labor.  In order to meet the needs of supplying men in the field, as well as build 
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defensible positions around major cities and strategic locations and deal with the social 
pressures of want and need in nonagricultural areas, the Confederate Congress passed 
legislation that created the power and process to impress goods for the war effort.  This 
legislation placed rigid price caps on food crops, even in the face of wildly fluctuating market 
prices and brought about a system by which tools, slaves, and field crops could be taken by 
the government, as well as a system of tithing in lieu of taxes.78  The irony of a Confederacy 
established on the rights of states and individuals to use property as they chose passing a law 
that mandated the seizure of goods and labor in the name of the national good was not lost on 
many. 
The Confederate Congress established the crop tithe as part of the Revenue Act 
passed on April 24, 1863.  The act established an eight percent tax on the value of processed 
crops such as tobacco, wool, cotton, molasses, and rice not meant for family consumption 
effective July 1 of that year.  It exempted farmers from paying a levy on the value of their 
land, but they had to pay a tax on income from the sale of beef cattle, as well as a one percent 
tax on the value of animals in their possession not directly tied to farm management.79 
Financial levies aside, Section Eleven of the Revenue Act established a tithe on agricultural 
produce that allowed farmers to plant a certain quantity of crops for home use; agriculturists 
owed ten percent of any surplus produced.  The legislation also created a means for 
collecting the tithe, usually a military officer or member of the community, as well as the 
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means of adjudicating any disparities in the amount to be tithed.80  In the very real terms of 
rations generated from the tithe, officials estimated based on previous production records that 
the tithe could generate bread rations for 200,000 men per year and bring meat to the 
haversacks of 160,000 men, as well as feeding more than 100,000 animals in Confederate 
service from the hay, oat, and fodder tithe.81   
The Confederate Congress chose to avoid issues of enforced subsistence production, 
however, leaving that question in the hands of the states even with increasing food shortages 
reported around the South.82  To this end, Georgia’s Governor Joseph Brown pushed for 
legislative action to aid in the protection of agricultural resources within his state.  Echoing 
the calls of newspaper editors and public figures across the state, Brown early on in the crisis 
appealed to the patriotism of Georgia’s farmers to double their efforts at the production of 
consumable crops for the public good and to abandon cotton production.83  In February of 
1862 Brown moved to limit if not halt the production of distilled alcohol from the state’s 
increasingly tenuous supply of corn and rye in order to conserve grain for civilian and 
military use, as well as taking steps to control the state’s precarious salt supply, a necessary 
item to the preservation of food for home use as well as preparing meat for shipment to the 
armies in the field.84  With legislation passed in November of 1862, all whiskey distillation 
was halted in Georgia, with the only exceptions going to those who produced under 
Confederate contract, as well as distillers manufacturing alcohol for medical or industrial 
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purposes.85  Brown and the Georgia legislature also took aim at the producers of cotton, 
limiting the cultivation of the crop to just three acres per hand and fining overproducers $500 
per acre over the allowed amount.  Money collected from the fine aided those in need of 
relief, especially the families of soldiers in the field.86 
 Confederate impressment went beyond the seizing of grain crops.  Legislation 
allowed representatives of the army and the government to take tools, animals and slaves to 
meet the needs of the war effort.87  The tithing of slave labor filled the need for workers to 
build Georgia’s defenses and military infrastructure.  This freed white troops for use in the 
field rather than spending their time with pick and spade.88  Slave owners large and small 
took issue with the state’s demands on their own privately invested labor supply; tales and 
worries of abuse and maltreatment abounded, to the horror of owners.  Small-scale slave 
owners, who most often owned between one and three slaves, protested being overburdened 
by donating labor to the government; they lost a greater proportion of their productive 
capacity than the owners of large plantations.89  A substantial backlash existed against the 
impressment or purchase of draft animals from the Georgia’s farmers and planters.  With 
fewer animals to begin with than the surrounding states, the loss of any meant a serious blow 
to the productive capacity of a small farm or even plantation.  Additionally, Georgia’s 
inferior transportation infrastructure relied more on draft animals than it did on the railroad, 
so impressment prevented farmers from moving their goods to market for sale, thereby 
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causing want in the towns and cities around the state.90  Diseases such as hog cholera also cut 
into the amount of food available to both farmers and the Confederate commissary; to meet 
the problem of meat production, the Confederate Congress allowed farmers to commute the 
pork and bacon tithes to cash payments.91 
 Questions of food became more and more central to the state of Georgia as the war 
dragged on and demanded more resources.  Agents of the Confederate Commissary system, 
in order to meet the demands of the army, turned increasingly to purchasing a farmer’s entire 
crop while it was still in the field and yet unharvested, creating the illusion of food 
abundance in some localities while hiding the realities of localized food shortages created by 
tithing and problems created by inclement weather.92  Between 1862 and 1864 several areas 
of the state suffered food shortages due to a combination of severe drought and periods of 
heavy rains, limiting the amount of food produced for home consumption, let alone allowing 
the farmer to meet the requirements of the Confederate tithe.93  Coupled with this inclement 
weather came the flood of refugees fleeing the Union-occupied regions of the upper South.  
Georgia, the breadbasket of the Confederacy, now faced a food crisis previously unheard of 
within its borders.  In a January, 1864, letter to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon, 
Brown painted a bleak picture of the impact of civil war on the agriculture of Georgia: 
I have lately been through the upper, middle and southwestern portions of 
the State, which are its most productive portions, and I tell you in all candor 
that the country is becoming so far drained of supplies that if relief cannot 
be had from some other source, I do not see how it is possible to supply the 
people and the army with bread till another crop is made, while the supply of 
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meat is entirely inadequate.  The cattle have been so generally taken for the 
army as to leave a still less encouraging prospect for meat for another year, 
and if heavy calls are to be made for troops to be taken from the agricultural 
pursuits the prospect for bread will indeed be gloomy.94 
 The cumulative effect of weather, conscription, the loss of labor, and the influx of 
refugees took a toll on the agricultural capabilities of Georgia.  Though the populace as a 
whole now suffered food shortages and a general want of goods, the state now needed to 
mobilize resources in order to meet the needs of the destitute.  At first this aid came in the 
form of direct monetary payments to widows and the indigent families of soldiers in the 
field; by 1863 and 1864, Brown transformed this aid into allocated food resources, especially 
to the families of north Georgia, especially hard hit by the combination of weather, refugees 
and foraging.  With meat hard to come by, his administration sent tens of thousands of 
bushels of corn to the needy throughout the state in some attempt to alleviate the want of 
food.95 
 The impressment system came with a price, as evidenced by the degree of want in 
Georgia.  From the very beginning, the outcry against waste and hoarding created a divisive 
bitterness throughout the state.  Massive amounts of corn and other grain crops lay at rail 
junctions and other collection points, rotting away while awaiting final collection and 
distribution to the storehouses and troops in the field.  Barrels and sacks of food spoiled 
before collection due to the lack of buildings or other means of protecting them from the 
elements.  Flour, meat, grain and other much needed supplies lay wasting away and good 
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only for the production of whiskey or soap, rather than human consumption.96  Some saw the 
waste and loss as a sign of the inadequate transportation infrastructure already overburdened 
by both civilian and military use.97  Georgia’s rail system dated only to the 1850s, built as a 
means to allow market access in between Atlanta and Chattanooga, with a second rail system 
connecting Savannah and points westward.  Without enough cars and engines to meet the 
demands of the populace and the government, the overtaxed rail system failed to answer the 
needs of the state.  While food by the ton wasted away and rotted at rail heads awaiting 
distribution, Georgia’s men in the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee 
saw their rations cut in half, often without meat, and lacked proper shoes and clothing due to 
the transportation issues on the home front.98 
 The public often targeted the farmers of Georgia themselves as part of the failure of 
the Confederate tithe and supply system.  While the original legislation established prices at 
which government agents were to purchase goods, the prices that the Confederacy offered 
were often well below market value, an issue that got worse as the war continued and 
Confederate currency lost value.99  Collection agents working for the government often 
resorted to outright seizure of farm goods in order to procure for the needs of the army due to 
farmers withholding goods for a higher price.100  People across the South cried out against 
farmers as speculators and hoarders, selling at a price so dear in that economic climate as to 
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have their patriotism questioned.101  City dwellers and newspapermen claimed farmers were 
responsible for driving the price of agricultural commodities up in some cases almost four 
hundred percent in the name of profiteering, often preferring to hoard goods in the hope of 
selling at a better price than Confederate officials offered.102 
 The economic argument cut both ways.  Farmers decried the effect of inflation on 
their ability to purchase goods.  Often they did attempt to resist the offers from Confederate 
purchasing agents, if only to attempt to receive something closer to market value for the 
goods they were forced to sell.103  Resistance came most heavily from areas in north Georgia, 
with a much more limited history of market interaction, and where the stony ground and 
colder climate made subsistence much more difficult.104  Writing to the Augusta Chronicle in 
November of 1864, one Georgia farmer related how inflation quadrupled the prices 
merchants were charging, thereby decreasing the amount of goods he was able to get in trade 
to pay the debt for what his slaves needed every year.105  While the civilians and merchants 
in Georgia’s cities claimed that farmers enriched themselves through wartime profiteering, 
the evidence showed that the merchants themselves were guilty of what they accused farmers 
of doing.  As one writer in rural Georgia pointed out, everyone was trying to buy cheaply and 
sell dearly, with the result that nearly everyone involved in the buying and selling of goods in 
war time was responsible for the economic mess at hand.106 
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 This was the agricultural climate of Georgia in early 1864.  What began as the 
patriotic call of farmers and planters to shed the industrial crop of cotton in favor of the 
production of corn and hogs to feed the people and armies of the South had now devolved 
into a back and forth argument over the shortages, profit and waste that came from an 
underfunded system unable to meet the demands put upon it.  The free white labor of the 
Georgia’s small farms, the yeoman backbone of its volunteer regiments, filled the gray ranks 
now sitting at Dalton guarding the northern approaches to Atlanta or watching the Army of 
the Potomac in Virginia, causing a labor shortage that decreased the ability of the state 
thought to be the breadbasket of the Confederacy to produce the bread and meat needed to 
feed the military and civilian populations of the South.  When the state seceded, the great 
hope of self-sufficiency seemed within easy reach simply by replacing King Cotton with corn 
crops on Georgia’s plentiful farmlands.  To some extent these hopes were initially met with 
success, only to find that the Georgia and its fellow Southern states lacked the ability to 
maintain and distribute the new-found food bounty in the face of war and an unprepared 
infrastructure.   
Now Georgia’s greatest challenge sat at Chattanooga, awaiting the opportunity to 
finally bring the war to a state previously untouched by the invader’s tread.  While Georgia’s 
agriculture had changed greatly in order to meet the needs of the Confederate South, Federal 
war policy had changed as well.  The state of Georgia was about to feel the final product of 
that evolution.  It was a far cry from the way war was fought just three years earlier. 
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Chapter Two: 
From Kid Gloves to “Hard War”: 
The Evolution of Federal War Policy Toward Civilians 
 
Shortly after taking to the field on his first active campaign in the spring of 1862, Si 
Klegg of the 200th Indiana encountered the hard realities of army life on the march.  After his 
unit passed its first night in the field in a driving rain storm with no tents, and then went 
through the farcical exercise of erecting their tents for the first time outside of the level fields 
of the camp of instruction, Si learned from his “pard” and messmate Shorty on how to create 
some form of creature comfort in the field.  Following the missive of his company captain to 
his men to make themselves comfortable, Wilbur Hinman’s young protagonist scanned the 
area around his new camp in search of something to make his life in camp more like home; 
what he found did not soothe his aches and pains.   
There were barns and outbuildings and fences in the vicinity, but bristling  
bayonets warned off all who sought to lay violent hands upon them.  They  
were as tempting to those gloomy-hearted Hoosiers as was the forbidden  
fruit to the ancestral pair in the Garden of Eden – and they were a great deal  
more securely protected.  The destructive propensity, which seemed to be an  
instinct in the breast of the soldier, showed itself at the very outset in the  
200th Indiana, and foreshadowed great activity in this direction whenever the  
restraint should be removed.  As the murky twilight began to deepen they  
would have torn down half the city, if they had been turned loose, and used  
the debris to keep themselves out of the mud.  But the time for this had not  
yet come.107   
 
Though surrounded by the fences and outbuildings of the farm on which they camped, Army 
policy prohibited the use or destruction of private property.  Pickets walked a beat around all 
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the buildings and even the fences in order to protect the Southern farmer’s improvements 
from the prying hands of soldiers looking for dry wood or the means to make a bench, let 
alone those in the ranks of the army who naturally felt an inclination towards thievery and 
criminal mischief.   
 After they attempted to make their beds in the muddy ground, finally sheltered by the 
thin canvas of an army tent, Si’s friend Shorty, a veteran of an earlier enlistment in 1861 who 
took the young Indiana farm boy under his wing, decided to defy the espoused official policy 
of the War Department and improve the living conditions of the pair.  After he posted Si as a 
lookout and after studying the pace and movements of the guard, Shorty made repeated 
forays against the Rebel rail fence until the guard, whom Hinman makes clear did not see the 
sense in guarding the fence and did not want to actually catch any thieves, challenged the 
pair.  After they ran off into the night with their illicit new possessions, Si and Shorty were 
able to hurriedly construct a sleeping pallet from their fence rails and spend a dry though 
uncomfortable night in the field for the first time.108 
 As the war progressed and the shine wore off the martial existence that a young boy 
dreamed of, Si diverged more and more from the official War Department stance towards the 
civilian populace.  In another telling instance when on guard during a period of short rations, 
Si drew blood for the first and only time with his bayonet.  When first enlisted, the young 
hero saw the bayonet as a fearsome weapon; instead, after finding use grinding coffee, 
holding a candle or securing a tent, Klegg’s mighty blade found its mark in the flesh of an 
errant Southern hog that unwittingly challenged the guard post of a hungry young soldier.  In 
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the name of hunger the soldier directly defied orders issued against foraging and the 
destruction of private property in the quietest way possible.109 
 Hinman’s post-war fiction narrative, written by a veteran to illustrate the life of a 
soldier serving in the field, reveals the changing nature of how Federal soldiers, like soldiers 
before them on the march in countless armies over the centuries, confronted the civilian 
populace of the South.  Generals and politicians could make policy in smoke-filled rooms, 
but the soldiers themselves determined how and if these policies were enforced.  These 
changes ultimately embraced foraging by the army, best exemplified by the events of 
Sherman’s Savannah Campaign in November of1864. 
The onset of hostilities in 1861 brought forth not just a conflict of arms for the War 
Department in Washington; the firing on Fort Sumter created an existential conflict for the 
Federal government. It created a question as to how policy should deal with the waging of a 
war, especially in light of the presence of American citizens as civilians in the path of the 
army once charged with protecting them.  President Lincoln’s view of South as a territory 
under rebellion, that is, a lack of civil authority, rather than a combatant nation, further 
complicated issues of how to deal with Southern civilians and their assets.  As a result, the 
War Department and its generals handled Southern civilians with an ever evolving set of 
rules and regulations dependent upon how those in charge of the Union war effort saw fit.  
What began as a strategy based upon the conciliation of perceived innocent civilians forced 
into secession slowly developed over three years into the use of the army as a means to 
punish the South as a whole for acting in open rebellion against the government.   
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This process of change from a conciliatory stance towards what historians have come 
to term as “hard war” occurred neither quickly nor evenly across all theaters of conflict.110  
Ultimately, Federal policy went through three distinct stages as the war progressed.  The first 
stage, conciliation, is best understood and lasted the longest in the operational area of the 
Army of the Potomac, the great eastern army which received a greater portion of news 
coverage and marched directly under the watchful eye of the government at Washington.  
Conciliation, couched in the history of other American conflicts as well as the belief in a 
slave power conspiracy, emphasized peaceful interaction with civilians, as well as granting 
them the full rights and protections of the Constitution and the government of the United 
States as a means of drawing the support of the Southern populace back into the fold of the 
Union.111   
The policies that came to typify the harsher forms of warfare developed beyond the 
Appalachian Mountains in the Western Theater of conflict, initially in the volatile 
environment of the state of Missouri, and developed further through the actions of the Army 
of the Tennessee under Generals U. S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman.  The 
pragmatic mindset that came to typify Washington’s set of policies after the fall of 1862 
came to fruition in Missouri as early as the summer of 1861 under the command of General 
Nathaniel Lyon.  This pragmatism chose to ignore the presence of civilians.  Civilians lost 
the protection of their non-combatant status if and when they took any actions that 
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challenged the primacy of the United States government or impeded the work of the army.  
Civilian property was sacrosanct only if the person or property in question was clearly not 
used to succor the enemies of the United States.  Foraging was not allowed, and if soldiers in 
an official act took the private property of civilians, a receipt must be given.  All other 
physical assets, including slaves, became military goods in the hands of secessionists, and 
were to be handled in an official manner by those representing the government.  In essence, 
the army needed to constrain itself to making war on the enemy on the battlefield.112 
Ultimately by the fall of 1863 pragmatism gave way to what has come to be termed 
“hard war” by modern Civil War scholars, and it was this set of policies that determined how 
soldiers interacted with civilians during the long campaigns of 1864.  These policies ended 
any official attempt to reconcile seemingly loyal civilians in seceded territories with the 
national government through noninterference and reimbursement.  From the fall of 1863 
through the end of the war, the Union Armies turned to a policy of treating all encountered in 
hostile territory as enemies of the state, allowing them to seize any and all goods needed for 
the support of an army in the field, as well as openly denying resources and comfort to the 
opposing forces present.113 
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The first architect of the Union’s war policy brought the nation’s only real experience 
in planning and executing a war.  The seventy-four year old Winfield Scott, hero of the War 
of 1812 and the Mexican-American War, could no longer take his position in the field at the 
head of an army, but his advanced age and physical condition did not prevent him from 
formulating the earliest attempts at a whole war strategy.  Scott drew on nearly fifty years of 
field service and a lifetime of study devoted to military tactics to lay the groundwork for a 
campaign designed to end the rebellion in much the same tone as his Mexican-American War 
campaign.  During that conflict, Scott’s victory relied upon a concentrated, well-disciplined 
force moving through the Mexican landscape without bringing harm directly to the civilians 
the army encountered.  This force only exercised its might in combat against the standing 
Mexican Army when encountered on the field, and Scott’s orders ensured that the rights of 
the Mexican civilians encountered in the path of the army be respected as the citizens of a  
sovereign nation, not as a people subjugated by the American military.  The ultimate goal of 
the campaign as Scott had planned it was to impress upon the people of Mexico the utter 
futility of waging a war against the vast strength and will of the United States.  Following the 
models of war established in pre-Napoleonic Europe, Scott sought to not destroy the army or 
country that stood in his path, but to bring about combat when and where he saw fit as a 
means to ultimately capture the enemy’s capitol and victory.  This was the ethos that the man 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press,2007) 
 
47 
 
considered to be the military genius of his day brought to bear when attempting to deal with 
civil war.114  
Remembered as the “Anaconda Plan,” a derogatory label given it in the press, Scott’s 
plan called for an army and navy of immense proportions to cut off the seceded states from 
any support through a naval blockade and the use of the army to sever the Confederacy in 
two through a prolonged expedition down the Mississippi River, and, if the South continued 
to resist, to cut the South into ever smaller pieces115  Scott’s plan rested on the belief that the 
majority of the people in the South did not favor secession and were in fact still loyal to the 
government.  The overpowering strength of the national army, moving to seize the major 
cities of the South while at the same time respecting the rights of mistaken citizens standing 
in rebellion, would cause the people of the South to question the wisdom of their leaders.116  
Scott and other strategists felt that any attempt to wage war on the citizenry of the South in 
the spring and summer of 1861 would only serve to destroy the actual loyalties of the people 
and prolong the war.117  By cutting the South off from any contact with  sources of military 
and civil succor, as well as removing the source of the region’s wealth through a blockade 
that made cotton sales impossible, secession would whither on the vine, ultimately ending in 
a reunited Union.   
At the core of these early conciliatory strategies lay the belief that the great “slave 
power conspiracy” deluded average citizen living in the rebellious states into secession, a 
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tenet of pre-war Northern political rhetoric.  Essentially the overpowering mantra in the 
North following the secession crisis held that the planter class duped the average citizen into 
supporting secession because of a perceived threat against slavery and all that slavery 
represented for Southern society, because even poor white farmers, according to this mantra, 
dreamed of acquiring property and slaves like the great planter-aristocrats.  To actively make 
war on civilians in the South would only destroy any sense of loyalty left in the region, 
further enhancing the power of the large planters and political leaders of the secession 
movement.  When the army encountered any civilian, it had to respect all legal and property 
rights.  No soldier could touch private property of any kind without fear of arrest and 
prosecution.  Thus, a show of great force through a reinforced army coupled with the 
European courtesies accompanying traditional warfare would aid the hoped-for majority of 
loyal Americans in finally overthrowing those conspirators comprising the base of 
Confederate power and end the rebellion with as little bloodshed as possible.118 
The War Department chose at first not to adopt Scott’s Anaconda Plan as delineated, 
though it became a rough outline for the long term prosecution of the war as the years passed.  
A long spring and summer of inaction in 1861 did not help in the acceptance of Scott’s form 
of conciliation as practiced by the army.  Throughout the period after the fall of Fort Sumter 
the Federal government lost control of naval yards and arsenals in Virginia and other 
Southern states, forcing Northerners to realize that the population of the seceded states might 
not be as pliant and coerced as many had wanted to believe earlier during the year.  Defeat at 
the Battle of First Bull Run/ Manassas Junction in late July helped close the era of Winfield 
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Scott and his delicate plans for pursuing a conciliatory war policy; with the Federal loss, any 
thought that the masses of Southern civilians were in fact secretly loyal to the old 
government evaporated, and leaders in Washington quickly realized that Confederate Army 
represented the best efforts of a people willingly at war.119 
Conciliation as a policy continued to wield its influence through the summer of 1862.  
George McClellan, Scott’s replacement and heralded as the “Young Napoleon” by the press 
for his actions prior to his promotion to the head of the army, continued the kid glove 
approach to warfare in Virginia.  The main difference between McClellan’s strategy and 
Scott’s was the perception that McClellan intended to bring on actual combat while still 
respecting the rights of the citizens in the path of the Army of the Potomac.120  The new 
general restored pride to an utterly demoralized force after its early setbacks through training 
and parades, but his lack of success on the battlefield, or perhaps his difficulty in finding 
anything like a battlefield in a timely manner, ultimately rang the death knell for the 
continued use and acceptance of conciliation by the Lincoln administration and the general 
public.  With the defeat of McClellan’s army before Richmond during the Seven Days battles 
in early June, 1862, and its hesitant retreat to Harrison’s Landing on the James River, 
followed by the tedious lack of movement until Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia 
moved aggressively to the Second Bull Run/ Manassas Junction and Maryland campaigns in 
the late summer of that year, all patience was lost for the concept of a slow moving army 
handling the enemy with kid gloves and kindness.  From this point forward, the second phase 
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of Northern military strategy toward civilians began to take effect, mirroring a strategy 
already in use in the Missouri and the Western Theater of the war.121 
From the very beginning, the war in Missouri carried a much different tenor than the 
more refined conflict that took place in the one hundred miles between Washington, D.C., 
and Richmond.  The war in Missouri was fought on a personal level, neighbor savaging 
neighbor.  Many used the mask of war to resolve old grievances, which in turn created a state 
of near lawlessness.  With the personal, vitriolic nature of the struggle over slavery and 
secession, coupled with Union leadership bent on domination rather than conciliation, Major 
General Henry Halleck established what came to be known as the War Department’s 
pragmatic policy, which governed the middle third of the war.  Missouri proved the perfect 
testing ground for pragmatism due to the tense nature of the war in that state.  While 
Missouri technically remained within the fold of the Union, the polity remained viciously 
divided on the question of secession.  Captain Nathaniel Lyon, commander of the Arsenal at 
St. Louis and proxy commander of Federal forces in the state while his superior traveled to 
Washington for a conference, nearly pushed the state to the brink of open hostilities when he 
used loyal militia and regular Army troops to surround and arrest members of the Missouri 
State Guard encamped in St. Louis in the spring of 1861.  The zealous Lyon followed the 
Camp Jackson affair with a conference that pushed tensions beyond the boiling point in June 
when, at a peace conference with secessionist governor Claiborne Jackson and pro-
Confederate militia leader Sterling Price, Lyon negated an offer of state neutrality by telling 
his Southern aligned counterparts that “Rather than concede to the State of Missouri for one 
single instant the right to dictate to my Government in any matter . . . I would see you . . . and 
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every man, woman, and child in the State, dead and buried.  This means war.”  Lyon’s 
speech ended any pretense of conciliation; from that point forward, Missouri became a 
contested, enemy-held territory in the view of Federal commanders.122 
Guerilla warfare marked much of the conflict in Missouri from an early stage, and 
dealing with irregular combatants became Federal policy there.  John Pope, one of the 
departmental commanders in Missouri, issued one of the first orders holding local citizens to 
task for the actions of guerillas in their area, a tool used over and over again in the West 
through the remainder of the war.  Should any guerilla activity occur within five miles of a 
town, and evidence showed that the populace had not taken action to oppose or stop the 
mischief, then the Army would hold the populace within that distance financially responsible 
for the actions in question.123  This order in essence began the process of dividing the 
population of Missouri, and eventually the rest of the South, into distinct groups based upon 
their perceived loyalties.  Pope divided the populace into two parts: those who supported the 
government and those who did not.  Such action was anathema to the concept of conciliation.  
Rather than work to maintain the loyalty of Missourians through a gentle, hands-off policy 
meant to foster good feelings toward the government, Pope set the stage for a new approach 
to handling civilians, one where civilians really played no part in the establishment of a 
strategy focused on military victory.  In essence, Pope hoped to ignore civilians unless their 
actions brought them to the attention of the authorities.  Pragmatism also meant that the 
government needed to avoid aggravating relations too much, so foraging or illicit actions by 
soldiers was met with harsh punishment. Thus were born the new pragmatic policies that 
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came to characterize the middle years of the war, from the late summer of 1862 through the 
end of 1863.124 
On November 9, 1861, Major General Henry Wager Halleck took command of affairs 
in the state when the War Department gave him command of the Department of Missouri.125  
Halleck stood as the nation’s preeminent expert on military theory and the legality of making 
war.  Just before the war began, Halleck published his own treatise on the laws of war, 
International Law; or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War.  His 
work became central to the understanding of how the United States could make war in the 
nineteenth century. Halleck admitted no place for irregular warfare in his treatise, finding 
such actions outside the laws of war as recognized in the European manner of warfare.  Also 
essential to the developing sense of how to fight, Halleck elaborated on the practice of 
seizing private property as both a tactical asset and a means to supporting an army in the 
field.  While Halleck did not condone illicit foraging, his work did acknowledge that times 
existed when confiscation from civilians was necessary for the support of a military force as 
long as policies laid out explicitly how and when this could be done.  If a military force 
needed to avoid being overly harsh to a local populace, it could, as shown earlier by John 
Pope’s actions, levy fines for the actions of partisans in a locale.  Additionally, an army had a 
right to seize material support on the battlefield, as well as force the citizens of an area to 
surrender food and other material needs for the support of an invading army without acting 
beyond recognized international conventions of warfare.126   
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Halleck set about the task of handling the civilian situation in Missouri soon after 
taking his place at the head of the Department.  On November 26, 1861, less than two weeks 
after taking command, his office issued General Order #8, establishing parameters for the 
seizure and use of civilian assets by the Federal military in his jurisdiction.  In this order, 
Halleck set strict guidelines for the practice, allowing only officers to take goods from the 
general public with the issuance of a receipt, as well as the intention to return or remunerate 
for any goods taken for the use of the army.  General Order #8 allowed for only highly 
regulated foraging, and punished those who operated beyond the law, for very good reasons 
in the mind of the General.  To forage in an irregular manner not only discredited the honor 
of the American army, it also created enemies where they did not previously exist.127   
Rather than continuing the practice of conciliation, Halleck’s order acted to begin the 
process of refining the new era of pragmatism.  After the brash actions of Lyon and Frémont, 
which antagonized the population of Missouri, as well as the rest of the South, Halleck 
worked to create a feasible war policy that was neither too harsh nor too friendly.  A week 
after General Order #8, Halleck issued a new circular in his department which set forth his 
opinion of issues with civilians.  “Peace and war cannot exist together.  We cannot at the 
same time extend to rebels the rights of peace and enforce against them the penalties of war.  
They have forfeited their civil rights as citizens by making war against the Government, and 
upon their own head must fall the consequences.”128  Halleck then went about defining the 
classes of citizen within the confines of his command, a distinction that also came to color 
future Federal military policy.   
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Casting aside those actually under arms in service of the Confederate government as 
enemy combatants, Halleck developed a tripartite understanding of the people of Missouri 
specifically and the South in general.  The first class of citizen was loyal to the United States.  
These people supported the actions of the Federal government and Union forces should leave 
them alone as they advanced.  The second class of citizens openly supported the Confederate 
cause as well as any troops that opposed Federal forces.  Halleck no longer condoned the 
“mild and indulgent” manner in which the government previously handled these people.  
Those who acted in such a manner, by hiding irregular forces, offering aid and comfort to 
enemy soldiers, or through any number of other means, should bear the full brunt of the 
army, and their possessions were fair game for foragers and military officials in time of need.  
General Order 13 did not condone outright punishment through foraging, however.  Officers 
needed to issue receipts for goods taken, though they could note the loyalty of those from 
whom goods were taken; those deemed less than loyal faced a harder time receiving 
reimbursement from the government for the use of their goods.129  
Between these two classes of people lay the neutral citizen of Missouri, and by 
extension, the noncombatants throughout the Western theater.  General Order 13 ignored 
their existence, dealing with only the loyal and disloyal.  While Halleck’s orders ended any 
pretense of conciliation in the West, it also recognized that wanton foraging and other actions 
by the military could push these people firmly into the support of the Confederate cause.  As 
such, some gentleness remained in the official policies of the government.  In essence those 
who occupied the middle ground in terms of overt shows of loyalty deserved to be treated 
with respect, but official actions began to shift towards a stance that ignored their presence.  
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No longer would the army purposely act in a manner that attempted to curry favor and 
loyalty; noncommittal citizens came to be ignored entirely in Federal policy for the duration 
of the war.130   
The onset of the pragmatic era in Federal war policy marked an important chapter in 
how the military handled encounters with Southern civilians.  Policies issued during the 
conciliatory phase deemed the act of foraging a crime.  Generals and political leaders saw 
foraging as the acts of felons and the most visible problem of an ill-disciplined army.  They 
did not realize or did not care about the boredom in the Union army diet; there was plenty of 
pork and hard tack, but little to enliven that menu.  Troops sought out pickles, tobacco, and 
other amenities, and all too often from the sutlers that followed the army.131  To encourage 
the act of foraging was to cast the army, and in fact the entire Union war effort, into a poor 
light nationally and internationally; to condone foraging was to act beyond the perceived 
bounds of civilized warfare.  Yet, as Mark Grimsley has pointed out, the outcry from the 
country came to call for some sense of “moral justice” to become part of how the government 
prosecuted the war.  Conciliation left a bad taste in the mouths of many who felt that the 
people of the South needed to pay a dear price for the sins of secession and war.132  The 
soldiers themselves mirrored the reaction of the general public and wished to make the war a 
harsh judgment on Southern civilians.  Writing near Bolivar, Tennessee, in August of 1862, 
Charles Cady of the Fifteenth Iowa Volunteer Infantry vented his feelings about how the 
people of the South should be treated in a letter home.  “. . . we have tried the milk and water 
plan long enough[.]  do just what their leaders said we would do, that is take their nigers and 
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cotton hang the leaders and if that wont do drive the Whole of them into the ocean.  the 
rebelion must be crushed and the sooner we do it the better.”133  He was not alone in his 
feelings.  Other soldiers during all periods of the war voiced their frustrations with the gentle 
war being fought from Washington.  
 In August, 1861, and July, 1862, Congress attempted to act on the wishes of 
Cady and others with the passage of the First and Second Confiscation Acts.  The First 
Confiscation Act, signed into law by President Lincoln on August 6, 1861, gave sanction to 
the seizure of any Southern property in use by supporters of the Confederacy.  The key 
aspect to the concept of property as mentioned was the definition of slaves as private 
property.  Whereas the various departmental commanders previously employed differing 
policies toward slaves and property, Congress passed the First Confiscation Act to create a 
singular unified practice for the government.  Section four of the law specifically stated that 
any slave used to materially support the Confederacy, a vague notion that might range from 
those slaves that drove wagons, built fortifications, or otherwise assisted in the insurrection 
against the government freed as a means to impede the Confederate war effort.134  The 
Second Confiscation Act, passed into law in July, 1862, reinforced the first act as a means of 
punishing states and people in rebellion against the government.  The act authorized the 
seizure of all property that those in rebellion against the government owned, something that 
would come to fruition when the Armies of the United States turned to a greater use of 
foraging in order to punitively act against the Confederacy.  Additionally, the act freed any 
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slaves held in bondage within areas controlled by the United States, as well as those slaves 
that escaped Confederate-controlled areas of the South and successfully entered Union lines.  
While the debates that surrounded both Acts raised deep questions about the nature of private 
property during war time, the impetus behind both pieces of legislation was to limit the 
ability of the South to materially continue in rebellion against the United States.135 
Foraging itself was not solely an activity based in vengeance.  While some soldiers 
used every opportunity to vent their frustrations with military service and Southern secession 
on the local populace, for others, foraging provided a vital activity to amend the logistical 
issues prevalent in the West.  As early as the summer of 1861 the men marching to 
Springfield, Missouri, as part of Nathaniel Lyon’s push against Confederate forces in that 
portion of the state found themselves in dire straits and turned to foraging to procure food 
and clothing.  Eugene Ware, part of the First Iowa Volunteer Infantry recorded his thought 
process when it came to stealing a pair of pants to replace the ragged ones he wore.  After 
paying a woman for a meal of chicken and biscuits, Ware and his friends encountered an 
abandoned log cabin with wash drying on the line. 
It took a good deal of argument to convince myself that I was  
entitled to that pair of pants.  But I was partially successful; it was this way: 
The house was evidently deserted on our approach.  I plainly, by intuition,  
saw that the man there was getting ready to go into the rebel army. [. . .]  
it was the duty of all American citizens to do what they could to increase  
the efficiency of the army during active service, and to make such  
sacrifices as were necessary to accomplish that purpose.  Thirdly, there  
could be no more worthy recipient of private charity than one who was  
serving the Government in an effort to put down the rebellion at eleven  
dollars per month.  Fourth, I needed the pants.  Fifth, I was defending the  
Constitution for him, the owner.  I was preserving for him all that was  
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dear for him,—life, liberty, the magna charta, the right of habeas corpus,  
and those inalienable and inestimable rights which he and his children  
would enjoy through all time.  In this great drama I was his agent with  
power to act, and he must furnish the pants.136 
Not every soldier was as conscientious about the constitutional arguments behind 
foraging and interactions between the military and civilians, but Ware’s comedic interlude 
nicely illustrated in microcosm many of the logistical and moral issues present in the west.  
While the men serving in the Army of the Potomac rarely felt the hand of hunger and 
deprivation in their military experiences, the men serving beyond the state of Virginia dealt 
with supply shortages on an almost regular basis.  In an area of operations plagued with 
shortages due to poor transportation infrastructure, as well as irregular forces operating to 
disrupt the flow of goods at random points along those routes of travel, the recognition of 
foraging as a viable military tool during the pragmatic stage of the war opened a new door in 
not only bringing the war home to civilians but also as a new way of making sure that an 
army on the march possessed the ability to feed and clothe itself when regular lines of supply 
dried up. 
Unleashing young men to find and pilfer items became a vital tool of the army’s 
logistical operations.  The movement deeper into the South reinforced soldiers’ opinions 
about the use of foraging as a physical and psychological weapon.  Halleck’s pragmatism 
was born in the heated atmosphere of Missouri, one of four slave states that never officially 
seceded yet nevertheless contained a populace deeply divided over the war.  As the western 
armies entered into Tennessee and Mississippi in 1862, the divided face of the people fell 
away, exposing the Midwesterners in the Army of the Tennessee for the first time to the 
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hard-line supporters of secession.  For some soldiers, close contact with the homes of the 
leadership of the Confederate government or army allowed them the chance to take some 
form of vengeance on those they blamed for the war.  Alexander Downing of the Eleventh 
Iowa Infantry made special note in his diary of the treatment that the plantation of an 
unnamed “secesh” general his regiment guarded.  “we made ourselves at home, killing all the 
cattle we wanted and taking all the honey that we could carry away with us.”137  In an 
October letter to Grant that accompanied the submission of quarterly reports, even General 
Sherman added his sentiments to the growing list of people looking to make a harder war on 
the South.  Noting that he finally felt that the number of Union enlistments was equal to the 
needs of the army and the situation at hand, Sherman told Grant that while they could not 
“change the hearts of those people of the South, but we can make war so terrible that they all 
realize the fact that, however brave and gallant and devoted to their country” that the people 
of the South would force their leaders to sue for peace in the face of the Union war effort.138 
As the war progressed into 1863, two events transpired which aided the 
transformation of the Union war effort towards a harsher prosecution of the war.  The 
Emancipation Proclamation, which Lincoln announced on November 1, 1862, and which 
took effect on January 1, 1863, changed the nature of the war by officially attacking the 
existence of slavery.  Beyond the theoretical implications of the Proclamation for ending 
slavery in areas that Federal forces did not control, thereby causing confusion and disrupting 
normal patterns of civil and military life in the Confederacy, the act aided the prosecution of 
the war by not only subverting the existence of the institution in the South, but also by 
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directly attacking the agricultural and military support networks in place across the region.  
Slaves across all theaters of the war performed the menial tasks of military life, from 
constructing trenches to driving wagons and cooking meals; by planting the seeds of 
liberation and encouraging African-Americans to seek their freedom, the Federal government 
created a means of disrupting the noncombatant labor force, thereby limiting the ability of 
the armed forces of the Confederate states to operate at its most efficient.  The Proclamation 
also attempted to create a similar labor vacuum on the home front by disrupting the labor 
force responsible for agricultural production, thereby limiting the South’s ability to grow 
foodstuffs.  While it is impossible for historians to accurately measure the success of these 
two subversive aims of the Emancipation Proclamation, they still represent an important step 
towards the prosecution of the war in a manner that eschewed the gentle handling of 
civilians.139 
The second major change that signaled a renewal of the push for a harder prosecution 
of the war came about during the prolonged campaign against Vicksburg in the winter and 
spring of 1863.  The new use of foraging as part of Federal policy expanded the interaction 
between Federal soldiers and Southern civilians and proved its importance in supplying the 
needs of an army in the field.  Nowhere was this better illustrated than by Grant’s Army of 
the Tennessee in its operations prior to the siege that finally caused the fall of the Gibraltar 
on the Mississippi.  Twice during the many months of action Grant severed his army from its 
base of supply and moved his army overland through populated areas and sustained his men 
strictly through foraging operations.  The first occurred in December of 1862 when 
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Confederate forces under General Earl Van Dorn seized the Union depot at Holly Springs, 
Mississippi, and destroyed Grant’s means of supply.  With his only other convenient supply 
base located far in the rear at Columbus, Kentucky, the loss of Holly Springs forced Grant to 
perform a retreat through hostile territory without rations or the possibility of regular 
resupply.  The success of the retrograde movement awakened Grant to the ability to feed an 
army from the farms of a hostile people, as well as the inherent problems with the tenuous 
nature of long supply lines in the West.  To feed his men Grant sent out foraging parties in a 
sweep fifteen miles on either side of his line of march with orders to take food and forage, 
but to also leave a sixty day supply in the household.  “I was amazed at the quantity of 
supplies the country afforded,” Grant reported in his memoirs.  “It showed that we could 
have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond 
the limits designated.”140 
The civilians along Grant’s line of march learned an important lesson as well.  
Gloating over the minor Confederate victory that resulted in the loss of his depot, many of 
the locals jeered Grant at his headquarters in Oxford, Mississippi, upon his return from the 
aborted movement, asking how the General would feed his men now.  When told of the 
foraging parties then stripping the land all around, “[C]ountenances soon changed, and so did 
the inquiry.  The next was, ‘What are we to do?’”  Grant’s calm reply was a subtle and yet 
menacing commentary on events yet to unfold.  Simply put, Grant told them that the Army 
had long supplied itself from Northern sources for as long as it could and avoided molesting 
the local farmers until the enemy had forced his hand.  His men would not starve in one of 
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the best agricultural regions in the Confederacy.  “I advised them to emigrate east, or west, 
fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left.”141 
The second instance of widespread army foraging during the Vicksburg campaign 
occurred later in the spring of 1863.  After several futile attempts at approaching the city 
overland from the Mississippi side of the river, in April Grant moved his army south of 
Vicksburg, crossed the great river near Bruinsburg to circumvent the city’s defenses, and 
then headed east to seize the state capitol at Jackson and drive off any Confederate 
reinforcements in the area, all to isolate Vicksburg and ultimately compel its surrender.  To 
do this meant a complete and pre-planned removal from regular lines of sustenance.  On 
April 20, the General issued Special Order 110 to his commanders, laying out the minutiae of 
his plans.142  Article 13 authorized his forces to forage for all supplies necessary to feed an 
army on the march.  The Union Army along the Mississippi River now undertook its first 
prolonged operation without a base of supplies.  Life was good for the men on the march.  
Charles Cady wrote home about what he encountered in Louisiana, and with a farmer’s eye 
recorded what he saw about Southern agriculture in the face of war.  “corn is knee high[.]  
that is the only crop that they have out in this section but that is gone to Davy Crocket, we 
have made use of the most of the fenceing for firewood and our rout is right through the 
plantations wherever the best land is . . .”143  On April 29 and 30 Grant’s men completed the 
downriver swing and landed once again on the eastern shore of the Mississippi below Grand 
Gulf, and as Grant himself famously noted, “I was now in the enemy’s country, with a vast 
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river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies.  But I was on dry 
ground on the same side of the river with the enemy.”144  The army attempted to create a 
supply depot at Grand Gulf, but the position was too tenuously held to securely act in this 
capacity.  From this point until the establishment of his siege lines around the city following 
the battles in early May near Jackson and Champion’s Hill and the lines of supply necessary 
for a prolonged siege, the Army of the Tennessee lived off the fat of the land, which Grant 
noted was in abundance, answering all the needs of his men.145  Iowa cavalryman Lot 
Abraham’s diary is rife with accounts of the bounty found in the vicinity of Vicksburg.  
Entries for the month of June, 1863, constantly mention gathering berries, plums, and other 
cultivated fruits, as well as corn, honey, and other instances of food gathered from local 
farms and plantations.146  Grant’s gamble paid off; not only did Vicksburg fall during the 
summer of 1863, the end of nearly a year’s planning and campaigning, but Grant, Sherman, 
and the hardened veterans of the western armies proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that an 
army in the field could function with impunity in an enemy’s territory without a base of 
supplies, or the loss of men to guard and protect those bases and the long roads and rail lines 
to get rations to the front.  In these movements and moments of success, a new mode of war 
was born. 
 Grant’s success at Vicksburg secured for him the command of the armies of the 
United States in the fall of 1863.  Following the disastrous battle along Chickamauga Creek 
in Georgia in mid-September and Grant’s subsequent relief of Braxton Bragg’s siege of 
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Chattanooga and the Army of the Cumberland with the taking of Missionary Ridge in mid-
November, promotions abounded and the leadership of the western armies changed hands.  
Grant moved his headquarters to Nashville, and soon thereafter accepted Lincoln’s 
appointment as head of all Union forces, leaving Sherman in command of the region around 
Vicksburg.  With plans brimming for the coming spring campaign, General Sherman needed 
to remove the threat that the remaining rebel forces in Mississippi presented to his army and 
the flow of traffic on the river so recently reopened.  To this point, the man soon to command 
the armies of the west approached his chief with an idea to strike at the Confederate forces in 
the area and destroy their ability to fight.  Such an action would thereby free the men of 
Sherman’s command to move on Georgia in the spring.  By marching on the rail head of 
Meridian, Mississippi, Sherman hoped to not only destroy the wealth of supplies that lay 
there, but also to tear up the rail network that connected Meridian with the principal points of 
supply throughout the region. 147 
 Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee set out on February 3rd, and for the next 
eleven days his men destroyed the railroad and marched against only light resistance until 
they arrived in Meridian, one hundred and fifty miles from Vicksburg along the Alabama 
border, on the 14th.  Sherman spent the next week destroying the depots, rail works, and 
Confederate supplies in and around Meridian.  In his official report to Grant, Sherman 
bluntly stated the town’s fate.  “Meridian, with its depots, store-houses, arsenals, offices, 
hotels, and cantonments no longer exists.”148  On February 17, as the army prepared to leave, 
Company D of the 4th Iowa Cavalry went out to scout a road in advance of the column.  Lot 
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Abraham noted that his men “got plenty to eat, some fine Turkeys &ct found our camp old 
cotton gin burned down on our return[.]”149  The men then returned via Canton, Mississippi, 
having fed off the land and destroyed rebel property at will.  With no significant resistance, 
Sherman satisfied himself that the strength of the Federal army could operate at will within 
the South, taking whatever it wanted in the way of food and forage while completely 
disrupting the ability of the Confederate military to make war.   
 Thus was born the doctrine of “hard war,” as Mark Grimsley terms it.150  In this final 
iteration of Federal war policy, which would come into full favor and use when the spring 
campaigns of 1864 began, American military and political leaders came to embrace the 
notion that the quickest way to put down the rebellion was not on the battlefield.  Yes, 
military victory was necessary to deal with the Confederate armies in the field, but the sole 
reliance on military victory had prolonged the war and made the Northern people both angry 
and weary.  To end the conflict quickly meant to remove the willingness of the Southern 
people to fight.  To this point in the war, Union forces attempted to either daintily handle the 
Southern populace or ignore it.  Neither system worked well, although the latter allowed for 
the development of foraging as a viable weapon.  The new theory of making war, proven in 
the west, showed that an army unleashed on the economic, logistical, and perhaps most 
importantly agricultural resources of an enemy not only denied resources to the armed men in 
open rebellion against the government, but also by marching at will through a territory and 
taking whatever was needed through foraging, Grant’s men had proven that the war could be 
brought home to the civilians of an enemy state.  No more would the casualty lists and taxes 
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of war prove the main sources of civil discontent and fear; indeed, the unopposed movement 
of an army comprised the greatest source of demoralization and terror possible.  If the war 
was to be brought to a rapid conclusion, then the men of the Union Army and the Federal 
government now knew how to bring that about.151  All that stood between the people of the 
South and the North’s new way of making war was the usual winter period of rest and 
resupply and the subsequent spring thaw.  It was late February; the spring campaigns of 1864 
were less than two months away. 
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Chapter Three: 
“I Can Make This March, and Make Georgia Howl”: 
Planning the Use of Foraging as a Weapon in the March to the Sea 
 
On April 4, 1864, Ulysses S. Grant, commanding general of the armies of the United 
States, transmitted his plan for the spring campaigns to his long-time confidant and 
replacement in command of the forces operating in the Western theater.  After explaining his 
wish for a unified push against Confederate forces across all areas of operation, Grant laid 
bare his expectations for the men under William Tecumseh Sherman’s command.   
You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and to get 
 into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the 
damage you can against their war resources.  I do not propose to lay down 
 for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is  
desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute in your own way. 
Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operation.152 
With three sentences, Grant laid bare his objectives for the coming year and gave his friend 
the free hand necessary to achieve those goals.  Parenthetically, Grant had a broad strategy 
where he would accompany George Meade and his Army of the Potomac, lock on Lee’s 
Army of Northern Virginia and deny it the opportunity for attack, while Benjamin Butler 
would march an army up the peninsula to threaten Richmond, just as McClellan had tried and 
failed to achieve in 1862, while a Union army under Nathaniel Banks would march from 
Mobile, Alabama, to meet Sherman near Atlanta.  Butler was too hesitant to achieve his goals 
with the Army of the James, and Banks turned his attention to the Red River region and its 
agricultural assets in Louisiana and Arkansas, a campaign which failed miserably.  Only 
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Meade and Sherman were left to carry out their portions of Grant’s plans.  Grant framed the 
year as an attempt to finally crush the rebellion by not just seeking combat, but to also make 
war on the ability of the South to prolong the conflict.  For three years the opposing armies 
parried at various points, and while the Federal armies made territorial gains, the Confederate 
government still stood at Richmond, its armies still arrayed the field.  Combat alone had not 
put down the rebellion; Grant now turned the focus of his forces against not just the men in 
gray who opposed him, but against the resources that sustained their ability to fight.  It was 
now time to turn the forces of the Union Army against the infrastructure and sources of 
supply that allowed the South to keep a force in the field.  Trains and supply depots seemed 
an obvious choice, but Grant’s orders meant something more sinister for the people of the 
Confederacy.  While Union leadership still sought to bring about a military victory, they now 
concluded that other means were necessary on order to weaken the resiliency of the 
Confederate government and its people.  By directing its armies against the logistical and 
economic infrastructure of the South, Grant and his lieutenants hoped to sever their 
opponents from their lines of supply  permanently and bring to bear another weapon against 
both Lee’s army in Virginia as well as Joseph E. Johnston’s army awaiting Sherman in 
northern Georgia.153 
 While Grant directed the movements of the Army of the Potomac against Lee in 
person, the most important aspect of the 1864 campaign against the Confederate armies and 
its logistical network took place under the watchful eyes of William Tecumseh Sherman.  His 
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Military Division of the Mississippi, the combined might of the Army of the Tennessee and 
the Army of the Cumberland, sat perched at Chattanooga in the spring of 1864, awaiting the 
order to march.  All of Sherman’s men knew their destination, as well as the importance of 
the coming campaign.  Two major rail lines intersected in Atlanta, making it the distribution 
hub of the Southern war effort.  Additionally, many of the major manufactories, displaced by 
the loss of other cities throughout the region, had relocated to Atlanta, making it a center for 
the preparation of war materials.  By taking Atlanta, Sherman and Grant hoped to remove the 
most important point in the Confederate logistics chain, paralyzing the flow of food, material, 
and other goods throughout the entire south. 
The question of logistics weighed heavily on Sherman’s mind in April, 1864.  The 
main base of supply for the western armies lay at Nashville, and one single track line served 
as the vital link between that point and Chattanooga, and ultimately Atlanta itself.  In order to 
facilitate his campaign against the Gate City, the General halted all nonessential traffic on the 
line in order to ensure the build-up of a supply depot large enough to feed and equip his men 
throughout the coming summer campaign season.  All civilian traffic, including food relief 
for the beleaguered loyalists in eastern Tennessee ended; Sherman even forced soldiers 
returning from veteran furlough to march from Nashville back to their regiments.  Even with 
these strictures place upon the railroads in order to build up ammunition and food stores, 
Sherman estimated that the army could not lay in a large enough supply of grain and hay for 
his army’s animals.  He figured to use the Georgia countryside to furnish those requirements 
through foraging.  To fulfill that need, Sherman retained a copy of the 1860 U.S. census in 
order to ascertain the varying levels of agricultural production in each county and plan the 
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route of march accordingly.  That volume of the census would play a decisive role in 
Georgia’s fate as the year went on.154  Sherman issued another order that held consequences 
for future action in Georgia.  In order to limit the length of his baggage train, and thus limit 
the number of animals and their need for forage, as well as the opportunities for Confederate 
cavalry forces to threaten his progress by disrupting his supply, the General issued orders that 
cut a regiment’s allotment of wagons to one supply wagon and one ambulance.  Rather than 
relying on a supply train that on other campaigns measured tens of miles in length, this order 
required that all men carry five days’ rations and all their own clothes on their person, and 
forbade the use of large tents.155   
Over the course of the next two months, Sherman’s western soldiers sparred with 
their counterparts in the Army of Tennessee, slowly flanking and murderously fighting 
across northern Georgia in places like Resaca, New Hope Church and Kennesaw Mountain, 
before fighting around and then ultimately laying siege to Atlanta.  Confederate General 
Joseph Johnston crafted a carefully staged fighting withdrawal, throwing up obstacles in 
Sherman’s path which forced the Federal general to order a series of flanking maneuvers.  
Johnston intended to counterattack near Atlanta, when Sherman’s line of supply would be 
most vulnerable; Jefferson Davis replaced Johnston with John Bell Hood before the former 
could carry out his full plans.  Hood attacked Sherman’s forces in July, when he was beaten 
back into the city, where both armies settled in for a prolonged siege.  While the siege 
allowed Sherman to avoid committing his troops into the headlong combat that he generally 
abhorred, the campaign dragged out for another three months, until the fall of the city at the 
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beginning of September.156  Earlier in the summer, the General quipped that “when we reach 
Atlanta the campaign will be but just begun.”157  As the Confederate Army, now under the 
command of John Bell Hood, retreated following the defeat at Jonesboro, Sherman’s men 
occupied the city of Atlanta and planning for the second phase of the 1864 campaign began. 
The first consideration was what to do with the city itself.  Sherman inherited a 
devastated city and the roughly 3,000 civilians who remained following the summer of siege 
and panic.158  To garrison the city and use it as supply depot or armed camp for the coming 
winter required the detachment of a significant portion of his army, forever lost to the duties 
of guarding the long line of supply, as well as preparing to repulse any attempt to retake 
Atlanta, further disrupting the flow of future operations. One had only to look at the number 
of men required to protect Chattanooga, Nashville, and other major cities throughout the 
South to realize that such an attempt would rob Sherman of a significant portion of his 
army.159  In general, the army assigned approximately 1000 men per mile as it advanced to 
protect its rail lines, supply depots, and bridges, as well as constraining the local populace.  
Cut off from the sources of supply that fed the city prior to its envelopment, these hungry 
civilian masses relied upon the charity of the Federal government to feed them.  The single 
rail line from that connected Northern farms and factories to Louisville, Kentucky, to 
Nashville and Chattanooga was still the main line of supply for the western armies, and now 
there was an additional hundred miles of track to guard against saboteurs.  Feeding the 
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civilian populace of Atlanta would unnecessarily tax the already thin line of supply that 
linked the army back to its distant base of supply.  Success, to the mind of Sherman, could be 
as crippling as defeat. 
In the short term, Sherman decided to make Atlanta a military fortress, corresponding 
to its isolation in Confederate territory.  To accomplish this, the General decided to expel the 
civilians living in the midst of his army so as to be able to have their homes for storage and 
quarters for his men, as well as to tear down those buildings that stood in the way of forming 
a compact defensive line.  As previously noted, ultimately the people living in Atlanta fell 
under the guardianship of the army in occupation.  It was too daunting a task for the slim 
Federal supply line to feed both soldier and civilian, all while attempting to build up the 
stores necessary to feed and equip any garrison that might maintain Atlanta.  Additionally, 
harboring a hostile population encouraged a security breach by allowing spies to move at will 
through the midst of his army.160 
While negotiating the evacuation of the population of Atlanta with John Bell Hood, a 
verbal dance that resulted in Sherman’s eloquent and blunt damnation of the South for 
bringing civil war to America, the General also began contemplating the next moves of his 
army.  The process of planning the next move for Sherman’s army began with a September 
12, 1864 communication from Grant to Sherman positing grand strategy questions for his 
friend aimed at points along the east coast, yet searching for what Sherman himself wanted to 
accomplish next with his army.161  On September 20, Sherman replied with the first outline 
of his future plans.  If an army-navy expedition could take possession of Savannah, the 
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General prophetically stated that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 
thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for the balance.  Where a 
million of people find subsistence, my army won’t starve . . .” due to Georgia’s as yet 
untouched agricultural bounty.162  Sherman’s main concern was the presence of a blocking 
force that could easily stall any movement of his forces; if a Federal force could take 
Savannah and establish a point of resupply for Sherman’s columns, such a fear would be 
unfounded.  Sherman was emphatic, however; such a move could only be considered if there 
was a relief force waiting for him in Savannah.163 
Grant waivered in his plans for Sherman, or rather in his approval of Sherman’s 
plans.  Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry roamed central Tennessee at will, threatening the 
railroads and garrisons throughout the region, and there was still the Army of Tennessee 
hovering around Sherman, waiting for any opportunity to move against the army.  By late 
September, it became evident that Hood meant to move out of Georgia, and proceed north 
into Alabama and invade Tennessee from the south, an act meant to divert Sherman’s men 
out of Georgia.164  Hood’s withdrawal north to Tennessee via Alabama confronted Sherman 
with two possibilities.  On the one hand, he could spend the coming winter chasing Hood 
across the upper South and ultimately fight the Confederate forces at a place of their 
choosing, prolonging the war and offering the Army of Tennessee something of a pyrrhic 
victory.  Conversely, Sherman now saw the opportunity to hand Hood off to General George 
Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland; Thomas had gained fame as the “Rock of Chickamauga” 
when he prevented the Union defeat at that battle from becoming a disaster, and Grant and 
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Sherman had confidence in his ability to deal with Hood’s threat to Tennessee.  This second 
option allowed the General to move to Grant’s relief in Virginia, combining the two largest 
and most storied armies in the Union war effort to come to bear against Lee’s Army of 
Northern Virginia around Richmond from both north and south after a march from dealing 
with Georgia.  Grant had long pressed Sherman to abandon the chase and move overland by 
the most direct route, but to Sherman, moving directly from Atlanta into a new fight in 
Virginia left the job unfinished in Georgia. 
Sherman pushed to finish the job his men started in Georgia.  On October 1 he 
telegraphed Grant about the situation now before him as Hood began to move north. 
Hood is evidently across the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater. 
If he tries to get on our road, this side of the Etowah, I shall  
attack him; but if he goes to the Selma and Talladega Road, 
why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which  
Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville,  
and for me to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to  
Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and doing irreparable 
damage?  We cannot remain on the defensive.165 
The cat and mouse game that Sherman feared was now afoot, and while dutifully beginning 
the chase, he offered Grant a clear vision of what he wished to do.  Rather than garrison 
Atlanta and have Confederate raids target his meager supply line, or hunt futilely after 
Hood’s battered army, why not take this chance to end the charade once and for all?  With 
Hood moving into Tennessee, it appeared, there was no force that stood in the path of the 
armies under General Sherman’s control.  That same day, Sherman wired O. O. Howard, 
commander of the Army of the Tennessee, to stand in readiness for a move south into 
Georgia, should Hood move as the General hoped.  If that happened, Sherman proposed to 
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send the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas after Hood, along with any Federal forces 
above Kingston, Georgia.  However, Sherman also warned Howard to stand ready to move 
against Hood if he did not leave Georgia as the Union commander hoped.  In any case, while 
Sherman had not yet received Grant’s final approval, he was optimistic that his proposed 
move across Georgia would be an easier feat than others thought.  As he told Howard, “[t]he 
march I propose is less by 200 miles than I made last fall, and less than I accomplished in 
February, and we can make Georgia a break in the Confederacy by ruining both east and 
west roads, and not running against a single fort until we got to the seacoast and in 
communication with our ships.”166   
 Unfortunately for Sherman’s plans, by the afternoon of the first it was evident that 
Hood presented a very real threat to the Federal army occupying northern Georgia.  As the 
telegraph hummed with communication to various commanders in the field, Sherman began 
to hint at what the future of the army held, more than likely to find out who supported his 
plans, while also putting men in motion to counter Hood and Forrest.  At 2:00 PM, Sherman 
wired George Thomas, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, then at Nashville, to do 
just that.  After giving Thomas permission to act at his discretion, the commanding general 
laid out what he hoped for from the actions currently developing.  “If I can induce Hood to 
swing across to Blue Mountain I shall feel tempted to start for Milledgeville, Millen, and 
Savannah, or Charleston, absolutely destroying all of Georgia, and taking either Savannah or 
Charleston.  In that event I would order back to Chattanooga everything the other side of 
Kingston, and bring forward all else, destroy Atlanta and the bridge, and absolutely the 
Southern Confederacy.”  While Thomas made reference to Sherman’s plan in his response, it 
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is evident that Atlanta’s fate, and the fate of Georgia itself, was sealed, pending permission 
from Grant and the War Department.167 
 Of course, the more obvious stumbling block that stood in Sherman’s path was Hood.  
While Forrest moved into Middle Tennessee, Hood’s army shunted north and then westward 
into Alabama.  The Federal troops garrisoning positions between Atlanta and the Tennessee 
border mobilized and moved after Hood as he dithered through western Georgia and eastern 
Alabama.  The Army of Tennessee lashed out at the Western and Atlantic Rail Road, 
destroying miles of track and illustrating the just fear that Sherman held all summer about the 
sinewy lifeline connecting him with Chattanooga and Nashville.  On October 5th, forces 
under Major General S. G. French attacked the Federal depot at Allatoona Pass, and while 
the rebel forces were hurled back after a long and bloody day of combat, Sherman and Grant 
saw yet another preview of the problems with continually occupying Atlanta and northern 
Georgia.  Was it worth trying to bring about a general engagement with the Army of 
Tennessee while they were still within reach of the Army of the Tennessee?  Could the army 
continue to chase Hood’s ghost across the South all winter without prolonging the war 
unnecessarily?168 
 These tensions built up in Sherman, and on October 9th, he telegraphed Grant to push 
for the approval of his plans to march through Georgia.  “It will be a physical impossibility to 
protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned 
loose without home or habitation,” declared the General. 
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. . . I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga 
forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville,  
Millen, and Savannah.  Until we can  repopulate Georgia, it is useless  
to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people,  
will cripple their military resources.  By attempting to hold the roads,  
we will lose a thousand men each month, and will gain no result. 
I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!  We have on hand over 
eight thousand head of cattle and three million rations of bread, but no  
corn.  We can find plenty of forage in the interior of the state.169 
With no word back from Grant, Sherman continued the pursuit of Hood, attempting to 
discern his enemy’s movements and ultimate destination.  The spring campaign started with 
the objective to destroy the enemy in his front, and if the Army of Tennessee would simply 
stand still, Sherman planned to do just that.  By midnight of the 10th, Sherman’s information 
placed the Army of Tennessee at Tuscumbia, Alabama; he wired Thomas to ascertain if 
Thomas thought he could withstand an attack from Hood in Tennessee with the force at hand, 
as well as the expected reinforcements coming to his aid, “as in that event you know what I 
propose to do.”170  The cautious Thomas replied that he could not say if he could hold against 
Hood yet, because he had no idea how many reinforcements were on their way to him.171  
Too many variables lay on the table for Sherman to disengage from Hood and turn south 
again. 
 Grant finally replied to Sherman’s telegram on the morning of October 11th; it 
contained the cautionary words of a commanding general viewing the whole operations of 
his men in the field.  How should the army deal with Hood?  He certainly couldn’t be 
allowed to roam freely throughout Tennessee.  While the Confederate army seemed destined 
to turn north and clear from Sherman’s path, Grant feared that the men under his friend’s 
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command faced the sniping and daily attacks “by all the old men, little boys, and such 
railroad guards as are still left at home,” inferring that the cost of constant petty assaults 
might be a worse cross to bear than confronting an organized army head on.  Grant added 
two more strictures: Thomas must remain in Tennessee to guard Nashville with its huge 
supply depots and still might not be up to the job of defeating Hood, and more importantly, 
Grant could not and would not detach a force from his command around Richmond to take 
Savannah as Sherman originally hoped.  Were these meant to be crushing blows to his 
friend’s plans, or a test to see how tenaciously Sherman held on to his plans?172 
 William Tecumseh Sherman’s reply was straight to the point, illustrative of his 
frustrations with the way the War Department conducted the war, and how much he favored 
making an offensive war while in enemy territory.  After stating his actions in attempting to 
guess and counter Hood’s army, Sherman bluntly told his friend what he wanted to do. 
We cannot now remain on the defensive.  With twenty-five thousand infantry and 
 the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my road.  I would infinitely 
prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 
including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with 
my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. . . .  
Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing 
at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans.  The difference in war 
is full 25 per cent. 
I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. 
Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.173 
The cat and mouse of the last week weighed too heavily on Sherman.  Final victory did not 
belong to those who sat and waited for the whims of his enemy; if Hood went north, then let 
the army sitting at Nashville take care of him.  If Hood followed Sherman, than let him come.  
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But Union armies could not defeat the Confederate States of America by garrisoning every 
point between Chattanooga and Tennessee.  Surprisingly, Sherman accepted Grant’s word 
that Savannah must remain in enemy hands until his force seized the city at the end of their 
campaign.  Sherman found it preferable to seize another city after a campaign through enemy 
territory than to follow Hood around and hope for a fight.  Confident in his plans for the fall 
campaign, he wrote his wife Ellen that “Georgia is now open to me, and steps are being 
perfected at other and distant points that will increase the value of my position here.”174 
 Grant replied that night; if Sherman truly thought he could make the march without 
major loss, and if he also thought that Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, could hold once 
more in Tennessee, then he could make his march through Georgia, as long as the railroad 
destruction began between Chattanooga and Dalton.175  Sherman held in his hands the 
permission he needed to carry out his plans.  Now he just needed to verify where Hood was 
going; once he knew that Hood would move into Tennessee, then the planning for his march 
on Savannah could begin in earnest.  That same day he sent a telegraph to Henry Halleck, 
Army chief of staff in Washington, restating his plan to the War Department, emphasizing 
that “I can do it.”176 
 Despite his positive affirmations to Halleck and Grant, President Lincoln hesitated 
about the plan that Sherman now urged.  Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wired Grant to that 
effect on the night of the twelfth, but contrary to his superior’s concerns, Grant showed a 
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favorable frame of mind to his friend the next morning.177  “It would be much better to go 
south than to be forced to come north,” declared Grant.  In the process of the operation, Grant 
wanted the country scoured clean of every useable piece of material, including slaves, which 
Grant mused about arming in order to add a force to Sherman’s army as it marched through 
Georgia.178 
 Grant began to take an active interest in the plans of his friend.  On October 13th he 
sent word to Halleck to begin preparations for Sherman’s approach to Savannah at the end of 
his march.  He ordered the preparation of a complete resupply of rations, forage and 
ammunition for the western army’s arrival at the Georgia coast.  Grant requested that the 
relief flotilla depart for the Georgia coast as soon as Sherman did so as to be prepared for his 
arrival.  It seemed that while the commanding general would not spare Union forces from 
Virginia to take Savannah in order to give Sherman a safe-haven on the coast, he could at 
least meet the original plan halfway by using the powerful Union Navy to meet the army’s 
arrival with enough food and forage to save it from starvation, should the worst happen.179  
Later that same evening, Grant again sent word to Halleck to have Thomas consolidate his 
forces by abandoning certain points on the railroad in the face of the enemy.  Rather than 
contesting Hood at every point, Thomas was to pull as many men as possible to a central 
point of strength to meet the advancing enemy.180  Stanton relayed the good news to Sherman 
that evening.  “You will see by General Grant’s dispatch that your plans are approved by 
him.  You may count on the co-operation of this Department to the full extent of the power of 
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the Government.  Supplies will be forwarded with the utmost dispatch to the points indicated.  
Whatever results you have the confidence and support of the Government.”181  Sherman now 
had the green light to go forward with the march to the sea.  All he needed to do was to 
consolidate and prepare his forces. 
 Sherman still had to deal with Hood.  The Army of Tennessee roamed at will across 
northern Georgia, one day bending towards the Tennessee border, the next showing signs of 
heading south again.  All the while the men of the Military Division of the Mississippi 
wound through the countryside in an attempt to catch up.  With so many breaks in the rail 
line and the winding nature of their march, Sherman turned his men to foraging to 
supplement their rations.182  Marching in the path of Hood’s army, also foraging, while 
tracing in reverse the path of the spring’s campaign assuredly brought hardship to the people 
of northern Georgia.  Alexander Downing noted in his diary that “[t]he valleys through 
which we are marching are quite rich and there are some fine plantations which afford good 
forage.”183  O. O. Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, took notice of the 
raucous nature that this foraging began to take on October 16th, when he sent a circular order 
to his command condemning illicit foraging.  Word reached him of officers overseeing home 
invasions, and while the specific events were not detailed, General Howard informed his 
command that all foraging should be done in an orderly manner as prescribed by earlier army 
policy.  While the Union Army no longer followed the strictures of “kid glove” treatments 
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toward civilians, there was a difference between foraging and pillaging, and the latter would 
not be tolerated under the command of the prim Howard.184 
 Sherman’s push for starting on a new campaign, rather than fruitlessly chasing Hood, 
gained momentum during the week after October 19.  On that day, Sherman sent two 
communications to the Chief of Staff that gave greater clarity to his plans.  In the first, a 
telegram sent at noon, Sherman promised to send the IV Corps back to reinforce General 
Thomas in Tennessee, reinforcing the defenses around Nashville should the Army of 
Tennessee finally take an offensive stance against that city.185  The second communication, a 
letter written by Sherman at Summerville, Georgia, gave the general more room to expand on 
his plans.  The Federal soldiers marching after Hood could not overtake the beleaguered 
Southern army; Hood’s army, unencumbered by supply trains, moved far faster than their 
opponents could hope.  Rather than continuing the fruitless chase, or moving in a defensive 
posture, Sherman pressed for the final permission to begin his movement into Georgia.  After 
destroying the rail connection between Chattanooga and Atlanta, Sherman wanted to leave 
Atlanta in such a manner as to leave everyone, especially his enemies, in doubt as to his final 
destination.  The general gave four possible avenues of egress from his Georgia campaign: 
Savannah, Charleston, Mobile, and Pensacola, and he asked that those four areas be put 
under surveillance so as to be prepared for his arrival.186  Sherman also practiced deception 
while on his march, sending his divisions on varied routes of march which threatened 
strategic points that he never intended to attack, keeping the outnumbered Confederate 
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defenders bottled up and confused near Macon and other vital points outside of the path his 
men took to the sea. 
 Most importantly, Sherman finally exposed the true purpose of his new campaign.  
Yes, he would destroy the railroad and threaten the major towns along his route of march, but 
he hoped for something much greater from the proposed march through Georgia.  By moving 
his army through the yet untouched heart of Georgia, Sherman hoped to emphasize the power 
of the Union Army and bring home the horrors of war firsthand to those who supported 
secession in 1861.  “They don’t know what war means,” declared Sherman, “but when the 
rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah see their fences and corn and hogs and sheep 
vanish before their eyes they will have something more than a mere opinion of the ‘Yanks.’  
Even now our poor mules laugh at the fine corn-fields, and our soldiers riot on chestnuts, 
sweet potatoes, pigs, chickens, &c.”  Yet Sherman also promised to visit this hardship on 
everyone.  There was no yeoman friend of the nation to be relied upon in Georgia, and all 
those who did not work hard enough to prevent secession needed to feel the same pain and 
deprivation as those who actively supported treason against the United States.  His army 
would not suffer in the face of want, no matter the class or political leanings of the people 
who fed the army against their will.  This was not a time for receipts and requisitions; this 
was a time for hardship and suffering as a means to educate the South, through Georgia’s 
example, of the folly of secession and war.187  
 That same day, Sherman wrote the men charged with the logistical support of his 
command.  To Colonel Amos Beckwith, acting Chief Commissary at Atlanta, the general 
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stated that he knew that Hood’s men were beyond his grasp.  As such, Beckwith needed to 
begin preparations for the coming campaign.  Giving him twelve days’ notice, Sherman 
declared that he want his army on a war footing, with nothing in Atlanta save those stores 
necessary for the movement of his men.  “Send all trash to the rear at once and have on hand 
thirty days’ food and but little forage.  I plan to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back to 
Chattanooga, and sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring upon the seashore.”188  He echoed 
these same orders to Chief Quartermaster L. C. Easton.  Sherman charged the quartermaster 
with the repair of the railroad back to Chattanooga to ensure the forwarding of necessary 
supplies to Chattanooga while also sending back excess material and those men unfit for the 
coming campaign.189  Sherman was once again putting his army into fighting trim, just as he 
did before the Atlanta campaign.  There would be no room for the infirm soldier who could 
not effectively make the march, nor was there room for superfluous baggage.  Uniforms, 
food, and ammunition, the barest essentials of an army, were all that he wanted waiting for 
his men in Atlanta when they returned from the fruitless chase after Hood.  Sherman ordered 
Henry Slocum, commanding the force at Atlanta, to ensure that “1,500,000 million rations of 
bread, coffee, sugar, salt, and 500,000 rations of salt meat” were on hand in Atlanta in 
preparation of the campaign.190  While the American mythos prefers to think of Sherman’s 
men living entirely off the land while marching through Georgia, the general himself knew 
better.  It was far better to bring enough food on the march to feed his moving army than it 
was to watch them starve should they be delayed by an opposing force, or find that the 
populace had acted to prevent foraging in any way. 
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 On October 26th, news of Hood’s army arrived at Sherman’s headquarters.  Hood’s 
men now occupied Decatur, Alabama, and, with the exception of Joseph Wheeler’s small 
cavalry force, no major Confederate military presence remained in northern Georgia.  This 
was the moment Sherman had long hoped for; the Army of Tennessee, outside of his reach 
and beyond the range in which they could threaten his plans, was Thomas’s problem now.  
Final preparations began in earnest to start the long march through Georgia.191  The next day, 
the general wrote his wife Ellen of his plans, preparing her for events to come.  “I expect 
very soon now to attempt another feat in which I think I shall succeed, but it is hazardous and 
you will not hear from me for months.  The War Department will know my whereabouts, and 
the Rebels and you will be able to guess.”192  While confident of the prospects of success, 
Sherman also hinted at the effect a change in plans at this juncture might bring.  “We can 
now live on the corn of the South, some salt and beef on the hoof, but it discourages our men 
to be compelled to turn back to attend to what others in our rear should.”193 
 On the morning of November 1, Sherman sent Grant a detailed telegram, laying out 
the state of affairs in Tennessee and Georgia, in essence pleading again for final permission 
to begin his march to the coast.  To chase Hood with the army negated the work of the year 
to date.  “If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he 
did here, retreat to the southwest, leaving his militia, now assembling at Macon and Griffin, 
to occupy our conquests, and the work of last summer would be lost.”194  Rather than 
granting final permission to proceed, Grant’s response triggered a rush of communications 
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that threatened all of Sherman’s plans.  Grant’s telegram of 6 PM, which Sherman claimed to 
receive on the morning of November 2, harkened back to the primary goal of the 1864 
campaign: destroy the enemy in the field.  While Sherman’s capture of Atlanta was a major 
coup for the Federal war effort, he had failed to destroy the Army of Tennessee, the main 
Confederate military presence in the western theater of operations.  With his men weakened 
from constant marching and few supplies, Grant’s message strongly stated to Sherman that 
Hood’s destruction was far more important that a romp through the countryside.195 
 Sherman’s reply to Grant, dated 11:30 on the morning of November 2, allowed 
Sherman to fully explain the tactical situation in Tennessee and Georgia to his commanding 
officer in Virginia.  To chase Hood was useless; his army was faster than Sherman’s larger 
force, Thomas held command of a force more than large enough to defend middle Tennessee, 
and he was a trusted, if not slow and methodical, leader with proven battlefield experience.  
Let the Rock of Chickamauga stand one more time, this time with a larger, better equipped 
force, in a strategically stronger location.  More important than the impossibility of catching 
Hood, Sherman saw his enemy’s movements for what they were: a diversion to draw him 
away from the breadbasket of the Confederacy.  Atlanta must be abandoned, no matter which 
direction Sherman chose; if it must be abandoned, then put the army into an offensive stance 
and move into Georgia, fulfilling Grant’s second directive for the campaign.  Hood now led 
an army in flight, an ineffectual fighting force wandering across the Georgia, Alabama and 
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Tennessee, and Sherman saw this as the chance to finally destroy the will and ability of the 
people of the South to make war against the United States.196   
 While Sherman awaited Grant’s reply as to the mission of the men in the western 
army, Sherman continued making preparations for his hoped-for campaign east-southeast to 
the Atlantic coast.  He ordered Chief Engineer Orlando Poe to prepare two separate pontoon 
trains for the use of the two wings of the army during the coming advance.  He also ordered 
Poe to prepare to destroy any remaining supplies in Atlanta, as well as any supplies or 
buildings that might provide succor to the enemy.197  Sherman wired General Thomas at 
Nashville the same day with more information about the known disposition of Confederate 
troops in Tennessee.  Sherman prodded his subordinate to concentrate his forces and 
preparation for action, but he also noted that with the chase of Hood completed in Georgia, 
he was now headed south to Kingston, Georgia, to begin final preparation for his 
departure.198 
 Grant’s reply came a few hours later.  Realizing that Thomas did in fact have an army 
at his disposal large enough to handle the combined forces of Hood and Forrest, and 
assenting to the fact that a move against the Army of Tennessee was in fact a retreat, Grant 
gave final approval of Sherman’s plans for the march he planned.  At long last, all the 
obstacles were pushed aside.  Now all that remained was the minutiae of final 
preparations.199 
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Sherman sent two communications to General Grant on November 6 that summarized 
his feelings on the true purpose of the coming campaign.  Sherman’s ultimate goal was to 
finally bringing home the terrors of war to the people of Georgia and the south as a whole.  
“If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to 
the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist.  This may 
not be war, but statesmanship, nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are 
thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the north can march an 
army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, 
leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power.”200  The damage done by 
a rampaging army, unopposed by those charged with protecting the Confederate homeland, 
would devastate the psyche of the South.  This was the ultimate means of fulfilling Grant’s 
plans for 1864 and bringing about a final victory; the Army of Tennessee had been swept 
aside and rendered impotent in the face of the Federal army, and now the people of Georgia 
must be made to feel the pain of defenselessness as the exemplar of Federal power in the 
west moved through their fields and farms at will.  The destruction wrought by Sherman’s 
men in Georgia would also aid Grant’s eastern campaign, stalled into a siege of Richmond; 
by subsisting on the fat of the land, Sherman’s men prevented precious food resources from 
feeding Lee’s army.201  Grant’s replied with his full support for the operation.  “Great good 
fortune attend you!  I believe you will be eminently successful, and, at worst, can only make 
a march less fruitful of results than hoped for.”202 
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William Tecumseh Sherman spent the next week speedily preparing his army for its 
grand movement.  Orders to the various posts and officers under his command kept his 
telegrapher and support staff busy day and night.  On November 9th, Sherman’s staff issued 
perhaps the single most important document related to the operations of the army in Georgia.  
As a mundane document necessary to the functioning of an army, Special Field Orders No. 
120 outlined the routes of march for the men under Sherman’s command, assigned the place 
of pontoon trains and wagons, and the like.  Yet the core of the orders spoke directly to the 
purpose and support of the movement at hand.  Removed from any lines of supply, and 
carrying thirty days’ worth of rations to be used only in the case of an emergency, the core of 
Special Field Orders No. 120 laid the groundwork for feeding the army and interacting with 
civilians during the weeks ahead.  Only corps commanders could order destruction of private 
property, and this was to happen only in the event that the army encountered armed 
resistance or attempts to retard the movement of the army.  Should that resistance be met, 
Sherman’s orders allowed his subordinate generals to “order and enforce a devastation more 
or less relentless, according to the measure of the hostility.” As an homage to the slave power 
conspiracy so prevalent at the beginning of the war, in foraging and taking animals for army 
use, the commander ordered his soldiers to consider the difference “between the rich, who 
are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly.”  No soldier was 
to enter a private dwelling, or use “abusive language” toward the civilians they encountered, 
but that was as far as manners went.  In order to feed itself, “[t]he army will forage liberally 
on the country during the march.”  Sherman officially charged organized brigade-level 
foraging parties to maintain the stocks of food and forage necessary for the logistical support 
of the army.  Any form of food encountered along the route of march was fair game for 
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seizure by foragers.  In essence, Sherman’s orders to his men, while written with the 
constraint of men’s passions in mind, opened the door to a wholesale devastation of 
everything that lay in the sixty mile wide path of his army.203 
 With the issuance of final orders, the army’s pace quickened towards Atlanta.  
Sherman departed for that point on November 12 after sending one last telegram to George 
Thomas.  With the words “Dispatch received – all right,” the last telegraph line connecting 
Atlanta and Nashville went silent, and all communications with the North ended.204  
Sherman’s army, divided into two bodies for the movement, set upon Atlanta, the gathering 
of the blue tide about to sweep southward.  Colonel Poe soon took to his special assignment, 
destroying any possible excess assets with fire and destroying the railroad infrastructure at 
the heart of the city.  The sky soon glowed red with the results of his work, although greatly 
aided by the actions of looters and hooligans, Northern soldier and Southern civilian alike.205 
 George Cram of the 105th Illinois Infantry wrote his final letters home on November 
6th and 9th, detailing his preparations for the coming campaign.  Old letters, reread one last 
time, went into the fire in order to lighten the load.  The soldier carefully packed his 
knapsack, including a small packet of tea, a comfort of life in garrison after the long 
summer’s work.  As one of the company non-commissioned officers, Cram also looked to 
preparing the company tools and paperwork for departure, sending some papers back for 
storage, while making sure that a few entrenching tools found their way to the sole company 
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wagon, should the enemy be found in force.206  Amid the other preparations for the coming 
march, Alexander Downing of the 11th Iowa Infantry noted the constant drilling of the 
company in order to prepare the new recruits for active service.207  As the men of the army 
gathered into Atlanta, Charles Wills noted that “[c]oming through Atlanta the smoke almost 
blinded us.  I believe everything of any importance there is on fire.”208  W. B. Emmons of the 
34th Illinois recorded that “a pall of smoke hangs over the ruined town and the great black 
cloud of smoke and forked tongues of shining flame roll up from many a house that has just 
caught fire.”  As with so many other regiments, the 34th passed out of the town and encamped 
outside the defenses, drew rations and uniforms in preparation for the movement, and waited 
for orders.209 
On November 15, the first of Sherman’s men began marching out of the ruins of 
Atlanta.  Men of the XV Corps rushed amid piles of quartermaster supplies, grabbing new 
shoes and replacements for their campaign-worn uniforms as they marched by.  The next 
morning, as dawn broke over north Georgia, William Tecumseh Sherman sat astride his 
horse on a small knoll and watched as the last of his men left the object of his long summer 
obsession.  Eleven years later, the General wrote perhaps the most stirring description of his 
army’s departure possible. 
. . . and reaching the hill, just outside of the rebel works, we naturally paused 
to look back upon the scenes of our past battles. . . . Behind us lay Atlanta, 
smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke rising high in air, and hanging like 
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a pall over the ruined city.  Away off in the distance, on the McDonough road, 
was the rear of Howard’s column, the gun-barrels glistening in the sun, the  
white-topped wagons stretching away to the south; and right before us the XIV 
Corps, marching steadily and rapidly, with a cheerful look and swinging pace, 
that made light of the thousand miles that lay between us and Richmond.   
Some band, by accident, struck up the anthem ‘John Brown’s soul goes  
marching on;’ the men caught up the strain, and never before or since have I  
heard the chorus of ‘Glory, glory, hallelujah!’ done with more spirit, or in  
better harmony of time and place.”210 
Hood’s army lay in the opposite direction; there was no chance for another Nickajack Creek 
or New Hope Church action.  On November 21, Hood left Florence, Alabama, to fight a 
bloody battle at Franklin and thereafter sit outside Nashville, passively waiting while Thomas 
completed preparations for his devastating counterattack in mid-December.  Only scattered 
portions of Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry and the old men and boys of Georgia’s home 
guard units stood between Sherman’s men and the sea coast at Savannah.  The March to the 
Sea had begun. 
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Chapter Four: 
“. . . Probably the Most Gigantic Pleasure Excursion Ever Planned:” 
Sherman’s Soldiers on the March to the Sea 
  
 The officers and men who marched with Sherman left their impressions of the march, 
the countryside through which they passed, and the horror they wreaked on civilians along 
their line of march.  While Confederate forces never threatened to stop Sherman’s advance, 
Confederate General Joe Wheeler and his limited number of cavalrymen and militia did seek 
to contest that advance.  The army marched in two broad wings, the Army of the Tennessee 
on the right flank and the Army of Georgia on the left, screened by General Judson 
Kilpatrick’s cavalry force.  In addition to the problems that Union foragers faced, portions of 
Sherman’s forces did see combat on November 22 at Griswoldville, as well as increasing 
enemy contact as they neared Savannah.  While contact with Confederate forces occurred, it 
did not provide the main narrative of the campaign.  Food filled that role. 
 For Major Charles Wright Wills of the 103rd Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, 
the Savannah Campaign began with his first glass of milk in eleven months, and things got 
more interesting from there.  The next day, November 16th, the Major took note of the “really 
fine country” that he and his men moved through, and again took note of the new culinary 
options supplementing his normal army fare.  After a camp servant prepared an opossum for 
breakfast, Wills wrote how the men of his mess “voted this morning that opossum meat was 
good enough for white folks.  I liked it very much.”  Glasses of milk and opossum breakfasts 
aside, the infantry officer delighted in what he and his men experienced in the Georgia 
countryside.  Just two days after the start of the campaign, Wills already summarized his 
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daily life: “This is probably the most gigantic pleasure excursion ever planned.  It already 
beats everything I ever saw soldiering, and promises to prove much richer yet.  I wish 
Sherman would burn the commissary trains, we have no use for what they carry, and the train 
only bothers us. . . . Our men are clear discouraged with foraging, they can’t carry half the 
hogs and potatoes they find right along the road.  The men detailed for that purpose are 
finding lots of horses and mules.  The 6th Iowa are plumb crazy on the horse question.”211  
On November 19th, Wills penned the results of his first interaction with a civilian while 
marching south from Atlanta.  After stating that the column of troops still marched through 
“a level, fine country” that was “well cultivated,” the Major took the time to thank a local 
woman for a rare occurrence he encountered at the end of the day.  “By the kindness of Mrs. 
Elizabeth Celia Pye, I occupy a feather bed to-night.  It is the first house I have been in for 
the last three months.  She understood from the Rebels that we burned all houses and she 
took all her things out and hid them in the woods.  The foragers found them and brought 
them in to her.”212 
Wills’ diary, published by his sister in 1906, recorded his daily life and observations 
during the March to the Sea.  Nearly every day on the march, Wills took note of his 
interactions with civilians, the environment, and the agricultural production of the state of 
Georgia, notably through the commentary on the food that found its way to his camp due to 
the foragers employed by General Sherman under General Orders Number 120.  He was not 
alone.  Of the sixty thousand men under Sherman’s command, a multitude of letters and 
diaries survive, giving light to the experiences of soldiers of all ranks as they made their way 
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from Atlanta to Savannah.  Some, like Mifflin Jennings of the 11th Iowa Veteran Volunteer 
Infantry Regiment, only recorded the amount of marching done during a day; other 
journalists simply stopped writing on November 15, 1864, only to resume once the army 
began the siege of Savannah.213  As with Wills, of those soldiers who did maintain a 
documentary history of their experiences on the march, almost all commented on three 
common aspects of their experiences: interactions with the environment, civilians, and 
agriculture, especially in the form of food.  These descriptors combine to show how the men 
of Sherman’s army understood their actions in Georgia as well as how they encountered the 
world around them as they helped ring the death knell of the Confederacy. 
Sherman’s men began their movement south from Atlanta early on November 15, and 
as the prospects for the future looked bright, the smoldering remembrance of a hard 
summer’s campaign lingered just over the shoulders of the departing army.  Sergeant 
Alexander Downing of the 11th Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry noted with enthusiasm that 
the column “[S]tarted early this morning for the Southern coast, somewhere, and we don’t 
care, so long as Sherman is leading us.”  The devastation of the long siege and fighting 
around Atlanta surrounded the men of the XVII Corps as they made that first day’s march, 
for Downing also took the time to mention the landscape around him.  “The country is very 
thinly settled and there is nothing to forage.”214  For an army designed to “forage liberally” 
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off the land to find its sustenance, an area of few farms and little food left after a summer of 
two armies taking whatever they needed boded ill for that first day.  Rations also played 
heavily on the mind of Allen Morgan Geer of the 20th IL.  His diary entry for November 15th 
listed the food carried in the regimental wagons to support the regiment on the campaign to 
come.  “Rations 15 days hard tack, 100 days coffee, 50 days sugar.  No meat or vegetables 
issued, 2 rations whiskey.”215 
The prospects for the coming days brightened considerably for Sherman’s left wing, 
the Army of Georgia, as it snaked its way further south.  Sergeant Downing noted with a 
farmer’s eye that the land through which he now passed was home to “some fine plantations, 
well improved with some good buildings.”216  Foraging parties found a much more 
productive region to operate in after the first days’ march, and John Gay of the 25th Iowa 
wrote that the men found “plenty of Forage of every kind we now live on sweet potatoes, 
beef, pork, honey and chickens[.]”217  Allen Geer agreed with Gay’s judgment on the rich 
nature of Georgia’s produce.  “This is rich foraging country. . . . Sweet potatoes and yams are 
found of all kinds and sizes.  Some of the latter weighing from 8 to 15 pounds.”218   
When Reverend G. S. Bradley of the 22nd Wisconsin Infantry ended his march on the 16th 
of November, he began his remarkably detailed journal of the March to the sea.  As the 22nd 
went into camp that night, a soldier found a supply of corn hidden by a local civilian which 
quickly became fodder for the horses of the regiment.  The ubiquitous sweet potato also 
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entered Bradley’s historical record, for the Reverend took note that “This is a great country 
for sweet potatoes and yams, the only difference between them being in the quality of the 
two, the sweet potatoes being finer.”  That night the menu for regimental headquarters 
consisted of “bacon, sweet potatoes fried, hard bread and coffee with sugar.”219  Bradley also 
gave a lengthy commentary on a conversation held that day with a local civilian.  While he 
learned that Sherman’s movement south caught the local populace completely unaware, 
Bradley also learned some of the agricultural history of the area through which he was now 
passing.  “The country through here was formerly owned and worked by rich planters, but 
exhausting the soil, they divided their large plantations, selling to poor men, and moved to 
Mississippi or Alabama, to the put the land there through the same exhausting process.”220  
The Reverend also recorded a rather humorous anecdote from another encounter he 
witnessed that day.  
By the road side, resided a family of Smith's. The following  
conversation occurred between one of the married daughters and one of  
our soldiers; 
"Is your husband in the rebel army?" 
"Of course." 
"Was he conscripted?" 
"No, sir, he volunteered; I would not have a man if he had to be conscripted!"221 
For George Sharland, a member of Company B of the 64th Illinois Infantry, the day’s 
orders meant marching in the rear guard of his brigade, protecting the wagons.   Sharland felt 
rather dejected at the assignment, for as he put it, “. . . being rear guard and having our 
charge to watch and care for, our time had not yet come to enjoy the common luxuries of the 
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sunny South. For in the main line of march of an army, everything in the line of eatables is 
taken in out of the wet by those that are in the advance, leaving the rear only the scanty 
pittance of their refuse, and sometimes not that.”  While Sharland longed to personally take 
part in the moving harvest brought in by others working to fill the provender of the column, 
the scenery of a summer’s fight surrounded him.  Sherman’s men now passed through a land 
that the soldier judged “was very good, and well adapted for farming purposes,” soldiers blue 
and grey had stripped the land “of everything in the shape of forage for either man or beast, 
from the fact that everything pretty much had been culled from it for the use of our army 
during the siege . . .”  While the diarist did not note the presence of common farm houses, the 
occasional plantation house, “large and stately,” found its way into the pages of his journal.  
These mansions were not the rewards of diligent work and a life well-lived, but rather “the 
product of compulsory labor and toil.”  The very slaves who provided the labor being the 
profit that built those homes lingered at the periphery as Sharland passed by, grim reminders 
of an unjust system, although their owners and masters seemed not to be present.222 
Company D of the 21st Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Captain John Otto, served 
as foragers for the regiment on the second day of the campaign.  It was a good day for the 
party, who returned to camp with a mule harnessed to a cart that carried sweet potatoes, 
molasses, honey, cornmeal, a two hundred pound hog, “a dozen turkeys and a dozen 
Chicken.”  As his party approached their camp, Otto remembered that the men from the 
division gathered by the side of the road and “cheered lustily” for every group of foragers 
and their prizes.  One man in Otto’s company was less than cheerful, however.  Identified as 
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“John,” the man lamented the lack of a good cooking vessel in the face of such bounty.  
“With mutton and fresh ham and turkey and sweet potatoes and cornmeal laying around him 
he grumbled.  On my inquiring what was lacking he groaned; ‘Oh my Dutch oven’!  The 
dutch oven we had to leave at Chattanooga at the beginning of the Atlanta campaign.  But he 
had a spider to fry in, and we had camp kettles to boil sweet potatoes; the only trouble was 
with the Cornmeal bread.”223 
 The foraging parties mentioned by the diarists acted as the official means of 
procuring food for Sherman’s army.  Several men, detailed from each company and 
regiment, became part of a larger body of men from their brigade who, under the direction of 
a regimental staff officer, set off away from the column for the day after being informed as to 
where to expect to meet the column at the end of the days’ march, generally at a crossroads 
along the route used for the day.  John Henry Otto felt the need to define foraging in his 
memoirs in the face of historical misconception.  “A good many people believe that the 
whole army was let loose bumming around like a lot of vagabonds, robbing and murdering 
and God knows what else.  That was not the case.  Why, we would have been gobled up, and 
taken prisoner, or killed within a short time by the rebel troops.”  Captain Hartwell Osborn of 
the 55th Ohio Volunteer Infantry described the sight of a party awaiting their unit at the end 
of day’s foraging: 
As the marching column neared its camp at night, at each cross-road would 
be found the party waiting to join its command.  The ability of the American 
soldier to get fun out of any and everything came out strong.  Wagons,  
carriages, buggies, in short, every vehicle was seized and loaded with the  
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spoils of the day.  Animals of every description and all sorts and sizes provided 
power; and too often the foragers presented themselves arrayed in motley finery 
of ancient date and fashion, and of no earthly use, except to add a fantastic air  
to the march of the invading army.  These rolling plains were fairly well cleared 
and cultivated, and proved to be a veritable granary.  The grotesque cavalcades 
nightly unloaded bacon, hams, sides, smoked and fresh meats, sweet potatoes, 
flour, meal, molasses, corn, fowls, ducks, geese, and turkeys; cows, often  
yoked with mules or horses, and drawing carts; sheep and hogs; and on more  
than one load a hive of honey gave evidence to the enterprise as well as the sweet 
tooth of the forager.224 
For those soldiers who wished to attempt to forage on their own, without the sanction 
of being part of an official party, military punishment sometimes awaited their actions.  
Captain Ephraim Wilson of the 10th Illinois Volunteer Infantry related the experience of two 
of the young men under his command.  After making camp one evening, the two men chose 
to find some excitement of their own and set off looking for their own food.  After shooting a 
hog, their division commander, General Mower, discovered the men busily cutting up their 
prize.  The general ordered the men tied up by their thumbs on the color line of their 
regiment, to serve as an example to others who would disobey orders.  While Wilson 
complied with the intent of the orders, he did so in such a way as to mitigate what he saw as a 
severe but necessary order.  The main lesson learned from the incident for the men of the 10th 
Illinois was vigilance in their surroundings, especially towards the presence of their own 
officers.  As Captain Wilson put it, “The boys, after this little episode, kept a close watch on 
Gen. Mower when they wanted to take in a pig or two or do a little foraging on their own 
account.”225 
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Army justice was not the only thing to fear for the forager, sanctioned or not.  While 
the main body of the Army of Tennessee had marched northward into Tennessee before the 
Savannah Campaign began, Sherman’s men still faced the haunting presence of Confederate 
cavalry under Joseph Wheeler as it screened the Federals’ march.  When Sherman left 
Atlanta, Wheeler’s cavalry force placed itself in position so as to protect Macon, an 
important arsenal and manufacturing point for the Confederate government, thus allowing the 
foraging parties to move relatively freely, but within days of the beginning of the campaign, 
units of rebel cavalry began to monitor and threaten the Federals out in search of food.  When 
the two opposing groups encountered one another, the foraging parties often deployed as 
skirmishers in order to fend off the mounted assaults.  They also played the role of a 
reconnaissance force, reporting back to the main army where they encountered Confederate 
resistance, allowing Sherman and his subordinates to know about the presence of Southern 
forces before the Federal cavalry could send such information up the chain of command.226 
Foragers who encountered Confederate cavalrymen in groups smaller than a full party 
faced a deadly reality.  Reverend Bradley of the 22nd Wisconsin related the tale of such a 
group.  On December 5th, a sergeant from the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division of the XII Corps ran 
into rebel forces while foraging with three other men.  After taking their day’s prizes to a 
crossroads church to await the main Federal column, the sergeant and his men found the 
bodies of four Union infantrymen, all shot in the breast, being buried by a group of slaves.  
The sergeant remained behind while his fellow foragers went back after something, and when 
they failed to return, he went in search of them.  After going several miles, the sergeant 
encountered a group of Confederates, and only escaped capture by riding hard for the route 
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of march.  The Southern cavalrymen gave up their pursuit only when the noise of the Union 
column told them that the sergeant was within reach of relief.  His companions were not seen 
again.227 
As the Army of Georgia continued south, the men of Sherman’s army continued to 
enjoy what might almost seem a carnival-like atmosphere, despite the occasional death of 
foragers.  None of the diarists make any mention of thoughts of the enemy or of any of 
hardships normally mentioned about a campaign.  Foraging continued to exceed any of their 
expectations, and several took note of the “fine country” they passed through still.  As Allen 
Morgan noted, “We pass through a splendid agricultural region and where the people have 
suffered but little from the ravages of an army.”  In fact, Geer’s only complaint seemed to be 
that the foraging party for the 20th Illinois went out on the wrong road, thereby not bringing 
as much as normal.  Albert Utterback, part of the foraging detail sent out by the 9th Iowa did 
not get lost, and the young man returned to camp with a canteen of molasses and sweet 
potatoes for his personal dinner.  As Reverend Bradley noted in his diary, “We are now 
striking through the very heart of Georgia.  All intend to live well during the campaign.”  
John Henry Otto remembered the central portion of Georgia as “a fertile, rich farming 
Country and quite well settled by planters.  It was full of large, well stocked plantations, such 
as we had seldom met with in Kentucky.  No armies, either rebel or yankee had ever been 
here . . .”228 
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 The 64th Illinois noticed a new and growing mass of humanity that attached itself to 
Sherman’s army as they moved away from Atlanta.  Slaves by thousands, some alone, some 
in family groups, began to follow the Union force.  Attracted by the strange army, as well as 
the martial music that sounded their arrival, slaves liberated themselves from the grasp of 
their masters in order to find freedom with the army.  According to George Sharland, the 
former slaves carried items of every description in every manner possible as they joined the 
army.  The chaos of the black flight drew comparisons to “the ancient Israelites’ exit from 
Egypt to the Wilderness,” an apt description for those fleeing from generations of forced 
labor and chattel slavery.229 
As the column passed south of McDonough, Georgia on November 18, foraging 
continued apace.  Captain George W. Pepper mentioned in his diary that more than two 
thousand men from Butler County, the location of the march that day, served in the ranks of 
the Confederate army; where he got this information is not recorded, but Pepper’s retribution 
against the local populace found its way to the pages of his diary.  “The poor people look 
surprised and begged us not to touch their scanty commissariat.  Sherman’s order was to 
forage liberally off the rich, and it was rigidly observed.”  Civilians in the route of march 
seemed more aware of the approaching troops, as the 22nd Wisconsin found out when they 
broke ranks at a place called Social Circle for a meal.  News of Sherman’s men reached that 
place the night before, and the soldiers found no rail cars and very few people upon their 
arrival.  Foraging was good in this land of empty homes, and the men brought in “literally 
everything” they could lay their hands upon.  That night, the 22nd went into camp on the 
plantation of a Mr. Jones, reputedly a former member of Congress from Georgia, yet the 
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owner failed to properly greet the men of the Federal Army; Mr. Jones fled his 2,000 acre 
plantation at their approach, telling his overseer that “it would not do for him to remain at 
home, as he had made too many speeches against the North when in Congress.”  The freshly 
harvested crops of 1864, apparently a banner year for the congressman, did not last the night.  
Several of Mr. Jones’ slaves also joined the column that night, causing G. S. Bradley to 
assume that “they had worked long enough for Mr. Jones.”230   
When the 64th Illinois caught sight of their foragers waiting to rejoin the regiment at a 
crossroads, the men struck a humorous chord for their comrades.  By the side of the road was 
a parade of every possible type of vehicle and means of conveyance the ingenious parties 
could find.  “Some could be seen with splendid horses, attached to silver mounted carriages 
and harness, driving in aristocratic style, the results of their adventure; some with light 
vehicles or buggies, driving like fast young men, with mules attached; others, not so 
fortunate as to secure horses or mules, get ropes and thereby attach steers, and even cows to 
buggies and carts, being the works and style of the olden time.”  The author even saw wagons 
and carriages pulled by former slaves, offered their liberty for pulling wagons of food to the army.231 
The narrative of the campaign continued much the same day in and day out as the 
men made progress toward the coast.  On November 19th, John Gay and the 25th Iowa 
crossed the Ocmulgee River near some “fine factories” that the river powered.  Those “fine 
factories” made a fine fire, destroyed as an asset to the Confederacy, but only after any cloth 
on hand was distributed to the “great number” of female workers present.  Ohioan George 
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Pepper’s men marched through “one of the best sections” of Georgia yet encountered.  “The 
soil is one of great fertility – the surface gently undulating; Jackson is the county seat. . . . 
The country around it, is one delightful, wide-spread plain, studded with an occasional rich 
planter’s residence.”  The presence of several plantations provided Allen Geer of the 20th 
Illinois the chance to deal with the boredom of marching; Geer began foraging books from 
the libraries of houses he passed along the road, although he didn’t always get to enjoy them.  
On the 20th, Geer mentions retrieving several volumes from local homes, but he soon lost 
them “through the agency of Capt. Raymond who is always around on the road.”  While Geer 
did not mention any punishment other than the loss of his entertainment, it appears that his 
officers wanted their men to keep their foraging activities restrained to the letter of their 
orders.232 
To Alexander Downing, those plantations were a wealth of agricultural production 
ripe for the picking; foraging provided a much more important source of food than ever 
before, because on November 20th for he mentioned the first time that he and his fellow 
soldiers were on reduced rations.  W. B. Emmons of the 34th Illinois echoed much the same 
tone about rations.  How was it that in this land of plenty, these men complained of the lack 
of food?  Word choice was important in these cases.  The men did not complain about a lack 
of food, but rather the lack of militarily issued rations.  As the soldiers themselves stated, 
food abounded throughout this early portion of the campaign.  Military rations, however, 
filled a void in the types of food mentioned in diaries and letters.  Coffee, sugar, and hard 
tack, the army’s form of bread issued on campaign, irreplaceable through foraging, had long 
acted as the mainstay of the army diet.  As such, William Tecumseh Sherman ordered that his 
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army carry twenty days’ rations in wagons for the Savannah Campaign.  In addition to the 
prepared rations transported in the wagon trains, Sherman’s men also drove a herd of 3,400 
cattle at the rear of the column.  These essentially emergency rations provided security in the 
event that food somehow failed to materialize in necessary quantities, or in the case that 
Confederate resistance slowed the march to the extent that foraging failed to supply the needs 
of the army.  Cut off from any form of immediate resupply and reliant on the land to feed his 
army, Sherman planned a layer of safety against the worst case scenario.233 
George Sharland documented not only the seizure of food from plantations and farms 
in the path of Sherman’s men, be also noted an important form of devastation visited upon 
any place where the army actually halted.  While food provided fuel for the inner man, men 
needed other fuel with which to cook their captured groceries.  Any piece of wood within 
reach of the army became fair game, and fences provided the easiest form of firewood for an 
army on the march.  As Sharland saw it,  
Fancy to yourself a large and wealthy plantation, surrounded and divided 
off with well constructed fences, for a mile or two in every direction, in the 
brief space of five minutes, cleared of everything, and present nothing but  
the appearance of a vast uncultivated plain, and yet such is the fact. For as  
soon as each regiment ascertains the whereabouts of its color line, two or  
three from each company can be seen rushing in wild haste in every direction  
of the camp to the fences, and piling up each for their respective companies;  
and as soon as they have stacked arms, each man instantly put off for his share 
—all presenting the appearance of rail brigades and divisions. The planters  
dread to see them more in this aspect of their warfare than any other, as it  
entirely cuts off their hopes for the prospect of a next year’s crop, but such is the 
dreaded fortunes of war.234 
                                                            
233 Downing, 230; Emmons, diary entry for November 20, 1864; J. Britt McCarley, “Feeding Billy Yank: Union 
Rations Between 1861 and 1865” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, December, 1998, 
http://www.qmfound.com/feeding_billy_yank.htm; Sherman, Memoirs, 684. 
234 Sharland, Knapsack Notes. 
107 
 
Once the soldier procured firewood, the men raced for water and straw or other bedding 
material, stripping the farm or plantation in question of every usable agricultural asset within 
reach.  The devastation of property could be total. 
Every day, the column moved forward, sweeping over the roads of central Georgia, 
marching relatively unopposed through one of the last untouched regions of the Confederacy.  
Allen Geer finally found a plantation where he “secured” a few volumes to help pass the 
boredom of the campaign without the interference of an officer.  The Harris plantation, 
Geer’s lending library of choice on November 21st, provided a mixed reading list for the 
traveling soldier; “Cogan on the passions, Loomis on the Elements of Geology, & The Devil 
on two sticks.” Whether Geer’s personal tastes ran the gamut from religion to science and 
cultural satire is unknown, but it is certain that in his case, the inner man was just as 
nourished as the physical man.235 
For Rev. G. S. Bradley, property of another kind continued to enrich the lives of the 
men on the march.  Slaves from the plantations through which the army passed continuously 
brought in the horses and mules under their care.  Ordered by their masters to hide the 
animals in the local swamps, the slaves chose to liberate themselves with the animals and 
join the Union Army, and the assistance rendered to the army extended beyond just bringing 
in horses.  As the Reverend saw it, “The feeling is almost universal among them to fall into 
our army.  They all seem to have the idea that we are down here to set them at liberty, or that 
the war is in behalf of the blacks.  They very readily tell us where anything is concealed, and 
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seem well pleased when we find various articles.”  In an area “more productive than any 
other we have seen,” such help ensured full forage wagons for Sherman and his army.236 
As the march continued on, an absence began to bother one Wisconsin officer.  His 
men never found garden vegetables during their foraging, nor did any other foraging party 
bring them in to the column for distribution.  Many plantations showed the evidence of a 
large amount of money and labor spent on landscaping and flowers, “but hardly a specimen 
could be found of such articles as beans, peas, carrots, lettuce, cellery, parsnips culliflowers 
or anything with which the gardens in the north abound.  Even onions could seldom be found 
but garlic grew wild in the fields.  Even the poorer class of the white people were to[o] lazy 
to raise such things.  At the best they would have a little patch of corn, sweet potatoes, 
pumpkins and gourds.”  Otto did grant some leniency to economically poor farmers in the 
path of Sherman’s army, noting that they tended to occupy less productive sections.  Lack of 
vegetables failed to bother another soldier.  George Pepper saw these plantations as islands of 
beauty and tranquility in an otherwise uncivilized land.  “The squalid, poverty and extreme 
misery apparent elsewhere and so irksome to a benevolent mind, does not exist here.”237 
Vegetable production was not the only critique Otto had for the Southern means of 
agricultural production he now witnessed in an area untouched by the ravages of an army on 
the march.  Marching through Georgia, Otto noticed very little wheat flour; corn meal instead 
marked the cereal staple of the Southern staple.  Perhaps the most wasteful form of 
production that he saw was open-field grazing. 
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If they wanted fresh meat or a beefsteak they sadled the horses and went  
a beast.  Their stock was all and allways running at large.  They were  
branded with the owners mark or name and they had to hunt until one of 
the right mark was found.  Many did not even know how many cattle they  
had.  The pasture ground was seldom enclosed, nor was any hay made as the  
Cattle were outdoors and found their living all the year round.  They did not  
care much for milk and butter, but some would keep a milch cow in a pasture  
near home. 
In the eyes of at least one Midwesterner, Southern agriculture seemed inefficient and 
slovenly, more content with impressive show than substance. 238 
The agricultural gleanings following the harvest of 1864 continued to richly feed the 
Federal army.  On November 23rd, Allen Geer described a rather idyllic scene.  Encamped 
near Gordonsville, Geer dined on “Molasses, Fresh Pork, & Sweet Yams” before spending 
the evening reading.  Sweet potatoes were indeed easy pickings for the men of the 20th 
Illinois, as they camped that evening on a plantation with “several thousand bushels” of the 
crop in storage.  W. B. Emmons of the 34th Illinois judged that the land which he and his 
comrades now camped near Milledgeville was “the best Country we have seen in the 
Confederacy.”  But Alexander Downing of the 11th Iowa noted a change in the country 
during that day’s march.  Sherman’s army began to enter the piney woods region of Georgia, 
and the transition marked one of the most commented geographic changes among the diarists 
in blue.  While the Iowan still noted the presence of “some very fine plantations,” the 
environment itself became more heavily wooded with pitch pine, a feature that would heavily 
influence the coming days of the campaign.239 
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As the country turned to pine woods, the topography became more uneven and many 
began to note the sandier composition of the soil.  One member of the 22nd Wisconsin wrote 
in his journal that “The soil must be rather poor through here, judging from the amount of 
sand it contains.”  The sandy soil also struck George Sharland’s imagination, but from an 
anonymous source he learned that the ground here was in fact productive and in fact 
preferred to the “low and dismal swamps” that more and more occupied the lowlands.240  
Sharland’s “low and dismal” description of the swamps was very nearly applied by 
George Pepper to the civilians he met along the path of the march.  The Ohioan did not hold 
the yeomanry of the state of Georgia in high esteem, and his post-war publication reflected 
his opinions rather openly.  “The people in this section are horribly ignorant.  The poor 
whites are the most illiterate and depraved creatures I ever saw – mentally and morally.  I 
don’t remember of ever having seen their equal.”  Pepper, whose earlier writing gave high 
praise to the taste and grand style of the plantation class, lambasted the common citizens of 
Georgia for their perceived lack of religion and education.  His journal repeated tales of 
women who could not say the ages of their children, families who seemed to lack any 
religion at all, and were ignorant of modern styles in clothing and manners.  When compared 
to the people of Western Europe, Pepper’s contempt ran deep.  “Edmund Kirke, in his work 
entitled “Down in Tennessee,” avers that the ignorance of the poor whites in the South is not 
so deep-seated and universal as that of the Irish and Dutch.  I must express my surprise and 
indignation at such an avowal.  I have seen the poorest, the most degraded subjects of 
Europe, and I must pronounce them superior to the imbecile looking creatures who eke out a 
miserable existence in the canebrakes of the Cotton States.”  Pepper’s stinging damnation of 
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the Southern populace was not universal; in fact, few soldiers recorded anything of the 
people they interacted with, save an occasional interesting conversation.  In many ways, the 
civilian unlucky enough to live in the path of Sherman’s men merely provided a temporary 
obstacle that only slightly impeded the ability of foraging parties to efficiently do their jobs.  
Few men even took the time to mention any interactions they had with those people unlucky 
enough to come in contact with the army.241   
The men of Sherman’s command now passed closer to the region around the Oconee 
River, and Charles Wills began to encounter new and unfamiliar plant life, noting in his diary 
on November 26 that he was “sure he saw palm leaf fan material growing.”  The next day, 
Wills mentioned a magnolia tree growing along the route of march, “the first I have seen in 
Georgia.”  G. S. Bradley took a decidedly judgmental tone in his journal the same day.  “I 
should dislike living in this part of Georgia very much indeed,” the Reverend declared.  
While the country was well timbered, perhaps reminding him of parts of Wisconsin, the soil 
was substandard to him.  Environmental concerns aside, Bradley found the area around the 
Oconee “extremely lonesome.”  The army encountered far fewer men in this portion of 
Georgia due to military service, and even male slaves were scarcer, conscripted into 
Confederate service in various capacities.  So few men were to be found in this part of the 
state that “women have the most work to do,” according to the minister. Unfortunately, the 
gentleman left no account of his thoughts on how well the women here were able to maintain 
their farms in the absence of those traditionally charged with agricultural production.  Despite 
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being forced to walk through the numerous swamps, the 34th Illinois enjoyed “splendid” health and 
were in “fine spirits . . . eating up the produce that the Rebel Army stands so much in need of.” 242 
By November 29 the piney woods section of Georgia grew denser, materially 
changing the tone of many soldier’s diaries.  Despite the fact that Charles Wills of the 103rd 
Illinois saw his first sugar cane farm, the pine forest played heavily on his mind.  “All day in 
an awful pine forest, hardly broken by fence or clearing.  I never saw such a lonesome place.  
Not a bird, not a sign of animal life, but the shrill notes of the tree frog.  Not a twig of 
undergrowth, and no vegetable life but the grass and pitch pine.  The country is very level 
and a sand bed.  The pine trees are so thick on the ground that in some places we passed to-
day the sight was walled in by pine trunks within 600 yards for nearly the whole circle.”  
Thankfully, the army was still able to bring in adequate forage even with the dramatic change 
in the environment.  The 11th Iowa drew only forty percent of their normal rations, but “the 
country still affords additional rations, such as potatoes and pork.”  Dr. John Hostetter, 
surgeon for the 34th Illinois Infantry, enjoyed the same type of forage that night, dining 
chiefly on “sweet potatoes, corncakes, pork, coffee and syrup.”243 
As the blue-clad army pushed through the piney woods closer to the coast, 
interactions with civilians also changed, or perhaps became more notable in this seemingly 
sparsely populated region.  As Alexander Downing wrote in his journal on November 30, 
farm houses were fewer in number, and those that stood in the path of the army represented a 
lower economic class than those farms and plantations found in the “good land” regions 
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found south of Atlanta.  Those small farms that Downing saw consisted of crude log 
structures, possibly reminiscent of his youth in pioneer Iowa.  As with other diarists, 
Downing only mentioned seeing “poor women and children” occupying these farms, as any 
men and boys old enough to fight served in the Confederate Army.  Charles Wills spent a 
period of time talking to a German-born farmer, from whom he learned that the army now 
marched through an area whose main cash crop was sugar.  Allen Geer took time off from his 
reading when rumors began to circulate about a group of foragers finding a large cache of 
gold hidden in the swamps; as he put it, “The people hide many valuables but they are 
generally found by our Wide a Wakes.”244 
On November 30, W. B. Emmons recorded a lengthy conversation he had with an 
elderly Georgia woman in Louisville.  The weather struck Emmons as nice as an Illinois 
spring day, one where he and his friends spent a good deal of time eating persimmons, 
sweetened by the November frosts.  Peering into a slave cabin, Emmons found several 
displaced books left by other foragers, including a copy of Milton’s Paradise Lost.  The 
soldier set about finding the mistress of the plantation, who was in another of the slave 
cabins, reduced to parching corn with the help of two female slaves.  “I told the old lady that 
as our soldiers were helping themselves to any thing that they wanted on her grounds that I 
wanted the book Milton but would not take it without her free consent,” the young man 
wrote.  The “old dame” consented, but not without lamenting the loss of some antique family 
china and wishing that the Federals would leave her alone and “go home.”  Emmons took 
this as an open invitation to discuss the merits of the war, perhaps goading her into further 
conversation.  Emmons proclaimed that the war was “for the restoration of the Union and 
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until that is accomplished it will go on.”  The two verbal combatants sparred back and forth, 
one backing the United States and the Federal government, the other arguing that the country 
as it existed before the war could never exist again, and the only way the war would end was 
when “all the Southern men were killed and crippled up.”  The sight of the elderly mistress 
sitting before the first struck hard at Emmons’ heart, and he soliloquized about the actions of 
his fellow soldiers during the past two weeks. 
[S]he went on parching corn poor Old Soul.  She had been wealthy by all  
appearances but now the fortune of war forces her to parch corn.  I suppose our 
straggling soldiers had taken all the provisions from her.  it is outrageous and  
against Gen Shermans orders but it is an evil that can hardly be stopped even by our 
Gen for we are living off the country.  we do not draw enough from our 
Quartermasters to keep us going and if we do not do some private foraging we would 
soon be reduced to starvation.  But there are hundreds of men in the Army that 
because they have a chance to look about for something to eat go it like a pack of 
thieves take money! watches! silver ware! finery! silk dresses! ribbons! womans and 
childrens clothing, insult white women! and go far beyond the bounds of human 
decency. 
Foraging had its limits, and for men like Emmons, the raucous nature of the March to the Sea 
began to border on robbery and cruelty in some cases. 
On December 1st the 21st Wisconsin moved into the transitional environment of the 
Piney Woods.  John Henry Otto took great interest in the changing nature of the landscape, 
noting the agricultural shift from upland crops like corn and cotton to the coastal crops of rice 
and sugar cane.  The new forest also piqued his curiosity.  “With the country the vegetation 
changes in generel.  The sturdy, tall whitewood, beach, soft maple and Chestnut give room 
for the life oak, red cedar, Cypress, magnolia and Palmetto.  The swamps are covered with 
tropical vegetation, so dense that not even a cat would find room for passage.”  Most 
impressive to the Wisconsin soldier were the pitch pines that now dominated the 
115 
 
environment.  The pines made for “excellent firewood,” but the smoky fires they created put 
off so much soot that they made “the whitest man into a nigger in less than no time and, what 
is the best of it, no amount of water” could clean the clinging soot from anyone so 
covered.245 
Not everyone was charmed by the changing environment as they approached the 
Atlantic coast.  Charles Wills wrote of the new landscape around him on December 1st.  Wills 
seemed drawn to the presence of swamp palmetto and palmetto trees, but his men found the 
presence of another type of plant life rather threatening from previous experience.  As they 
marched closer to the coast, Spanish moss began to sway from the branches overhead.  It 
reminded the men of their time along the Black River in Mississippi during the summer of 
1863.  “The men shake their heads when they see it and say, ‘Here’s your ager,” in reference 
to the likelihood of the fevers, disease, and illness found more commonly in the near-tropical 
climate.  Reverend G. S. Bradley agreed with the men of the 103rd Illinois; his diary noted 
that the march through the swamps already told on the health of the men in his Wisconsin 
regiment with many men already coughing and showing signs of growing sickness.246 
The army still foraged and camped at farms along their route of march.  One provided 
a humorous incident for Major Wills.  As he finished some paperwork at the end of the day, 
he overheard a captain talking of his men’s action that day.  “I heard Captain Smith say, ‘Our 
folks captured one Rebel ram.’  I asked him where, and he pointed out an old he sheep, one 
of the men had just brought in.”  The 22nd Wisconsin passed through a seemingly deserted 
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land, passing farms devoid of all but slaves.  The regimental chaplain thought that word 
reached the people of this section in such time that allowed them to escape the army.247   
George Sharland and the 64th Illinois encamped on December 1st near the plantation 
of one Mr. Jones who was not present to greet the Federal force, perhaps, as Sharland noted, 
because he was a member of the Confederate Congress, and as such felt that his future 
looked brighter in another place.  The plantation, well maintained and effectively farmed, 
gave a great spectacle to the men of the Midwest unaccustomed to such sights.  “It was three 
stories high with a square roof, while in the center of the same was a square enclose 
surrounded with a balustrade, thereby enabling the owner to enjoy a full and extensive view 
of his broad possessions.  The whole design forming a correct expression of genuine 
aristocratic proclivities.”  The agricultural spoils were just as great as the manor house they 
were meant to supply.  The smokehouse held choice cuts of pork that could not survive the 
quick work of the foragers, and an older slave placed in charge of hiding the plantation’s 
work stock came in and turned the horses and mules over to the Federals, “proving his 
genuine loyalty,” as Sharland noted.  The home of a Confederate legislator paid a heavy toll 
at the hands of the invading army.  Sharland wrote that the men of Sherman’s grand army 
caused the plantation to pay dearly for the insurrection of its owner, one that would teach a 
“silent lesson” for years to come for the owners’ role in plunging the nation into civil war.  
The people of the South who wanted war and secession “must expect terrible results” from 
the men charged with putting down rebellion.248 
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December 2 found John Gay and the 25th Iowa marching with the course of the 
Ogeechee River, although Gay mentioned that their progress was slow due to the cypress 
swamps.  The swampy ground forced the army to corduroy the road as they advanced, laying 
downed trees into the road bed so as to make a passable surface.  Because of the work in the 
swamps, the 25th Iowa only marched six miles that day.  Allen Geer did not note the length of 
his march that day spent guarding the wagons at the rear of the column, but he did stay at the 
same plantation that George Sharland wrote of the previous day.  While Geer failed to 
mention the results of that day’s foraging, once again he dabbled in the literary arts to his 
fiscal and moral satisfaction, thanks to Mr. Jones.  “Sold American Female Poets.  Read 
S[w]edenburg’s Heaven & Hell.”  For Jefferson Moses of the 93rd Illinois, the only thing 
memorable about December 2nd was that he drew government rations for dinner, a half ration 
of hardtack and sugar.  The countryside still afforded foraging parties the opportunity to find 
more than enough meat to satisfy the needs of the men.  Indeed, even Dr. John Hostetter of 
the 34th Illinois commented on the broad nature of the farm operations he witnessed that day.  
“The great wonder is the plenty found through this region.  Corn, wheat, rice, hops, sheep, 
molasses and sweet potatoes are abundant on every plantation.  Cotton here is grown on 
every plantation and it is not uncommon to see fifty acres and more in one field.”  Dr. 
Hostetter enjoyed a rather easy day while his regiment guarded a local crossroads; truly his 
main concern seemed to be commenting on the evening meal of “fresh pork, fried; sweet 
potatoes, boiled; baked flapjacks, syrup and coffee.”  The lack of china to dine from seemed 
to bother the physician, as he even took the time to comment on having to use tin for his meal 
service.249 
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The increased presence of sugar cane plantations itself created a situation both 
comical and problematic to the health of the men.  On December 3rd, John Otto wrote that 
some of his men began to suffer the ill effects of too much raw sugar consumption.  His men 
witnessed several slaves at work in the field who consumed raw cane sugar from the plant 
when in need of a break.  “The darkies cut of[f] a stalk, peel of[f] the rind and chew the 
marrow.  The men soon followed their Exemple and as the stuff is of pleasant taste indulged 
freely therein.”  Unfortunately the men under Otto’s command, the saccharin treat created 
gastrointestinal distress.  Too much sugar caused men’s bowels to loosen, and several hours 
after they indulged in their sweet snack, the men often had to break ranks and find a place to 
relieve themselves.  “After a few hours it was amusing to observe how anxiously the men 
would dodge aside in the woods or swamps which was the cause of much joking and 
merriment.”  The day was a pleasant one, as far as the diarists contended; Jefferson Moses 
avoided the sugar cane but supped on sweet potatoes brought in by foragers, and Allen 
Morgan Geer wrote “In foraging we find plenty, we see much, and in fact enjoy the 
campaign hugely.”250 
Rev. G. S. Bradley conversed that day with an overseer on the plantation where he 
stopped to feed his horse.  Feeding the animal directly from a corn crib, the overseer told the 
minister that prior to the arrival of Sherman’s army, his plantation possessed approximately 
3500 bushels of corn produced in that year’s crop “worth about $8,00 per bushel;” by the 
time the Federal army finished passing by, the cribs would be empty.  “The overseer 
remarked, that the women and children of the country must suffer very much after we go 
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away.”  Bradley also learned from the overseer that “The Confederate government calls for a 
tenth of all they raise. What would our northern farmers think to be thus taxed?”251 
The army’s foragers varied in their results on December 4th.  For the 103rd Illinois, the 
day was marked by an easy passage over good roads and the presence of vast quantities of 
sweet potatoes, “from 75 to 500 bushels” per farm.  Alexander Downing of the 11th Iowa 
found examples of some excellent farms as he marched that day.  “Good crops were raised 
the past season, the work having been done by old men and negro women.”  Unfortunately 
for Albert Utterback and the 9th Iowa, foraging proved an empty activity after he finished 
guarding a local home.  The 22nd Wisconsin received news about the fate of a group of 
unlucky foragers that afternoon.  “A few days ago, four men of the 55th Ohio were found 
hanging by their necks in the woods, with a piece of paper attached to one of them, stating 
that the hanging was done by members of company F, 21st Georgia.”252 
The 64th Illinois received a welcome gift from an unsuspecting Georgia farmer on the 
4th akin to Allen Geer’s practices during the march.  While stopped in the afternoon at an 
abandoned farmstead, the men of the regiment found a large stash of old newspapers which 
quickly passed from soldier to soldier, hungry for a taste of civilian life.  The treat did not 
last very long, as George Sharland remembered; “. . . the idea of being treated to a feast of 
reading matter is out of the question, as the necessity of timely reaching our distant camps is 
of more importance . . .” The men reached their night’s camp near Cameron Station in the 
late afternoon, only to discover a herd of hogs nearby.  Within short order, the men 
dispatched the unlucky swine, and fresh pork filled the menu that night, which Sharland and 
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his comrades enjoyed “squatting around nature’s table in true and genuine Chinaman 
style.”253 
John Hostetter of the 34th Illinois spent December 4th marveling at never before seen 
oddities.  The first discovery of note was “a kind of small tuber, somewhat less in size than a 
peanut. . . . The negroes call them grass nuts or chufusco.”  Hostetter also handled a piece of 
alligator leather.  The discovery of greatest comment, however, was a rice-hulling machine.  
Designed to clean rice after threshing, the machine featured “four tilthammers of square 
wood, in a mortar made of blocks” on a crank system.  While Hostetter failed to mention the 
mode of power used to operate the crank system, machines such as this rice huller would 
soon play a vital role in feeding the men of Sherman’s army.254 
On December 5th, Charles Wills wrote of an encounter with several slaves.  During the 
afternoon, “Negroes swarmed” the 103rd Illinois.  “I saw one squad of 30 or 40 turned back.  
Sherman’s order is not to let any more go with us than we can use and feed.”  Later, after 
sunset, a young slave girl came into camp.  Earlier that day, the girl showed Federal soldiers 
where her mistress ordered the plantation’s work stock hidden.  In return, Milly Drake, the 
slave owner and plantation mistress, “took half a rail and like to wore the wench out.  Broke 
her arm and bruised her shamefully.”  The unnamed slave waited until dark and looked to the 
Federal column for her freedom.  Her fate once inside Union lines remained unclear.  G. S. 
Bradley of the 22nd Wisconsin told of a conversation that day with a slave who aided three 
Union cavalrymen from Stoneman’s failed raid earlier that year.  The man sheltered and fed 
the men for several weeks before guiding them out of the area.  When Bradley asked the man 
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why the slaves of Georgia so willingly aided the men of the Union Army, the slave replied, 
"O," said he, "I knew that they were trying to set us free, and I was not afraid of them."255 
On December 6th, W. B. Emmons of the 34th Illinois got word of a tragic incident.  A 
farmer shot a soldier in the process of foraging, and the army wrought swift retribution upon 
the farmer’s property.  While the man who pulled the trigger eluded the grasp of a vengeful 
army, Emmons recorded that soldiers removed the family from their home and promptly 
burned the property.  To Emmons, Georgia at times was a world on fire.  “Our men burn all 
cotton gins and presses that have cotton in them day after day as the Column marches along 
the road we see the smoke and flames from the burning buildings we started.  Oftimes we can 
feel the heat of the fires as we march past, the buildings are so close to the road.”  Fear 
spread ahead of the oncoming column, and Emmons wrote that “the citizens hide their effects 
in the swamps or bury them to keep the hated Yanks from getting them out[.]”  A diarist in 
the 22nd Wisconsin also noted the wrath with which Sherman’s army sometimes acted.  The 
force stripped the land of anything of value for a width of forty miles along the route of 
march.  “No one, without being here, can form a proper idea of the devastation that will be 
found in our track. Thousands of families will have their homes laid in ashes, and they 
themselves will be turned beggars into the street. We have literally carried fire and sword 
into this once proud and defiant State.”256   
By December 8th, rations began to play a more important role in the campaign.  The 
20th Illinois found plenty of supplemental food that day, and Allen Geer’s foraging party 
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brought in “flour bacon pickled port fresh pork and molasses,” as well as a the usual 
selection of books that Geer always kept an eye out for.  However, the men also drew five 
days’ worth of rations that day, including “one pound hard tack to the man.”  Alexander 
Downing and the 11th Iowa received two days’ rations, with instructions to make them last 
for five days.  As the army continued further into an area dedicated to rice production and 
dominated by swamps, foraging opportunities began to disappear.257 
W. B. Emmons noted on December 9th that he witnessed very little cultivation where 
he passed, and the men were forced to use the swamp water for drinking and cooking, “which 
is very bad stuff.”  George Sharland wrote that foraging, in the terminology of his comrades, 
was “played out.”  After spending nearly a month living off the fat of the land, the men now 
faced short rations and little relief from the land.  Foraging parties searched longer and more 
intensively for decreased amounts of food.  In the Piney Woods region and the swamps near 
the rice plantations, the men turned in desperation to stalking loose cattle.  Under orders not 
to shoot animals, and painfully aware of the closer presence of the enemy, men became 
creative in the methods they used to dispatch their bovine adversaries.  Sharland described 
one strategy: 
Having a very wild and untractable heifer to secure, they surrounded it, and  
gradually narrowing the circle down to a small diameter, they made a plunge  
for its tail, which often turns out, not a very safe undertaking.  One of the  
number having secured it, clings to it with all the muscular strength he has to  
spare; the heifer in the meantime making desperate plunges to extricate herself;  
but others jumping in, secure the same hold, and pull in an opposite direction  
with all their might having by these means considerably retarded her progress; 
another jumped in and secured her by the horns, while the executioner with the  
axe, struck the fatal blow but it often turns out that the adventures get a little  
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worsted, and can be seen sprawling on the ground in near proximity, while  
the poor animals make good their retreat, to elude if possible, further pursuit.   
The men used a similar manner to trap and deal with hogs.  While a certain amount of levity 
surely ensued in such an act, it was actually an act of desperation, a struggle to feed 
Sherman’s men as they passed through an area that offered little to eat.258   
 If free-ranging cattle were unavailable, and with all other forms of foraging “played 
out,” Sherman’s commissary began to issue what rations were available.  George Sharland 
claimed that after December 9th, no hard tack remained for issue, and that the 64th Illinois 
only received coffee.  M. D. Gage of the 12th Indiana merely claimed that the men of his 
regiment were issued reduced rations.  To alleviate the situation, the army began to issue 
fresh beef, culled from the herd brought along on the hoof from Atlanta, as well as the rice 
found locally.  Army beef, as Sharland wrote shortly after the war, provided an exercise in 
chewing.  These cattle “have been driven on foot from the Ohio river to the coast, at all hours 
and under all circumstances, by night and by day, through streams, swamps, bogs, 
quagmires, woods, and dense bush, with scarcely anything to eat but what they could pick up 
by the way, and huddled together in big droves and placed in all conceivable circumstances, 
that by the time it is issued to the rank and file, most of the flesh has disappeared from the 
bones, leaving nothing but the frame work or structure to be issued to the troops—the very 
smell of it sometimes proving very disagreeable to one’s olfactories.”  For those accustomed 
to army rations as well as the bounty afforded by foraging, bony, worn-out livestock with 
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nearly a thousand miles under their feet proved poor fare.  Hunger made the option 
acceptable to the discerning palate.259 
   Despite Dr. Hostetter’s earlier description of a rice hulling machine, the army issued 
unhulled rice to the troops.  Expedience required issues of food as it became available to the 
men, and in the swamps surrounding Savannah, rice became the cereal of necessity.  The 
men attempted various means to separate the rice grain from the hull.  George Sharland 
recorded that some groups of men constructed mortars and pestles to clean the grains, a 
technique learned from local slaves.  On December 11th, Captain John Otto of the 21st 
Wisconsin described the threshing and cleaning process as he witnessed it.  The 20th Corps 
provided the means for threshing the rice after capturing a threshing mill on an island outside 
of Savannah.  Otto noted that some preferred to use mortar and pestle, which also relied upon 
fanning the rice away from the chaff by winnowing, an action familiar to soldiers who 
farmed before the war and did not have access to a fanning mill.  “In this operation we 
usually had to raise the wind, which was done either with the hat, or big fan made from old 
tent cloth, bags or any kind of rags we could get hold of, stretched on a frame.  The stamping 
and winnowing was repeated until the kernels were free of shells.”  Others chose to clean and 
thresh their rice in one operation by placing the grain to be cleaned in a bag and beating the 
bag against a tree stump or rock.  “This process was more slow but no rice was wasted, 
which could not be avoided in the stamping process.”  Once cleaned, Otto wrote that the men 
took their rice “boiled with salt and water we took it with gries, or without, but one becomes 
                                                            
259 Sharland, December 10, 1864; M. D. Gage, From Vicksburg to Raleigh; or A Complete History of the 
Twelfth Indiana Volunteer Infantry (Chicago: Clarke & Co., 1865) page 266. 
125 
 
soon tired of and disgusted with it if eaten three times a day.  How the Chinese and Japanese 
get along with it is more than I can account for . . .”260 
John Gay of the 25th Iowa mentioned the rice now issued to the men in their ration, 
but also noted that oysters were present in abundance, offering a new diversion from army 
beef and rice.  The 34th Illinois seemed to not avail itself of the seafood, as W. B. Emmons 
only mentioned beef and rice as the main form of sustenance.  The “awful swamps” bothered 
Charles Wills due to the inability to find enough flat, dry ground for his men to sleep at night.  
As always, Allen Geer defrayed the swampy experiences and poor rations in his usual 
manner: “Read Richard’s Electron a poem on the power history and uses of electricity.”261   
The 11th Iowa ran out of rations on December 13th.  “. . . no more can be issued until 
we open up communications with the fleet,” bemoaned one Iowan in the unit.  “To do that 
we shall have to open a way to the coast.  Our men have foraged everything to be found.  The 
only thing that we can get now is rice, of which there is a great deal in stacks, besides 
thousands of bushels threshed out, but not hulled, and stored away in granaries.”  The 20th 
Illinois sent out foragers in a vain attempt to find enough food for the regiment.  The party 
“captured a wagon load of corn & potatoes with two yoke of steers and darky.”  The 
regiment slept well that night after a feast such as that.262 
Despite the fact that Fort McAllister, the Confederate bastion on the coast that 
prevented Sherman’s resupply from the sea, fell to a Union assault on December 13th, food 
relief did not immediately begin to flow into the Federal army outside of Savannah.  Albert 
                                                            
260 Sharland, December 10, 1864; Otto, 312-313. 
261 Gay, cited in Meyer, Iowa Valor, 396; Emmons, diary entry for December 12, 1864, page 2; Wills, 334-335; 
Geer, 182. 
262 Downing, 237; Geer, 182. 
126 
 
Utterback went to bed the night of the 13th hungry after he failed to receive any form of 
rations that day while on picket duty.  Alexander Downing looked forward to the renewed 
issue of full rations, delayed by the presence of Confederate torpedoes in the Savannah River.  
“There is great rejoicing in camp, as we have nothing left but unhulled rice.”  W. B. Emmons 
still lived on rice and beef on the 14th, as well as coffee made with swamp water.  Emmons 
wrote of hulling the rice by putting it in a sock and beating it with a stick to little avail.  More 
noteworthy to him were the thousands of slaves that wove their way into the life of the army 
after they followed it to freedom.  “[I]t appears that the slave women are more anxious to get 
free of their masters than the males are and many a slave mother has carried her little child in 
her arms, endured the hunger and hardship of the march to be free.”263   
Relief came to the men of the Military Division of the Mississippi slowly but surely.  
On December 17, Jefferson Moses of the 93rd Illinois still subsisted on nothing more than 
rice.  “It is very good but still hard tack and sow belly would go much better here.”264  
However, as army rations flowed in from the waiting naval vessels of Savannah, the men 
began to write accounts of the last month of their lives that glossed over the more recent 
hardships.  Frank Malcolm, a sergeant in the 7th Iowa Infantry wrote a letter home that 
remembered rather glowingly his life of the last thirty days.   
We have in the last month passed through a fine country with the  
Exception of about 3 days travel in the pine swamp and with the exception  
of four or five days the weather has been beautiful and the Roads good.   
forage has been plenty and while on the move we lived fine had plenty of  
frish Beef and Pork Chickens Turkeys Gees & &.  in fact “we had all that  
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we wanted to eat had Plenty of Sweet Potatoes Turnips Cabbages corn  
meal molasses salt sugar &&  there was a guard stationed at every house  
& guard all that was inside of it & to protect the women & children but the 
soldiers were at liberty to take all that they could find out side of the house  
or on the farm we are now living rather hard but I think we will have plenty 
 in a few days all that we have to eat now is Cornmeal and Beef.  we live on  
mush & fryed beef.  I could not care if I could get plenty of coffee but we  
do not get anything excepting what I have mentioned.265 
George Cram wrote his mother on the 18th, extolling the great bounty of food he and his 
friends fed from.  Foraging successfully fed the men as long as the army kept moving; when 
the army met Confederate resistance before Savannah, food became the one great question 
for Cram and his comrades.  According to the letter, the rice and beef met that so dominated 
other soldiers’ accounts was better than nothing for the men in the 105th Illinois, at least until 
regular rations could once again make their way from the Navy.  Edwin D. Levings of the 
12th Wisconsin sent a letter home to his parents the same day wherein he gave an account of 
his foray into Georgia with Uncle Billy.  “We lived off the country almost entirely.  We had 
only 12 days rations hardtack issued to us while on the way and full rations. We took 
everything we could lay our hands upon and I will say never since I have been a soldier did 
we fare better, lived like princes in the eating line, flour, meal, rice, fresh pork, chickens, 
geese, turkeys, honey, fresh beef, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, turnips, sugar and molasses 
being plenty. But we took all and there is not enough left along the line of our march to save 
the people from starvation. They must go elsewhere or suffer with hunger.”266 
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 Some civilians would indeed “suffer with hunger” in the wake of Sherman’s army.  
Like locusts, the Union force stripped the land of every useable item in a three hundred mile 
long swath across the heart of Georgia.  For the men of the Midwest, however, the Savannah 
Campaign proved to be almost a non-event.  For those soldiers who bothered picking up their 
pen at the end of the days’ march, their diaries reflect the bounty of the land that entered their 
camps in the forager’s wagon.  Some found a new environment to study, enamored with the 
palmettos and magnolia trees of coastal Georgia that complimented the well-groomed 
plantations and tasteful architecture found during the early days after leaving Atlanta.  Many 
men took the time to praise the “good land” they saw around them in those opening days of 
the campaign; with the eye of a farmer or those used to the agricultural landscape of the 
Midwest, these soldiers admired the well-cultivated larger farms that showed an organized 
effort to tend the land in an efficient manner.  But this was not truly the pleasure excursion 
that Charles Wills spoke of shortly after leaving the wastes of Atlanta.  Sherman’s Savannah 
Campaign proved to the dying Confederacy that it was useless to resist the might of the 
Federal government and its armies in the field. 
The March to the Sea was over.  Behind Sherman’s army lay the ravaged landscape 
of Georgia.  After a short period of rest and refitting in Savannah, the men turned north, their 
gaze set on South Carolina, where the army truly came to perfect the role of punitive 
foraging.  The fate of the seat of secession and war mattered little for the civilians left in the 
wake of Sherman’s army.  For them, the narrative of the previous month was not one marked 
by feasting and pleasure.  Instead, theirs was a tale of survival in the face of an oncoming 
army. 
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 Chapter Five: 
 
Those Who Remained Behind:  
The Women of Rural Georgia and the March to the Sea 
 
When William Tecumseh Sherman’s men swept southeastward from Atlanta, they 
found an agricultural land untouched by war, but that land was not uninhabited.  Thousands 
of small farms and plantations lay directly in the path of the Union Army as it snaked its way 
towards Savannah.  While the male population of Georgia early on had flocked to the colors 
and enlisted to fight for the Confederacy and later faced conscription to maintain the armies 
in the field, the women of the South remained behind to manage their family farms and 
plantations to the best of their ability, thrust into unfamiliar roles by the necessities of war. 
Unfortunately, the women of Georgia’s farms and plantations did not leave as 
expansive a record of their experiences with the invaders as did those who lived in Georgia’s 
small towns and cities.  The wealthy plantation class contributed most if not all of the written 
accounts available to the historian today.  The voice of the yeoman’s wife is lost, 
unfortunately.  As such, the civilian accounts of the March to the Sea are heavily skewed 
toward the upper-class experience; these accounts are skewed even further by the relative 
distance between when the women who endured Sherman’s campaign first set pen to paper, 
and when they were edited and published.  Later generations must sift for the truth through 
the invocation of the Lost Cause mythos.  For example, Julian Street edited Dolly Lunt 
Burge’s diary and published it in 1918, in the midst of the First World War.  Street’s 
introduction to the text invokes the Rape of Belgium as a comparison for the Savannah 
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Campaign.267  Other works cited herein saw publication between 1906 and the middle of the 
twentieth century, often in the works compiled by the United Daughters of the Confederacy.  
Eliza Frances Andrews’ tale of refugee life in the face of Sherman’s army begins with a 
lengthy defense of the Old South as pure and almost holy state, the last bastion of culture and 
social bearing before the descent into wage slavery and corporate oligarchy, a place noted for 
the presence of “faithful” servants until the army brought social change.268 
In November, 1864, these women faced down a threat greater than the loss of labor or 
the deprivation caused by the Federal blockade.  Sherman’s grand Military Division of the 
Mississippi, the great western arm of the Union Army, now descended slowly from the 
smoldering ruins of Atlanta, its eye set on Savannah and the Atlantic coast.  No great 
Confederate force stood in its path; the Confederate Army of Tennessee marched now in 
Tennessee on the way to its near destruction at Franklin and Nashville under John Bell Hood.  
Only a small cavalry force remained, just large enough to pester the flanks of Sherman’s 
army and watch where the Federals went.  Rumors moved faster than Sherman’s men, and so 
those women and families with enough prescient knowledge took what actions they could to 
prepare for the invaders.  Fueled by these tales and rumors, Georgia’s rural populace 
struggled to hide their possessions and provisions, all too often in vain.  It seemed that only 
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luck itself stood between the farm wives and plantation mistresses of Georgia and the utter 
ruin that followed in the path of the hungry blue army that marched unstoppably toward 
them. 
 Dolly Lunt Burge, a thirty-seven year-old widow, lived on a plantation near 
Covington with her young daughter and approximately one hundred slaves.  On November 
16, 1864, while traveling from town after she completed some household marketing, Burge 
encountered two neighbors who asked if she was aware that the Sherman’s army was on its 
way to the area.  Burge quickly put the idea aside, and she commented to her diary that more 
than likely the rumors dealt with a foraging party.  As evening approached, she walked to a 
nearby home to see if there was any more news about the gossip, only to find Joe Perry, the 
head of the household, preparing to report for Home Guard service.269 
Word arrived the next day that shook Burge to her core.  Her wishful thoughts of a 
small Federal foraging party evaporated when the neighbors informed her that in fact “a large 
force moving very slowly” was headed towards her home.  The thoughts “What shall I do?” 
and “Where go?” dominated Dolly’s mind that night.  She “[s]lept very little” that night, and 
every time she went outside and stared at the northern horizon, the bright glare of buildings 
aflame dominated the skyline.270 
The plantation mistress refused to leave her fate in the hands of the oncoming army.  
Early on the morning of the 18th, Burge took steps to secret away some few provisions in 
order to survive the coming horde.  She ordered two mules taken into hiding to preserve 
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some small amount of her work stock.  Next, Burge ordered her slaves to disguise a barrel of 
salt, a precious commodity in the blockaded South, as an ash-leaching barrel used for the 
manufacture of lye.  Finally, she had some of the meat in her smokehouse hidden in an out of 
the way portion of the grounds and the wagon used disassembled and stashed away as well.  
With these few steps, Dolly hoped to save something against the worst she thought an army 
could do.  After the men completed her orders, she then set them to the fall plowing, perhaps 
to disguise any anxiety felt on the plantation, as well as to go about the usual tasks involved 
in farm maintenance.  An army might well be on its way, but life needed to go on once the 
invader passed.271 
No sooner were these few tasks completed than she learned the proximity of 
Sherman’s force.  Several slaves asked to hide their personal property, especially their mules.  
Word had spread quickly among the slaves of the nearby plantations that the Federals took 
all the livestock they found, no matter who claimed ownership.  As such, Burge allowed her 
coachman to take his herd of forty hogs and hide them in a distant swamp on the property.  
For the rest of the day, life seemed at a standstill.  Burge took up some sewing projects, but 
she reported that most of the slaves on her plantation sat idle in the face of the strange army 
that hovered in the distance.    That distance closed with every hour, as she learned when one 
of her slaves, returning from an errand to a neighbor, told of encountering two Union 
foragers who encouraged him to run away.  Tension began to build on the Burge 
plantation.272 
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November 19th began with an almost palpable sense of foreboding.  Dolly Burge slept 
in her clothes, sure that the Union Army would come in the middle of the night.  After 
breakfast, Burge and her daughter walked to a neighbor’s house to see about any news of the 
Federals.  As they talked in the road, the neighbor looked for her husband who hid the night 
before after portions of the Union force visited the plantation of her in-laws.  As the two men 
emerged from the nearby hiding place, a group of blue-clad soldiers crested a hill.  The sight 
struck terror in Burge’s heart, and she ran for her home.  As she fled, she heard the two 
recently hidden men shoot at the oncoming force, only to hear their opposition met with a 
salvo of Federal guns.273   
Dolly Burge arrived at the front gate of her home at almost the same time as the first 
Union foragers.  She rushed to tell her servants to hide themselves before she went in search 
of a guard for her home.  It was too late, as she recorded the maelstrom that exploded in her 
front yard.  “But like demons they rush in!  My yards are full.  To my smoke-house, my 
dairy, pantry, kitchen, and cellar, like famished wolves they come, breaking locks and 
whatever is in their way.  The thousand pounds of meat in my smoke-house is gone in a 
twinkling, my flour, my meat, my lard, butter, eggs, pickles of various kinds – both in vinegar 
and brine – wine, jars, and jugs are all gone.  My eighteen fat turkeys, my hens, chickens, and 
fowls, my young pigs, are shot down in my yard and hunted as if they were rebels 
themselves.”274   
Burge pleaded to no avail with a nearby officer to stop the hurricane that swept over 
her home and plantation.  Helpless, she saw her horses and mules laden with all that the 
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foragers could take and lead away, followed closely by her young slaves.  Burge claimed that 
the Union soldiers forced her young male slaves to come with them, some at the point of 
bayonet; at least two boys attempted to hide before they were forced to leave their cabins.  
Burge lamented the loss of her slaves and railed at the invading army that perpetrated this 
deed.   
They are not friends to the slave. We have never made the poor,  
cowardly negro fight, and it is strange, passing strange, that the all- 
powerful Yankee nation with the whole world to back them, their ports  
open, their armies filled with soldiers from all nations, should at last take 
the poor negro to help them out against this little Confederacy which was 
to have been brought back into the Union in sixty days' time!  My poor  
boys! My poor boys! What unknown trials are before you! How you have  
clung to your mistress and assisted her in every way you knew.  Never  
have I corrected them; a word was sufficient. Never have they known want 
of any kind. Their parents are with me, and how sadly they lament the loss  
of their boys. Their cabins are rifled of every valuable, the soldiers  
swearing that their Sunday clothes were the white people's, and that they  
never had money to get such things as they had.275  
The Federals continued to loot the Burge household, including the slave cabins.  Every item 
of marginal use disappeared, until the plantation’s mistress sought permission to bring her 
possessions, as well as those of her slaves, into her room, the one sanctuary from the storm 
afforded to her.276 
 One of the Federal officers that entered Burge’s home became a source of comfort.  
Identified as a Captain Webber, the gentleman took the time to talk with the nearly hysterical 
woman.  After he offered her his personal protection against further action, Captain Webber 
informed Dolly Burge that he knew her brother back in Illinois.  The officer expressed 
surprise that she had not stored any foodstuffs inside her home in light of the order that 
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forbade entering private homes; Burge stated that such measures had no effect during the 
raids she suffered through the previous summer.  While the officer showed sympathy with 
her plight, he also took no action to alleviate her condition.277 
 All day long, Sherman’s army trudged past Burge’s plantation.  Each passing 
regiment added to the devastation that surrounded the scared woman.  Her fences 
disappeared, torn down for easier access to the gardens and to open easier paths.  The army’s 
cattle herd trailed across her land, which added to the destruction of the land itself.  As Burge 
witnessed the passage of the army, she thought that much of the damage was done 
“wantonly,” almost for fun, “when there was no necessity for it.”278  Someone attempted to 
burn the cotton stored in her carriage house; the bales smoldered but failed to ignite, saving 
the building and everything stored in it.  As night finally fell, Dolly Burge found herself 
crowded into her bedroom with her daughter and several of her slaves.  All watched with 
anticipation for soldiers to set fire to the other buildings on the plantation, an action that 
failed to occur.  Eventually, even the two soldiers that guarded Burge’s home came in and 
laid down for the night in front of her fireplace.  Burge could not sleep that night, and she 
paced the floor and wondered what the future held for her.279 
 As the sun came up on November 20th, Dolly Burge expected more of the same 
treatment from the rest of the army.  She and those female slaves that sought sanctuary in her 
room breakfasted on a chicken shot the day before and found in the yard, as well as a few 
yams.  She traded a little breakfast for some coffee, and then those soldiers who encamped on 
                                                            
277 Ibid, 27-29. 
278 Ibid, 29-30. 
279 Ibid, 31-32. 
136 
 
the grounds of her plantation departed as a part of the main Federal column.  By ten o’clock 
that morning, no one else attempted to molest Burge’s property, and save for one request for 
a bucket of water, the Southerner reported no other interactions with any of Sherman’s men.  
Dolly traveled to a close friend’s home to commiserate about the damage done, an act 
interrupted by a rising pall of smoke in the direction of her home.  Rushing home, Burge 
surmised that it was the cotton gin of another neighbor down the road.  She supped that night 
with her slaves in one of their cabins.  She confided to her journal that she felt “so thankful 
that I have not been burned out that I have tried to spend the remainder of the day as the 
Sabbath ought to be spent.”280 
 For the next several days after the departure of the Sherman’s army, Burge attempted 
to return her life to normal.  She took a quick inventory of what remained and found several 
bushels of potatoes, as well as wheat, syrup, and some meat in her smokehouse.  To protect 
these precious commodities, Burge ordered these hidden in her rooms in case some 
straggling bummer came to her home.  Thankfully, two forlorn cows from the army’s herd 
strayed on her property, and the two Union cows quickly fell under the knife to restock that 
which was stolen.  Burge shared the meat with some of her neighbors, with whom she also 
compared losses and celebrated the survival of the men she thought died when Sherman’s 
men first appeared.  In the process of reassembling her life, Dolly Lunt Burge, plantation 
mistress and long unaccustomed to the benefits of all that accompanied that class, traveled by 
wagon with a load of wheat to a local mill in order to procure flour for her home.  “Never did 
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I think I would have to go to mill! Such are the changes that come to us!”  Indeed, life would 
never be the same for Burge.281 
 After they departed the Covington area, Sherman’s men continued on their march to 
Savannah.  Soon after they passed Dolly Burge’s plantation, the army entered Jasper County, 
the home of Louise Caroline Reese Cornwell.  Cornwell lived on a plantation near Hillsboro, 
along with her mother, niece, and two cousins, refugees from Memphis.  On the morning that 
the Federal army came to their farm, a group of Confederate cavalry arrived shortly before 
their counterparts and asked the family for breakfast.  Nervous about the rumored retribution 
that such an action promised, Cornwell refused them food and begged for them to leave.  Just 
as the rebel horseman left, Union soldiers appeared and gave chase to the Confederates.  For 
the rest of the day, the Union army passed their home, and groups of foragers entered the 
property in search of food and spoils.  The destruction was total.  “We had a negro boy who 
was our dining room servant and hostler.  The Yankees made him ride one of the carriage 
horses off and lead the other.  They drove off every cow, sheep, hog, yea, indeed, every 
living thing on the farm – took every bushel of corn and fodder, oats and wheat – every bee 
gum, burnt the gin house, screw, blacksmith shop, cotton &c.&c.” According to Louise 
Cornwell’s account, the family’s slaves never betrayed the location of any secreted goods, 
unlike stories related to her by friends and neighbors.  One slave, an “Uncle Peter,” remained 
so loyal to the family as to never visit the Federal camps, and assisted the family when he 
located what food he could after soldiers looted the plantation. 282  
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 For four days the army passed by the desolate home.  A cold front accompanied the 
Union Army which brought a chill to the air, perhaps made worse by the mental scars of 
invasion and loss.  “We had little fire,” wrote Cornwell, for despite the loyalty of her slaves, 
“the negroes did not provide wood for us as was their custom.”  The Federals destroyed 
every possible form of transportation, burning the wagons as well as taking the work stock.  
Every axe and cutting implement departed with the soldiers, and what food remained on the 
home place “was destroyed by being made unfit to eat.”  During the passing of the army, 
only one momentary pleasure brightened the lives of Cornwell and her family.  A band 
attached to the XVII Corps played “Lorena,” a popular sentimental song of the era.  “For a 
moment we enjoyed it, then looking around, seeing our desolation the thought involuntarily 
came, ‘This music plays her gayest airs as in mocking of our woe.’”283 
 Emma Manley’s trouble with Sherman’s foragers also happened in Jasper County.  A 
resident of Spaulding County, Manley’s parents sent her away to refugee with extended 
family near Macon because of the Yankee invasion.  Manley left home on November 16 with 
“two large wagons” filled “with edibles, valuables, and comforts.”  Emma rode in the 
family’s phaeton, pulled by a matched pair of prized horses, all intended to make her life in 
hiding comfortable, as well as to secure the family’s most valuable possessions.284   
 As the Manley’s procession crossed Jasper County they stopped for lunch near the 
plantation of a Stephen Johnson.  Suddenly, a Union cavalry force appeared on the near 
horizon; when the travelling group sought refuge with Johnsons they were turned away on 
the rumor that the Yankees burned out any family that harbored refugees.  The cavalrymen 
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claimed the wagons that carried the family’s precious possessions.  Emma watched as the 
silks and fabrics she hoped to carry into hiding suddenly became garish pennants and 
drapings for the cavalry horses of her captors, as her traveling trunks were rifled for trinkets 
and trophies of war.  Taken to Federal General George Spencer’s headquarters, who granted 
Manley protection in a simple log cabin where she stayed for three days, all the while 
watching the carnival of destruction around her.285 
 At the first opportunity, Emma Manley returned home after her captivity.  A new, 
harsh world met her at the gate of her family’s home.  “We left Sylvan Grove on a warm, 
bright sunny morning in a handsome turnout and returned in an oxcart on a bitter, cold, icy 
day, found house standing alone, palings, fences, gin houses, cotton, cows, chickens, horses, 
mules, everything in the house, except my sister’s room, destroyed.”286  Only the fact that 
General Blair, commander of the XVII Corps, used her sister’s parlor as his headquarters 
prevented further damage to the home, although Emma recorded that when the General 
wished to communicate an order to someone outside the home, he uncouthly kicked out the 
window panes instead of summoning a courier or aide-de-camp.287  For the next week, 
Manley’s family huddled in the ruined shell of their home.  “We sat up by the fire a week and 
had no bedding and lived on parched and boiled corn and roasted potatoes.  Not a dish or 
cooking vessel was left.  Dead carcasses lying all around the house.”  The pleasant scenes of 
Manley’s youth were now gone, replaced by the true spoils of war. 
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 Sue Sample met the XV Corps of Sherman’s army on November 30th as it neared the 
coast and its’ goal of Savannah.  Semple, originally from Newberry, South Carolina, 
travelled to Emanuel County, Georgia, to visit her sister-in-law Rachel.  A local Confederate 
cavalry unit, home in search of remounts, left during the day after they visited with relatives 
and rested.  That night, a slave summoned Sample and the other members of the household 
around nine to find the plantation’s yard filled with Federal cavalrymen.  While none entered 
the house, and Sample failed to note if her in-laws lost anything that night, the terror of the 
disturbance acted only as a precursor of things to come.288 
 The next morning, as the women surveyed the damage from the previous night, the 
first foragers entered the plantation.  The action was chaotic and immediate.  “They shot all 
the hogs in the pen.  Two Yanks came first, a Dutch and Negro, telling Rachel [Sue’s sister-
in-law] it would be best to turn the hogs out, but she had no time before they were there.  We 
could hear nothing but guns all day and the squeals of hogs.  We begged them to leave 
something, but no answer.”289  Sue rushed to the corn cribs in an attempt to save some of the 
precious grain, where the soldiers promised that they would only take what they could fit in 
the wagons present.  “They left enough corn for my sister to make out on, when no one else 
had a bushel left.  Was it my entreaties that saved it?”290 
 The Union soldiers camped that night near the plantation.  According to Sample the 
camp was “five or six miles long,” and the next morning several local civilians investigated 
the scene after army departed.  “Persons were obliged to pick up what they left, or perish.  I 
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saw such a destruction – only those who have marked the footsteps of the Yanks know.  Here 
families were left without knowing where they would get their next meal.”291  That night, 
thanks to the largesse of the Federal soldiers who failed to destroy the corn cribs and all they 
held, the women of the household supped on parched corn.  One of the slaves, Pete, returned 
from hiding with lard, bacon, and a few other comestibles with which to make things more 
comfortable for the home.  A week after Sherman’s men passed by, Sample and her relations 
left the plantation as refugees seeking shelter and hospitality from a planter who suffered far 
less than those in Emanuel County.  Three weeks later, Sample attempted to return home to 
South Carolina, following in the wake of those who swore an even stiffer punishment for that 
state.292 
 Nora Canning was a refugee of a different sort.  In the rush to avoid Sherman’s 
approach to Macon, one of the perceived targets of the campaign, Canning and her husband, 
a judge only noted as “H.” returned to their plantation near Louisville in the swamps of 
Jefferson County.  On November 24th the couple discovered that they lay directly in the path 
of Sherman’s men and decided to take precautions against the oncoming army.  One servant 
dug a false floor in the smokehouse to hide its contents, and Judge H. took charge of building 
stockades in the swamps to hide the cattle.  Nora ordered one of the cooks to prepare several 
days worth of food for their owners; she also distributed a month’s worth of rations to the 
slaves to prepare them for the destruction to come.  Then, she and the overseer’s wife buried 
their valuables in an attempt to save them.293 
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 The Union army arrived at noon while the Judge and Nora prepared to dine.  Unlike 
other accounts of civilian interactions with the Union army, Canning recorded several polite 
conversations with the soldiers who rapidly invaded her home and plantation.  The first 
foragers on the scene asked Canning’s husband about purchasing some flour.  They then 
inspected the smokehouse and other outbuildings, after which they advised the Judge to 
“have these provisions carried into your house; some of our men are not very particular to 
ask for what they want.”  At the same time, another soldier actually offered his assistance in 
securing the meat from the smokehouse.294   
 Not all her interactions were so pleasant.  When one soldier’s question about the 
presence of Confederate soldiers was met with stony silence, he proceeded to curse Canning.  
When another soldier asked her the same question in a more polite manner, Nora answered 
with candor that Wheeler’s cavalry was in the vicinity and had been for several days.  
Despite the relatively polite interactions, when Canning and her family returned inside their 
home to try and eat their supper, they found the table bare, stripped of all food, dishes, and 
even the tablecloth.  Men of every principle composed Sherman’s army.295 
 The next morning brought a new intensity to the family’s interactions with the Union 
Army.  The soldiers forced Judge H. to assist them in their search of the swamp for barrels of 
syrup.  As her husband departed in the company of the foragers, others set fire to the 
plantation’s cotton gin and the bales of cotton and cloth stored therein.  The granary soon 
followed suit, and fire consumed the building and the wheat stored within.  One soldier, 
remembered by Canning as “particularly insulting,” gloated to the plantation’s mistress about 
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the work wrought upon the gin and granary.  “Well, madam . . . how do you like the looks of 
our little fire.  We have seen a great many such, within the last few weeks.”  Nora’s only 
response was to express gratitude that the cotton would never “feed a Yankee factory or 
clothe a Yankee soldier’s back.”296 
 At some point during the day, someone cut the well ropes and stole the water buckets, 
which deprived the family and slaves of that precious fluid.  As Nora Canning remembered, 
the next morning another soldier came to their aid. 
. . . a rough looking man from Iowa came to the window and asked me  
if he could be of any service to me. . . . I told the stranger we had no water and 
nothing to eat.  He offered to bring me some water if I would give him a bucket. 
I told him every vessel had been carried off and we had nothing.  He then left  
and in about an hour returned with a wooden pail, such as the negroes used in 
carrying water to the fields. . . . I was thankful to get it and expressed my  
gratitude to the man. 
The good Samaritan then took from his pocket two envelopes containing 
about two tablespoons of parched coffee and the other about the same quantity  
of brown sugar, and handed them to me. . . . I never appreciated a cup of coffee 
more than I did that one.  This man was rough-looking, but his heart was in the  
right place.  He certainly acted the part of the ‘Good Samaritan.’297  
 
Nora Canning looked back upon her experiences with the soldiers of Sherman’s army and 
believed that “[W]ith one exception, the only kindness I received was from the Western 
soldiers.  There were in that large army some feelings of kindness, but it was not my good 
fortune to meet them.”298 
 The “rough” Iowan continued to assist the family in crisis.  When Canning saw a 
group of soldiers looting her potatoes, the “rough” Iowan again came to the door and offered 
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his renewed assistance.  “Give me a basket and I will bring in some of those potatoes before 
they are all taken, for you will need them.”  The soldier brought in three bushels of potatoes 
for Canning, who directed him to hide them under the bed.  “All the time he was bringing 
them in, the soldiers were jeering ‘Old Secesh.’  He paid no attention to their taunts, but kept 
bringing in the potatoes as long as he could find a place to put them.”  Eventually, everything 
that Canning, her slaves, and the helpful soldier saved filled one bedroom that Canning and 
her husband occupied, safe perhaps against the hands of the foragers, as long as they failed to 
fully notice the stores of food.299 
 As tensions increased around the manor house with the continuing influx of Federal 
soldiers, Canning sought protection for her home and husband.  Finally, when one soldier 
threatened to fire the house, Nora invoked her husband’s Masonic membership as means of 
protection.  A young infantryman brought his Colonel to the house, who then granted a guard 
to the family and cleared the home of foragers.  In an act of kindness to a brother Mason, the 
Colonel ordered several days’ worth of “coffee, sugar, rice, beef, flour and other articles” 
sent to the family’s relief.300 
 The army remained stationary near Canning’s plantation through the course of the 
day, and several officers came to visit her home.  In a candid conversation with an 
“intelligent” officer about the nature of war and “the horrors . . . brought upon the women 
and children of the South,” Canning learned that a far worse fate awaited the people of South 
Carolina.  “’You think the people of Georgia are faring badly,’ he said, ‘and they are, but 
God pity the people of South Carolina when this army gets there, for we have orders to lay 
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everything in ashes – not to leave a green thing in the State for man or beast.  That State will 
be made to feel the fearful sin of Secession before our army gets through it.  Here our 
soldiers were held in check, as much so as it is possible with such a large body of  
men, and when we get to South Carolina they will be turned loose to follow their own 
inclinations.”301   
 On Friday, the army departed the neighborhood of Nora Canning’s plantation, and on 
Saturday morning, the full reality of the effects of an invading army began to sink in to the 
mistress of the plantation.  Such a scene of ruin and despair surrounded the home that 
Canning could hardly believe that “[O]ne week before it was one of the most beautiful places 
in the State.”  The cotton gin and wheat granary, outbuildings so essential to the processing 
and storage of the plantation’s produce, “lay in ashes.”  No more fences stood within sight of 
the house, and the corn crop, previously unharvested, lay trampled in the field, destroyed by 
the cattle and horses of the Union army.  The sun itself, blotted out by the smoke from the 
burning structures in the area, “seemed to hide its face from so gloomy a picture.”  
Sherman’s hungry foragers even sought their prizes from the slave cabins.  The month’s 
worth of rations, distributed a few days before the army came to prepare the slaves against 
the oncoming swarm of looters, was gone, along with every other possession.  The 
destruction spoke to an orgy of waste and gluttony.  “All around the grove were carcasses of 
cows, sheep and hogs, some with only the hindquarters gone, and the rest left to spoil.  There 
were piles of carcasses all around where the army had camped.  Some of them had been 
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killed and left without being touched.”  If this gross destruction was evidence of an army 
held back, then the fate of South Carolina truly would be terrible.302  
 The diaries presented here have long provided the historian an important and 
accessible tool for understanding how soldiers and civilians interacted during the Savannah 
Campaign.  The highly personal and sometimes emotional accounts grant an appreciation for 
the ways in which women faced the invading army and the damage it did to their farms and 
plantations.  They put a human face on what historians have otherwise termed foraging.  
Soldiers foraged and supplied themselves from the fat of the land, but these women sat by 
and watched as strange men came and stripped away their livelihoods.   
While the women in Sherman’s path watched an orgy of destruction unfold around 
them, Union soldiers, witnesses to nearly four years of destruction, boredom and slaughter, 
enjoyed what Major Charles Wright called “the most gigantic pleasure excursion ever 
planned.”303  A great juxtaposition occurred in Georgia’s rural landscape that November.  For 
those men so long habituated to the harsh realities of military life, the movement from 
Atlanta to Savannah proved a rare period of relief from the usual tensions of war.  There was 
no real risk of violence on a grand scale; an unchallenged movement supplemented by the 
spoils of war gave a festive attitude to Uncle Billy’s soldiers.  The civilians who lived in the 
path of those men, unaccustomed to the tread of an invading army, watched as their peaceful 
life evaporated with the approach of the army, changed forever by the touch of war. 
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There remains another source to learn how the people of Georgia fared in the face of 
the Union Army’s advance across the state.  During the early 1870s, the government 
established the Southern Claims Commission, an entity tasked with analyzing the claims of 
Southern civilians who lost property to the armies of the United States during the war.  In 
order to receive compensation for lost goods, the person in question needed to prove that he 
or she remained loyal to the Union throughout the course of the war and provide an itemized 
list of the property lost to the army.  In all, the commission received 22,298 claims, with a 
total value of $60,258,150.44.304  A total of 2,151 applicants came from Georgia, of which 
the commission only allowed or reimbursed thirty-eight percent.305  It took nearly a decade 
for the government to sift through these petitions,   To receive financial assistance, applicants 
needed to fall within strict guidelines, in some cases guidelines almost impossible to meet.  
The value of crops in the field, as well as grass fields that the tread of armies disrupted, were 
not included in the schedule of items eligible for reimbursement, nor was the value of items 
lost to illegal foraging.306  In the end, the government paid only $4,636,920.69 for 16,991 
claims.307 
Harriet Howard of Baldwin County, a seventy-six year old widow, submitted a claim 
on August 7, 1871, in the amount of $1,231.50.  In her claim, Howard gave an itemized list 
of all she lost, including livestock, grain, syrup, clothing and furniture, all lost to Sherman’s 
troops when they foraged near Milledgeville.  Her affidavit claimed a loyalty to the 
neighborhood, and while three of her nephews served in the Confederate army, none enlisted 
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of their own free will.  Throughout the document, she strived to prove her loyalty to the 
Union with claims that she lived in a Union neighborhood, and that several people heard her 
speak in such terms during the war.  In April, 1877, the Claims Commission awarded Harriet 
Howard the sum of $881.00 for her claim.  The men who heard her case allowed some value 
for the majority of her property, although she only received reimbursement for the full worth 
of her cattle.308 
Tabitha Batson experienced the hardships of war from both sides of the conflict.  
Confederate soldiers executed her husband when he refused to enlist or serve in their cause.  
When General Hugh Kilpatrick’s cavalry force entered Baldwin County in November, 1864, 
they passed over the widow’s farm.  Already struck by the tragedy of war, Batson’s farm 
supplied the Federal cavalrymen with four horses, one hundred bushels of potatoes, two 
hogs, a barrel of flour and five bushels of wheat.  In all, Tabitha claimed a loss of $487 when 
she filed a claim on July 14, 1871.  The Claims Commission awarded the woman $313 when 
it adjudicated her claim on December 5, 1877.  The commissioners granted her full value for 
the loss of her potatoes (fifty dollars), as well as her barrel of flour (ten dollars), while they 
only awarded a partial value for her horses ($250 rather than $400) and her meal (three 
dollars rather than seven).  The commission disallowed the value of her hogs.309 
For Sarah Wiggins, Sherman’s men brought her the means to escape Georgia.  She 
claimed to be “loyal in her feelings and language throughout the war, and to have rejoiced in 
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Union victories.”  Wiggins claimed no forms of passive resistance such as hiding food and 
valuables when the foragers entered her farm.  Not only did she give “everything she had” to 
those soldiers with whom she interacted, she chose to uproot her family in the wake of the 
passing column.  In her petition, she claimed to follow the army with her seven children all 
the way to Savannah.  From there, her family took passage to New York, and from there 
journeyed to Indiana, perhaps to live with family.  The commissioners who reviewed her case 
noted that “[t]he testimony to prove the taking is all familiar testimony [and] that of claimant 
[and] her two daughters, [and] is therefore to be received with great caution, [and] all doubts 
are to prevail.  Without going into detail we allow $365.00.  Most of the items disallowed 
were not taken for Army use.”  The reimbursement of $365 represented less than half of the 
amount she claimed.  The government refused to pay Wiggins for the loss of her cattle, 
potatoes, syrup, and a shotgun, among other items.310 
A quick survey of the allowed claims from Georgia shows that there were eighty-nine 
women who filed claims with the Southern Claims Commission and who received some form 
of reimbursement for their losses.  Those claimants asked the government for an approximate 
total of $126,412.45; the commissioners of the Southern Claims Commission authorized a 
payment of $54,279.70, something like 42.9 percent of the funds requested.  Six women 
received full compensation, whereas only one woman received no money from the 
government.311 
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The women that met Sherman’s men during their exodus across Georgia were not 
simply passive observers.  The narrative of the diaries female witnesses to Sherman’s march 
left, as well as the affidavits filed with the Southern Claims Commission, illuminated the 
ways in which Georgia’s women participated in the military actions on their farms.  While 
the loyalty claims filed with the Southern Claims Commission strived to show women as 
willing participants who aided the Union cause at every instance, including Sarah Wiggins’s 
open-arms policy, the diaries and letters generally illustrated two types of resistance.  Those 
who hid food and livestock through a variety of mechanisms presented an active resistance 
towards the Federal army.  Many such attempts failed to entirely save the resources so 
hurriedly disposed of, the act itself showed a self-awareness and agency in action.  Nora 
Canning’s tale recorded the use of active resistance in the hiding of goods; she also used a 
more passive form of resistance when taunted by some of the Federal troops.  Her refusal to 
interact with anyone who treated her in an ungentlemanly manner was a socially acceptable 
emotional response open for women to use in the face of stress and hostile action.  When 
Canning acted in a “cold” manner and refused to cooperate with those who threatened her 
life and livelihood, she operated within the accepted scope of emotional response for a 
Southern woman.312 
The Military Division of the Mississippi did not raze every field and farm in Georgia.  
As such, some women left a record of the aftermath of the Savannah Campaign, rather than a 
tale of being caught up in the actual foraging.  Sherman’s army missed Eliza Frances 
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Andrews’s family plantation; the family suffered no deprivations at the hands of foraging 
parties.  In December of 1864, after the Union Army took possession of Savannah, 
Andrews’s father sent his daughters to spend the winter with an older daughter who lived 
alone on a plantation in southwestern Georgia.313  The two girls travelled first via an 
overcrowded train and then by wagon, a trip over “65 miles of bad roads and worse 
conveyances, through a country devastated by the most cruel and wicked invasion of modern 
times.”314  After two days’ travel, the girls and their traveling party neared Sparta, the edge of 
what Andrews’ referred to as the “Burnt Country,” the sight of which made the young 
Andrews “understand the wrath and desperation of these poor people.” 
I almost felt as if I should like to hang a Yankee myself.  There was hardly a 
fence left standing all the way from Sparta to Gordon.  The fields were trampled 
down and the road was lined with carcasses of horses, hogs, and cattle that the 
invaders, unable either to consume or to carry away with them, had wantonly  
shot down to starve out the people and prevent them from making their crops.   
The stench in some places was unbearable; every few hundred yards we had  
to hold our noses or stop them with the cologne Mrs. Elzey had given us, and it 
proved a great boon.  The dwellings that were standing all showed signs of  
pillage, and on every plantation we saw the charred remains of the gin-house  
and packing screw, while here and there, lone chimneys, ‘Sherman’s Sentinels,’ 
told of homes laid in ashes.315 
  Destruction existed everywhere within the ‘burnt country.’  The agricultural 
landscape bore the brunt of Sherman’s wrath, and everywhere that Andrews looked, she saw 
the largesse of the land wiped away in the short time that the Federal soldiers spent in any 
particular spot.  There was no evidence left of the year’s harvest in the path of Sherman’s 
men; the “corn cribs were empty,” and no fodder existed for Georgia’s livestock, should any 
livestock still remain on those farms.  Eliza confided to her diary that she “saw no grain of 
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any sort, except little patches they had spilled when feeding their horses and which there was 
not even a chicken left in the country to eat.  A bag of oats might have lain anywhere along 
the road without danger from the beasts of the field, though I cannot say it would have been 
safe from the assaults of hungry man.”316 
At the edge of Milledgeville, Andrews and her party crossed the site of where the 
Federals encamped.  Here the young girl described local citizens, left destitute by the passing 
of the army, as they gleaned the site of the former camp in search of anything they could use 
for food, as well as any lost valuables they might find.  Conditions forced many of the people 
to pick “up grains of corn that were scattered around where the Yankees had fed their 
horses.”  The first scavengers found the possessions and treasures of Georgians scattered 
about, “plunder that the invaders had left behind,” but the pickings grew slimmer by the day.  
As Eliza described it, when she passed the field the only things left were spoiled grain, 
rotting animal carcasses, and the stench of death.317 
Another, perhaps more important view met Andrews’ eye.  “Some men were plowing 
in one part of the field, making ready for next year’s crop.”  The damage wrought by 
Sherman’s men as they crossed Georgia was only temporary in nature.  While the coming 
years brought a drastic change to the nature of agriculture in the South, in the winter of 1864-
1865, those left with the tools of production set about preparing the land for the year to come.  
The short-term view for the people of the South was bleak indeed, and for many the twin 
specters of famine and want accompanied the coming winter.  For the farmers of Georgia, 
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however, the seasons remained the same.  In order to recover, the time came to prepare the 
land for next year.  There was hope for the land with the turning of the plow.  
The women who wrote of the Savannah campaign faced a hard recovery in the wake 
of Sherman’s passing force.  Dolly Burge lamented a Christmas without the revelries and 
presents of years passed.  The pain was almost palpable when she wrote of her daughter’s 
empty stocking as it hung by the fireplace and waited for a Santa Claus that never came.  Her 
slaves, used to the distribution of gifts on Christmas morning, erupted into her room and 
chanted “’Christmas gift, mist’ess!  Christmas gift, mist’ess!’  I pulled the cover over my 
face and was soon mingling my tears with Sadai’s.”318  Unfortunately, her heavily edited 
diary portrayed little of the agricultural recovery on the plantation until April, and then only 
as an introduction to the discussion of the collapse of the South.319  For Burge’s editor, the 
only tale worth being recounted was that of a Southern woman who passively told of the 
world around her.  Sue Sample and Nora Canning’s stories failed to elaborate on their 
experiences after Sherman passed.  Eliza Andrews spent the winter of 1864-1865 with 
relatives in southwestern Georgia.  The teenage girl’s dairy related only the tales of 
visitations with neighbors and the doldrums of rural Georgia, isolated from home.  Though 
touched by war, the last thing on a young girl’s mind was the agricultural work of the coming 
year. 
Survival dominated the lives of Georgia’s rural population when Sherman brought his 
army through their farms and plantations.  While all practiced some form of resistance to the 
invaders, in the end all they could do was wait for the army to pass in order to pick up the 
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pieces of their lives.  The loss of slaves, either through their desertion of their Southern 
homes or by their post-war emancipation, coupled with the loss of fences, the destruction of 
fields, and decimated livestock populations retarded Georgia’s agricultural recovery.  In the 
autumn of 1867, John Muir of Wisconsin set forth on a thousand mile walk to the Gulf Coast.  
On October 3, he recorded his encounter with a Georgia plantation still attempting to recover 
from the passage of Sherman’s army.  While he travelled through the “Piney Woods,” he met 
came to the plantation of one Mr. Cameron.  He arrived at the plantation just as Mr. Cameron 
attempted to repair parts from his cotton gin, just then resurrected from a pond on his 
property where they escaped the Union Army’s wrath, along with the mechanisms of his 
cotton press.320  Muir wrote of the scarred landscape he saw at the time, as well as Georgia’s 
hope for the future.  “The traces of war are not only apparent on the broken fields, burnt 
fences, mills, and woods ruthlessly slaughtered, but also on the countenances of the people.  
A few years after a forest has been burned another generation of bright and happy trees 
arises, in purest, freshest vigor; only the old trees, wholly or half-dead, bear marks of the old 
calamity.  So with the people of this war-field.  Happy, unscarred, and unclouded youth is 
growing up around the aged, half-consumed and fallen parents, who bear in sad measure the 
ineffaceable marks of the farthest-reaching and most infernal of all civilized calamities.”321  
In the end, the marks on the landscape and the civilian population of Georgia would take far 
longer to replace than Muir thought. 
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Conclusion 
One month following the surrender of the Confederate armies in both major theaters 
of operation, the victorious Federal armies gathered around Washington, D.C. in preparation 
for the largest troop review held to that point in American history.  On May 23, 1865, the 
Army of the Potomac, the spit-and-polished soldiers of the East who always operated within 
easy reach of supply depots and major cities but found mixed battlefield success, marched 
down Pennsylvania Avenue under the watchful eyes of the new President of the United 
States, Andrew Johnson, and the population of Washington, long familiar with these men.  
With polished brass, bright weapons, white gloves and cleanly brushed uniforms, these men 
presented an image of what a properly fed and supplied army should look like.  For the Army 
of the Potomac, this was just another parade.322 
 The next day, May 24, brought a hushed excitement to the crowds gathered along the 
parade route.  The men on review today were new to Washington; their service in the Union 
was beyond the eastern theater and the eyes of the Capitol City.  At 9:00 A. M. a gun 
sounded on the outskirts of Washington and announced the march of Sherman’s men.  
Beginning with the men of the Old Northwest serving in the XV Corps, the Army of the 
West strode along the parade route as their long western step pushed them along at a pace 
faster than the men took the day before.  These men were not bedecked in the finery of a 
proper nineteenth century army: while some men wore fresh uniforms drawn by commanders 
who wanted to be seen leading textbook soldiers, the majority wore wide-brimmed slouch 
hats and threadbare uniforms.  But uniforms only clothe the soldier; long marches across the 
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South, hard fought victories, and short supplies hardened these shabbily dressed soldiers.  
These shared experiences imbued them with a sense of pride in themselves and their general.  
Each man fixed his gaze the proscribed fifteen paces to the front as they marched.  Honors 
were paid to the dignitaries, but no man gawked and acted the buffoon that Sherman feared 
might happen.  This was Sherman’s grand Army of the West; they had not let down their 
general in the field, and they refused to let him down now.323 
 Sherman turned in his saddle to look back on his men only once that day to see how 
his men appeared as they marched down Pennsylvania Avenue.  The love of a general for his 
men flowed from Sherman’s pen as he remembered what he saw.  “When I reached the 
Treasury Building, and looked back, the sight was simply magnificent.  The column was 
compact, and the glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, moving with the 
regularity of a pendulum. . . . It was, in my judgment, the most magnificent army in existence 
. . . well organized, well commanded and disciplined; and there was no wonder that it had 
swept through the South like a tornado.”324  The General also noted that proof of his army’s 
destructive legacy appeared as trophies for the edification of the Washington crowds.  “Some 
of the division commanders had added, by way of variety, goats, milch-cows, and pack-
mules, whose loads consisted of game-cocks, poultry, hams, etc., and some of them had the 
families of freed slaves along with the women leading their children.”325  Sherman saw no 
better punctuation to put on the campaigns that brought fame to him and his army, as well as 
a finale to the war. 
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In a letter home to his wife written the day after the Review, Frank Malcolm, a 
sergeant in Company D, 7th Iowa Volunteer Infantry, related the events he witnessed in 
Washington and the tension between the soldiers of the two major theaters of the war. 
Crossed the Long Bridge passed through the principle streets of 
the city and then down Pennsylvania Avenue past the President’s 
Mansion the Treasury Building and Capitol [.]  I had the pleasure of 
seeing all the big men of the day . . . the Crowd was the largest that I 
ever saw in my life – do wish you could have been present. . . . I am 
told by those who witnessed both reviews that Shermans Army 
marched better and was a much finer looking set of men than the 
Army of the Potomac . . . I flatter myself that our sunburnt hands and 
faces did not make an unfavorable comparison with the white cot 
gloves and pale faces of the Army of the James.  The Difference in the 
two armies is this.  they have remained in camp and lived well.  we 
have marched and fought and gone.  Ended the war and now they are 
not willing to admit that we are soldiers, call us Shermans Greasers 
Slouch Hats && . . .326 
Malcolm was but one soldier, yet his thoughts are representative of the great body of men 
whom one observer commented that day “march like lords of the world.”327   
 William Tecumseh Sherman’s Savannah Campaign, more popularly situated in the 
annals of American memory as the March to the Sea, still evokes the imagery of burning and 
destruction spread across a civilian landscape.  Historians declare it among the first military 
campaigns that utilize the concepts of modern warfare.328  Gone with the Wind, Margaret 
Mead’s popular novel and in 1939 starring Clark Gable and Vivian Leigh, one of the most 
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popular films in the history of American cinema, portrays the path of Sherman’s men as 
devoid of any evidence of life.  The soil is bleakly tan, no grass or living plant or animal can 
be seen within camera shot, and the only living things evident, aside from the Southern belle 
refugee and her entourage, are the vultures moving amongst the bodies of dead Union and 
Confederate soldiers.  The evidence of total and complete destruction is everywhere and only 
intensifies as the travelers move closer to their destination.  The only living Yankee depicted 
is a deserter, a lecherous man desirous of stealing everything he can find, including the purity 
of Southern womanhood.  Poverty and ruin face the young girl, perhaps the South as a whole, 
due to the actions of a faceless army and its vindictive leader, whose name is the only one 
uttered when discussing this savagery perpetrated against the people of Georgia.329 
 The March to the Sea is perhaps one of the most memorable and disputed aspects of 
the Civil War, lingering in the American memory like the scar Sherman and his men 
supposedly left on the landscape.  It posits the agrarian South against the industrial North on 
a real scale.  Soldiers, some armed with repeating rifles, the apex of the weapons industry in 
1864, roamed the land faced only by a rag-tag assembly of Georgia militiamen and women 
who helplessly watched as damned Yankees looted and burned their farms.330  Farms burned, 
slaves gained their freedom, and the glory of the Old South died forever under the heels of 
Sherman and his bummers.  Brooks Simpson and other historians have argued, rightly so, 
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that the memory of the march to the sea is another example of how the Union army won the 
war, but the collective memory of Southerners and their writers won the peace.331 
 That Southern victory over the memory of the March to the Sea emphasized the total 
destruction of Georgia and the South as a whole.  If one were to believe the mythology that 
surrounds the Savannah Campaign, Georgia in December of 1865 was completely 
devastated, a burning scar on the American landscape, with nothing left within the borders of 
that state.  While Sherman’s men left a deep psychological scar on the people of Georgia, the 
physical damage was confined to a strip of territory sixty miles wide and three hundred miles 
long.  Yet people still talk of Sherman’s destruction of the landscape, that the lone chimneys 
of destroyed homes still stood a skeletal watch over the route from Atlanta to Savannah.  In 
fact, geographer D. J. de Laubenfels followed a portion of the route used by Sherman’s men 
in the mid-1950s in order to compare the landscape of Georgia at that time with a set of 
highly detailed maps created by one of Sherman’s officers.  Instead of the scars of a long 
finished war, de Laubenfels found that many of the buildings on the original maps still 
existed, and that time and age stood as a greater enemy to their future than Sherman’s visit 
presented in 1864.  These maps showed seventy-two dwelling places present in 1864; in 
1955, twenty-two of them still stood.  Sherman’s men destroyed only three of the seventy-
two structures, the rest falling at some point in the ensuing ninety years.332  de Laubenfels 
pointed out that most of the changes in the landscape of Central Georgia occurred because of 
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the changing nature of agriculture after 1864, both because of displacement of civilians 
unwilling or unable to start over after the loss of their food and farm supplies, as well as the 
conversion from a cotton-based agriculture to one that was beginning to emphasize cattle 
production in Georgia following the invasion of a more devastating foe, the boll weevil.333  
 Sherman’s March to the Sea carried a heavy toll on a previously untouched 
agricultural landscape, and the soldiers who wrought their work on the land noted the change.  
On December 3rd, George Ward Nichols, a member of Sherman’s personal staff, wrote 
extensively about the agricultural production he saw in the country around Millen, and the 
ultimate meaning of the army’s movement through Georgia.  While Georgia’s landscape now 
seemed filled with corn fields from “one hundred to one thousand acres” in size, Nichols 
wisely deduced that those fields “were once devoted to the cultivation of cotton, and it is 
surprising to see how the planters have carried out the wishes or orders of the Rebel 
Government; for cotton has given way to corn.”334  Regardless of the adjustment in crop 
production, Sherman’s men still burned thousands of bales of cotton on their march through 
Georgia, although Nichols thought that the actual production must have been larger, as the 
men of the Federal army only burned what they found concentrated near the railroad.  More 
important than the destruction of cotton, however, was the yeoman’s work that the men of 
the Military Division of the Mississippi wrought in destroying and consuming the food found 
along their path.  Georgia acted as the granary of the Confederacy, and especially for the 
western armies.  “. . . for although corn and beef are sent to Lee’s army, he draws the bulk of 
his supplies from the states east of the Savannah [River], and there is no region so prolific as 
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that about Columbia. . . . One thing is certain, that neither the West nor the East will draw 
any supplies from the counties in this state traversed by our army for a long time to come.  
Our work has been the next thing to annihilation.”335  Charles Wright Wills of the 103rd 
Illinois concurred with Nichols’ estimates.  On December 6th, Wills wrote in his diary that, 
“We were talking over last night what this army had cost the Confederacy since the 4th of 
October last, when we started from Eastpoint after Hood.  We all agree that the following 
estimate is not too high in any particular: 100,000 hogs, 20,000 head of cattle, 15,000 horses 
and mules, 500,000 bushels of corn, 100,000 of sweet potatoes.  We are driving with us 
many thousand of cattle.”336 
Such numbers failed to take into consideration the destruction of buildings and fences 
for firewood, a wide-spread and more universal devastation than even the loss of food 
represented.  The ravenous need for fuel to cook soldiers’ meals devastated the infrastructure 
of Georgia’s farms.  Animals and crops were renewable resources, ones that took time to 
replace through investment and natural increase.  The loss of buildings and fences, measured 
as improvements to the land in the nineteenth century, could take years to replace, if a family 
possessed the financial resources to start over.  The millions of fence rails destroyed for cook 
fires alone meant that fields were no longer protected from the advances of wildlife and 
livestock, which limited the fecundity of a crop.  Intangibles such as these, the minutiae of 
destruction, took as great a toll on Georgia’s farms and plantations as did the broad strokes of 
emptied seed bins and raided smokehouses.  It is almost impossible to establish a monetary 
value for the property improvements destroyed by Sherman’s men.  Perhaps, as Paul W. 
                                                            
335 Ibid. 
336 Charles Wills Wright, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier (Washington, D.C.: Globe Printing Company, 1908) 
page 332. 
162 
 
Gates notes, the loss of invested time may be more important than the financial loss.  An 
individual earned pennies per rail when they split logs for fences, but a fence line represented 
years of work and upkeep.337 
 As noted in their journals, the soldiers of the Military Division of the Mississippi saw 
their Georgia foraging as not just a function vital to the survival of the army, but as fun as 
well.338  The grand caravans of carriages that carried the prizes of war back to the main 
column were often gay affairs, illustrative of the fun that the assignment to a foraging party 
brought.  The opportunity to forage gave the soldier a social release from his normal duties 
and discipline as a soldier, augmenting the festive atmosphere.  According to Lee Kennett, 
some soldiers found an additional release through group polarization; not only did service in 
the army separate their individual identity from their deeds during their service, but it also 
allowed individual foragers to commit acts they would never attempt in civilian life.339  
American society has never accepted arson or larceny as socially normal activities, yet 
Sherman’s men were able to use the mask of military service, as well as the loss of individual 
identity while acting in a group of foragers ransacking a farm together. 
 On the second day after he departed Atlanta, General William Tecumseh Sherman 
visited a plantation near Covington, Georgia.  After he conversed with several slaves, the 
General was talking with some members of his staff when a pair of soldiers passed by.  
Sherman painted a very singular picture of one the soldiers who confiscated goods from the 
plantation’s larder.  The forager “passed me with a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum-
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molasses under his arm, and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating, and, 
catching my eye, he remarked sotto voce and carelessly to a comrade, ‘Forage liberally on 
the country,’ quoting from my general orders.”340  While General Order Number 120 indeed 
instructed the men to take advantage of Georgia’s agricultural bounty, Sherman confronted 
the impertinent enlisted man and reminded him that “foraging must be limited to regular 
parties properly detailed and that all provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regular 
commissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept their ranks.”341  Properly 
admonished, the General and the soldier parted ways.  In some sense, Sherman’s attempt to 
lecture the man seems to only pay lip service to the concept of military discipline.  If the 
event actually happened, was the General simply going through the motions of limiting his 
foragers? 
 Sherman only ordered one case of foraging as an act of revenge.  On November 22nd, 
Sherman and his staff stopped at plantation for the night.  After he first sought shelter from 
the weather in a slave cabin, he was summoned to another home a short walk down the road.  
“In looking around the room, I saw a small box, like a candle-box, marked ‘Howell Cobb,’ 
and on inquiring of a negro, found that we were at the plantation of General Howell Cobb, of 
Georgia, one of the leading rebels of the South, then a general in the Southern army, and who 
had been Secretary of the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan’s time.”  The owner’s 
name sealed the land’s fate.  Sherman sent word to the closest command about who owned 
the plantation, and told the men to “spare nothing.”  The soldiers took up the task assigned 
them by their beloved Uncle Billy as they emptied the secessionists’ grain bins and 
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storehouses.  “That night huge bonfires consumed the fence-rails, kept our soldiers warm, 
and the teamsters and men, as well as the slaves, carried off an immense quantity of corn and 
provisions of all sorts.”  Cobb’s treason in leading Georgia from the Union and making war 
on the United States of America bore final fruit in the destruction of his property.342
 How had Sherman’s men seen the farms of the South?  The commentary on Southern 
agriculture was often intermixed with their environmental commentary.  Repeatedly during 
the first three weeks of the march, men of Sherman’s army used terminology that evaluated 
the concept of “good land” to describe what they saw.  The only large-scale discussion came 
when the men of the upper Midwest discovered some unfamiliar aspect of the southern 
world.  During the early portion of the march, the most common comment seems to reflect 
Charles Wills’ notation of November 19th about a “fine country” cited earlier.343  On 
November 16 and 17, Sergeant Alexander Downing of the 11th Iowa Veteran Volunteer 
Infantry made mention of the area he passed through to the same effect.  On the first date he 
made mention of “some fine plantations, well improved with some good buildings,” while 
the next day he wrote that “We marched through some fine country today, and though 
heavily timbered, it is well improved.”344  As an Iowa farmer, Downing’s use of the term 
“fine country” seems to rely on the nature of farm assets available on the land in question, 
such as level of cultivation and the presence of natural resources.     
 As historian Conevery Valenčius argues, nineteenth century Americans possessed a 
heightened connection with the land, often attributing physical and moral attributes to the 
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environment.345  When soldiers like Downing and other Midwesterners assigned such 
descriptors as “good” or “fine,” they passed judgment on both the ability of the landowner to 
manage his fields and holdings, as well as the natural state of the soil.  Good land was fertile 
and clean, well cultivated and free from weeds and trash.  A “good” farm belonged to a man 
that took pride in his work and his profession.  Conversely, the men used disparaging terms 
in reference to both poorer modes of farming, as well as to give negative connotation to the 
wastelands or borderlands of the swampy regions and Piney Woods sections of Georgia.  
Soldiers labeled the swampy regions as “unhealthy.”  The most notable example came on 
December 1st, when Charles Wills commented that his men associated the presence of 
Spanish moss with “ager” or the fevers and illness prone to happen in these areas.346  The 
farms in this area presented fewer “fine” plantations, replaced by the farms of yeoman 
families, and as such, were not generally held in as high a regard as the better kept farms and 
plantations seen during the first half of the march.  
 If the memory of the March to the Sea claimed a swath of total destruction discernible 
for decades, what was the real agricultural impact of Sherman’s campaign through Georgia?  
The diaries and letters of the civilians left in the path of the army do not answer the question.  
The only quantifiable way of measuring the destruction left by the Union Army’s foray is to 
compare agricultural census data from before and after the war.  As Lee Kennett notes, it is 
nearly impossible to extricate the effects of the Savannah Campaign from the war as a 
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whole.347  Georgia’s agricultural recovery was stunted by the loss of slavery as a labor 
system and the loss of a generation of young men to disease and the gore of the battlefield.  
de Laubenfels noted that in the confusion of the post-war era small farms exploded, driving 
down the average amount of land per farm, radically changing the agricultural landscape.348  
The largest single change was the loss of slave labor.  Without chattel slavery as a cheap 
source of labor, farm production dropped markedly.  When farm recovery came, it changed 
the face of farming in Georgia.349 
 In 1860, the state of Georgia had 62,003 farms worth $157,072,803.  The owners of 
those farms showed an investment in machinery and implements valued at $6,844,387.  
While Georgia did not lead the nation in the production of any single crop, as a whole the 
state produced magnificent amounts of crops.  More than thirty million bushels of corn came 
from the fields, as well as more than seven hundred thousand bales of cotton.  Six and a half 
million bushels of the ubiquitous sweet potato, food for man and beast alike, came from 
Georgia’s fields.  In the coastal regions, rice planters produced more than fifty million 
pounds of their chosen crop, and the sugar producers sent forth nearly twelve hundred 
hogsheads of sugar and more than half a million gallons of cane molasses.  Two million hogs 
populated the landscape, and 130,771 horses and 101,069 asses and mules provided the 
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motive power for agricultural tasks and transportation.  The total value of all the livestock in 
rural Georgia was $38,372,734.350 
 In 1870, Georgia’s agricultural production was a shadow of its former self.  While 
there were seven thousand more farms than a decade before, the cumulative value of those 
farms was sixty percent less than the previous census showed.  Machinery and implement 
value was just over four and a half million dollars, approximately two-thirds of their pre-war 
value.  Georgia’s agrarians produced only seventeen million bushels of corn and 473,934 
bales of cotton.  Sweet potato production plummeted to just over one-third of its previous 
number.  Coastal Georgia’s rice and sugar planters, so heavily reliant on slaves to work their 
swampy fields, suffered equally with the rest of the state.  Only twenty-two million pounds 
of rice appeared on the census; there were only 644 hogsheads of crystallized sugar produced 
in 1869.  Only cane molasses showed a growth in the first census following the war, but only 
by seven thousand barrels.  The war decimated Georgia’s livestock populations.  Census 
marshals only tallied 988,566 swine, a devastating blow to the main source of protein in the 
Southern diet.  Fifty thousand fewer horses, and approximately fourteen thousand fewer asses 
and mules lived on the state’s farms.  It is impossible to know what combination of events 
suffered the farm animal population to drop; the military needs of the Confederacy, as well as 
Sherman’s foraging in certain areas no doubt took a steep toll on these numbers.  With the 
destruction of fences and other farming infrastructure, it is possible that a certain percentage 
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of these animals became feral, especially hogs.  Regardless of what happened to the animals, 
the total value of Georgia’s livestock was $30,156,317, a drop of eight million dollars.351 
 Georgia’s long recovery continued into the 1880 census.  The total number of farms 
exploded to 136,626 worth $111,910,540.  There was a total investment in farm machinery 
and implements of $5,817,416, an increase of one million dollars from ten years earlier, but 
still one million dollars less than before the war began.  Corn production had nearly 
recovered to prewar numbers but was still two million bushels shy of the numbers recorded 
in 1860.  Rice production remained less than half of that reported in 1860, and forty-three 
fewer hogsheads of cane sugar came from the coastal sugar region, although cane molasses 
now numbered nearly three times the number of gallons produced twenty years earlier, 
perhaps representative of a change in the market for that material.  Sweet potatoes showed an 
increase from 1870, but lagged behind 1860’s numbers by two million bushels.  Cotton 
production exploded with the number of farms to more than eight hundred thousand bales, an 
increase of more than one hundred thousand bales over the number of bales recorded in 1860.  
Livestock continued its slow recovery as well.  There were now 1.4 million swine on 
Georgia’s farms, an increase almost half a million from ten years before, but still six hundred 
thousand fewer than before the war.  The 132,078 asses and mules that powered the state’s 
agriculture showed an increase of thirty thousand over 1860, but there were still less than one 
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hundred thousand horses on Georgia’s roads and farms.  Agricultural recovery from the 
ravages of war was a slow process that would continue for years to come.352 
 Capital, labor, and transportation infrastructure issues worked hand in hand to create 
an economically distraught South in the post-war period.  Financially ruined by the loss of 
slaves, the single largest form of investment for the planter class, as well as the loss of money 
invested in Confederate war bonds and the five year removal from markets that generated 
revenue before the war, the South sought credit from Northern institutions, often through 
mortgages and loans, in an attempt to rebuild their lives and restart their farming 
operations.353  Georgia’s transportation infrastructure was devastated by the war; not only did 
Union military forces destroy certain aspects of its rail network, but roads had degenerated 
due to lack of maintenance, as had river and sea transport lanes, which also suffered from 
Confederate attempts to make these avenues inaccessible to Union naval encroachment.354  
However, the greatest issue that faced that Georgia’s farmers and planters faced was the end 
of slavery and the quest for a new source of labor to produce the commodity and sustenance 
crops that fueled the South’s agricultural base. 
 One change that might be directly linked to the after effects of the presence of 
soldiers in the South is the change in Georgia’s fence laws in the 1870s and 1880s.  Prior to 
the war, Georgia, along with other states throughout the Union, utilized laws that required 
farmers to fence to in their fields as a protection against wandering open-range livestock.355  
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Soldiers decimated the fences of Georgia for firewood.  As discussed earlier, fence 
construction represented a larger investment of time rather than money.  In response to the 
need to maintain croplands and prevent loss to meandering livestock, Georgia’s legislators 
created new fencing laws in the 1870s and 1880s that shifted the responsibility for fences to 
livestock raisers by mandating that they fence in their animals.  While these laws were not 
uniformly adopted at once, they reveal the general trend towards ending open range livestock 
rearing.356 
Cotton’s resurgence in Georgia’s post-war economy indicated the push for financial 
recovery.  Cotton became the commodity of choice in all regions of the state as people 
sought ways to alleviate the financial losses suffered due to the war.357  Still a staple of the 
industrial systems of America and Europe, cotton offered the quickest means to gain relief 
from the indebtedness that followed the war.  Spurred by prices that reached eighty-three 
cents per pound, those planters labeled as unpatriotic by the Southern press during the war 
for continued cotton production were the first to bring cotton back on to the open market, 
selling the bales they produced and hoarded throughout the war.358  Cotton quickly became 
the premier commodity crop in the post-war period due to its profitable nature.  According to 
Lee Alston, four factors increased cotton’s profitability: high price per unit, decreased prices 
for fertilizer, the development of new areas of cultivation in upcountry Georgia due to 
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increased rail development after the war, and the fact that merchants accepted cotton in 
payment for debts at country stores and factor houses.359 
Rice and sugar production dwindled in the postbellum era due to a number of issues.  
The production of both crops found a more congenial environment in Louisiana.360  In 
addition, much of Georgia’s rice infrastructure was damaged during the war by direct action 
or through neglect; without the finances and labor to repair the water control devices on 
coastal Georgia rice plantations, the industry became a shell of its former self.361  Access to 
land became an issue for the rice and sugar planters following the war when their lands, often 
abandoned when families became refugees from Union incursions, were aggregated into a 
slave resettlement area along the coast known as Sherman’s Reservation.362  Additionally, 
rice and sugar production were much more capital intensive than cotton production, which 
limited the recovery of these two forms of agriculture.363  The former slaves who took on 
these subdivided lands tended to practice subsistence agriculture, rather than opt for 
commodity rice and sugar production.364 
The answer to Georgia’s labor issued came in the form of sharecropping.  With little 
else to turn to, and no means of their own to earn a living, former slaves returned to the land 
and worked as laborers on plantations or became tenants.  The Freedman’s Bureau attempted 
to aid in the resettlement of African-Americans, and it encouraged the development of 
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Republican free labor ideology throughout the South via contract negotiations over the value 
of labor between former slaves and land owners.365  Joseph Reidy argued that sharecropping 
developed from a stalemate between land owners who desired to maintain former production 
levels on their lands and the former slaves who sought to control their own labor for the first 
time, unwilling to work the long hours forced upon them when they were slaves.366  While 
contracted labor at first began as a contractual arrangement between groups of laborers and 
farm operators, it eventually assumed the guise of the family as a contractual unit through 
lease contracts.367  In the long term, sharecropping came to replace slavery as the 
predominant form of indentured labor in the South, often placing long-term economic bonds 
on a family that replaced chattel slavery in Georgia and the rest of the South well into the 
twentieth century.368 
Although the March to the Sea had an immediate negative effect on Georgia’s 
agrarians unfortunate enough to live in the path of the marauding Union Army, in and of 
itself, it was not an agent of long term agricultural change.  Some slaves left their plantations 
and farms and followed the army to freedom, which limited the amount of labor available in 
the short run, and the Military Division of the Mississippi ransacked the storehouses that 
stored the harvests of 1864, but Sherman was not an agent of change in his actions.  The 
success of the campaign rested in the denial of resources to Confederate soldiers and civilians 
alike, and in the terror that Sherman wrought in the population of Georgia.  The casual reader 
and the historian alike cannot escape that terror when confronted by the words of Dolly 
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Burge, running from the blue clad figures as they appeared from behind a hill while she 
visited with her neighbors.  That emotion was based in the loss of control over their lives 
when confronted by an invading army.  No longer was the war miles away in Tennessee or 
Virginia; here was conquest visited upon Burge, her neighbors, and all the families who 
awaited Sherman’s arrival.  The greatest victory of the Savannah Campaign was the 
psychological wound that Sherman and his soldiers inflicted when they showed Georgia that 
no one was safe from the power of the Union Army.369 
Sherman wrote as much in a letter to General Henry Halleck on Christmas Eve, 1864.  
After he discussed his plans for South Carolina in the renewal of the campaign, as well as his 
wishes for General Thomas’ actions in Tennessee, Sherman wrote the Chief-of-Staff about 
the importance of maneuvers such as the one just completed by his men in Georgia.  “I attach 
more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy’s country,” wrote the victorious 
General, “because this war differs from European wars in this particular: we are not only 
fighting hostile armies, but hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel 
the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies.  I know that this recent movement of 
mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect.  Thousands who had been 
deceived by their lying newspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time now 
realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience.”370  By 
bringing the war to those previously untouched by its grisly hand, William Tecumseh 
Sherman drove a wedge through the Confederacy physically and mentally.  The physical 
scars healed, eventually; the mental scars lasted for generations, and they continue to find 
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currency today.  That is the greatest legacy of Sherman’s foraging parties and their 
interactions with Georgia’s agrarians. 
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Appendix 
. Comparative analysis of selected census data for Georgia from 1860 – 1880. 
 
 1860371 1870372 1880373 
Cash Value of Farms $157,072,803 $94,559,468 $111,910,540 
Value of Farming 
Implements and 
Machinery 
$6,844,387 $4,614,701 $5,817,416 
Horses 130,771 81,777 98,520 
Asses and Mules 101,069 87,426 132,078 
Swine  2,036,116 988,566 1,471,003 
Value of Livestock $38,372,734 $30,156,317 $25,930,352 
Bushels of Indian 
Corn 
30,776,293 17,645,549 28,202,018 
Pounds of Rice 52,507,652 22,277,380 25,369,687 
Ginned Cotton, bales 
of 400 lbs. each 
701,840 473,934 814,441 
Bushels of Sweet 
Potatoes 
6,508,541 2,621,562 4,397,778 
Cane Sugar, hhds. Of 
1000 lbs. each 
1,167 644 601 
Cane Molasses, 
gallons of. 
546,749 553,192 1,565,784 
Value of Animals 
Slaughtered. 
$10,908,204 $6,854,382 XXX 
Total Number of 
Farms 
62,003 69,956 136,626 
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